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Perceptions of the bilateral security relationship between the United States and
Japan are beginning to depart the post-war nonn. Japan's economic competition is
beginning to be seen by some in the United States as a greater threat to U. S. national
security than the traditional threat of Soviet expansionism. A difference in fundamental
values between the United States and Japan may exacerbate these diverging views
during a period of dramatic East-West change. This thesis proposes that the U.S. and
Japan re-examine their bilateral security relationship and replace it with a formal,
rational division of burden and decision sharing by allocating primary areas of security
responsibility in Asia within the alliance. It proposes that Japanese naval forces assume
primary responsibility of stability and peace in Northeast Asia while the United States
continues primary responsibility of stability and peace in the vital sea lanes of
communication in the Indian Ocean and South China Seas. The flexibility of this
strategy would permit coping with the uncertainty of United States-U.S.S.R. relations
until the success or failure of Soviet reforms can be ascertained. Also, a revised
security arrangement between the United States and Japan would diminish the prospects
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United States foreign policy appears to be approaching a third epoch of strategy
in Asia this century. Beginning with the first period, in 1900 the United States
promoted an "Open Door" policy tailored to the requirements of a rising power seeking
an equitable position in a multi-power world. However, this policy failed to prevent
a single power from gaining hegemony in Asia and was a precursor to war between
the United States and Japan. In the second period formulated after World War JJ, the
United States followed a policy of "Containment" to deter the expansion of the
U.S.S.R. and P.R.C.. NSC 68 provided the security framework that allowed Japan,
South Korea, and Taiwan to develop and prosper with the ultimate goal that they
would generate amenable political, social, and economic values, along with military
self-sufficiency, promoting stability and security in the region. 1 As our Asian allies
have increased in economic stature in contrast to the perceived relative decline in threat
from the P.R.C. and U.S.S.R., the very success of containment has brought into
question the necessity and cost of maintaining the second grand strategy.
'John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment (New York, N.Y.: Oxford
University Press, 1982), pp. 98, 99, states, "NSC-68 defined containment as an effort
by all means short of war to block further expansion of Soviet power. ..(and) foster the
seeds of destruction within the Soviet system...that the Kremlin is brought at least to
the point of modifying its behavior to confonn to generally accepted international
standards." To ensure this goal, "United States strength would have to be sufficient to
provide an adequate defense against attack on the United States... (and among other
areas) the Western Pacific. ..and on the long lines of communication to those areas."
In the late 1980s the United States debates what new strategy, if any, should
guide foreign policy, and consequently, military force structure. As the United States
proceeds into the Twenty First Century the nation should develop a strategy in Asia
which protects and promotes American values and interests, maximizes U.S. assets yet
is attuned to domestic fiscal and regional political restraints in the exercise of power,
and recognizes the convergent/divergent interests and mutually beneficial assets of our
allies, namely Japan, to achieve objectives in the region. The United States and Japan
should restructure a security alliance which recognizes the possible political trends of
the world in the 1990s:
• A "beyond-containment" world that is evolving toward an international system
of multiple power centers.
Continued economic turmoil and possible political instability in the U.S.S.R. and
P.R.C. as these nations attempt to resolve the contradictions of implementing
economic and political reforms while maintaining "democratic centralism" to
further single party rule.
• Increasing pressure within the United States for fiscal responsibility and global
economic competitiveness which may require an adjustment of security
commitments.
Japan's conventional armed forces will reach parity, in a maritime aspect, with
those of the Soviet Far East in the 1990s. Therefore, Japanese-U.S.S.R. relations
may become increasingly antagonistic.
This thesis discusses the option of a strategy of increased security alliance with
Japan. The U.S. goals of this alliance should be: 1) the continued stability and
prosperity of the region, 2) relieving the United States from the task of full
conventional security responsibility in the region, moving toward one of equal
partnership with Japan, and 3) preventing hegemony by another power that may restrict
economic access and influence in Asia for the United States. This strategy would not
prevent the United States from unilaterally defending U.S. national interests in Asia.
A. UNITED STATES NATIONAL SECURITY IN NORTHEAST ASIA
The United States allies and friends, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, are
testaments to the success of containment in Northeast Asia after World War II. To
implement this strategy of containment, the United States deployed military forces
forward, as necessary, to help deter and contain communist expansion. This military
capability to secure lines of communications enabled the United States to project power
in Asia advancing U. S. and allied interests. 2
United States economic supremacy after World War II easily supported the
military force structure to defend commitments in Northeast Asia. However, the United
States recent relative decline in economic supremacy, vis-a-vis our allies rebuilding
after the war, has created concern over the validity of maintaining the security status
quo. 3 Some scholars, such as Paul Kennedy, predict a possible decline of U. S. global
supremacy as a result of "imperial overreach," while others, such as Samuel
Huntington, proclaim the United States, while in relative decline compared to the
1950s, is the only nation capable of meeting all the requirements of world leadership
Donald Reagan, National Security Strategy of the United States (Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988), pp. 1, 2.
3Asian Wall Street Journal , 16 August 1988, p. 10, reports that in 1950 the U.S.
share of world reserves was fifty percent, while in 1988 it had diminished to less than
nine percent.
well into the next century.
4 The crucial importance of economic competitiveness as an
integral component of U.S. national security policy, while admitted, is beyond the
scope of this thesis and will not be addressed in detail. Nevertheless, the current reality
is that the United States has entered a period of fiscal restraint in defense spending-
during a period of economic growth-to reduce the fiscal deficit. This reduction may
continue, and even increase, in the 1990s if the economy ends consecutive years of
expansion and recession forces negative growth in defense outlays. The danger of this
scenario of a relative U. S. economic weakness and an unwillingness to make structural
changes in alliances before economic turmoil could lead to rash Congressional actions
on troop withdrawals and force structure cuts. 5 In other words, U.S. defense policy and
force structure may become based solely on economic priorities rather than a balanced
security strategy.
A continued reduction in U.S. Navy force structure, a high possibility during the
Bush Administration given the budget crisis and warming of U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations,
may place naval deployments in Asia at greater risk as current commitments continue
with fewer resources. 6 If commitments are reduced risk may also increase since fewer
"Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (New York, N.Y.: Random
House, 1987), and Samuel Huntington, "Coping with the Lippman Gap," Foreign
Affairs , Vol. 66, No. 3, 1988.
'James Chace, "A New Grand Strategy," Foreign Policy , Spring 1988, p. 4.
6Frank C. Carlucci, Annual Report to the Congress FY 1989 (Washington D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988), p. 191 states sixteen frigates were cut from
the Navy by fiscal reasons. This has been followed with a cut of an additional thirty
three destroyers and frigates from the active Navy by SECDEF Cheney in FY 90.
Unfortunately, according to Mr. Carlucci in Defense 88 , May-June, p. 22, construction
of new combatants will not keep pace with these cuts, increasing risk for U.S. security.
ships will deploy to the Western Pacific to secure lines of communication necessary
to defend U.S. and allied interests. A lowered force structure compels remaining
military units to function at an unacceptable level of combat capability for a global war
scenario, i.e., sequential operations in successive theaters will become necessary, with
the risk and uncertainty that approach takes. 7 A global war between the United States
and U.S.S.R. seems increasingly improbable as the 1980s come to a close. However,
the United States must be prepared for a possible hard-line backlash and dismissal of
Gorbachev's reforms in the 1990s. Additionally, U.S. security strategy must be able to
deal with all nations capable of severely threatening U.S. interests, no matter their
stated intentions. Conflicts in multiple theaters at the same time would not necessarily
require Soviet participation, i.e., the Persian Gulf and Korean peninsula. The United
States inability to secure sea lanes of communication and project power in Asia during
the period of the "open door" policy placed U.S. interests in an undefendable position
and failed to deter war. Post-war U.S. strategy has provided for flexibility and
sufficient application of force to ensure that no area of vital interest is lost by default. 8
During this period of force structure reduction several U. S. vital interests in Asia
remain.
First, the Arabian Gulf region, with fifty-five percent of the world's proven oil
reserves, is a vital interest and critical to the economic health of the free world. The
United States has maintained a naval presence in the Gulf since 1949. Three
administrations, including the present, have committed the United States to ensure the
7Reagan, previously cited, p. 39.
"Carlucci, Annual Report to the Congress FY 89, previously cited, p. 57.
critical lines of communication in Southwest Asia remain secure. 9 Northeast Asian
reliance, especially Japan's, on Middle Eastern oil was a primary consideration in the
U. S. decision to escort oil in a "de facto" war zone. This act of world leadership to
bring stability in the Gulf played a key role in ending the Tanker War and contributed
to the cease-fire between Iran and Iraq. However, while European allies eventually
responded to U. S. leadership by deploying combatants in the region, Asian allies,
especially Japan, contributed little. 10
Concern over the Gulf will remain in the future. Of all the possible scenarios for
war on the Soviet periphery, it would be more in the Soviet favor if they attacked the
Arabian Gulf area. It is assumed they would never attack in the Gulf region alone-
an unwarranted assumption." However, it is not necessary to assume reckless Russian
expansionism producing a calculated initiative to cut energy supply lines. Confrontation
could come from an escalation crisis that begins, for example, with an inconclusive
radical coup in Saudi Arabia. The Gulf is an area which U.S. economic concerns are
most directly linked with security planning. United States interests in Northeast Asia
'Michael H. Armacost, "US Policy in the Persian Gulf and Kuwaiti Reflaging,"
Current Policy , No. 978, U.S. Department of State, pp. 1, 2. See also Reagan,
previously cited, p. 29.
10For example, the author served aboard a cruiser homeported in Japan which was
one of the first ships dispatched into the Gulf after the Stark incident and consequently
participated in the first nine "Ernest Will" convoy missions. While the cruiser departed
Japan to escort tankers, many of which were destined to Japan, the JMSDF sent ships
of an "Escort Flotilla" on a world tour making port visits in Pearl Harbor and San
Diego. Japan did donate a $10 million navigational system, equal to the cost of ten
days U.S.N, presence in the Gulf.
"The Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy, Discriminate Deterrence
(Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988), p. 23.
can only be appreciated in terms of the larger area.' 2 Certainly, secure lines of
communication in Southwest Asia will remain a vital interest well into the 21st
Century as world demand for oil continues to grow and as reserves elsewhere
dwindle. 13
Second, peace on the Korean Peninsula is vital to Northeast Asian security. The
only "hot" vestige of the "cold war," armed conflict in Korea may be improbable just
as much as keeping the peace there may be unpredictable. Certainly a conflict on the
peninsula would damage the well-earned economic development and increasing trends
for democracy in South Korea, favorable forces for regional stability. Additionally, war
on the peninsula without an United States commitment could induce a Japanese
response of unknown proportions. Likewise, a dramatic total removal of U. S. military
forces from the peninsula may induce one, or both, of the Korean governments to
develop an independent nuclear arms capability, causing a dramatic reappraisal of
Japanese defense requirements. 14 Consequently, the United States is determined to stand
with South Korea in preserving the common defense. 13 However, this traditional
commitment to the Republic of Korea, represented by the presence of 40,000 soldiers
and airmen of the U.S. 8th Anny and 5th Air Force, is coming under increasing
review. The question now heard in Congress is, why should the United States continue
12Richard K. Betts, "Washington, Tokyo, and N.E. Asian Security," The Journal
of Strategic Studies , Vol. 6, No. 4, December 1983, pp. 7, 9.
1S
U.S. Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power 1989 (Washington, D. C:
U.S. Government Printing Agency, 1989), p. 120.
14
Franklin B. Weinstein, "U.S. -Japanese Relations and the Fallacies of Burden
Sharing," Pacific Community , October 1977, Vol. 9, No. 1, p. 6.
15Carlucci, Defense 88, previously cited, p. 9.
a presence in Korea nearly four decades after the Korean War while the United States
finds itself in a $10 billion trade imbalance with South Korea? 16 Also, it appears South
Korea, by virtue of its superior economy, has required Kim Il-Sung to spend up to
twenty-five percent of GNP on defense to keep pace with the R.O.K.. For example, the
Roh Tae Woo government spent "only" six percent of GNP on defense even though
the South out spent the North by $6.2 billion to $3.9 billion in 1987. ,7 Military
modernization and a strong economy in the Republic of Korea makes long-term
prospects on the peninsula favorable. ,R Therefore, increasing anti-Americanism, R.O.K.
nationalism, and the safety and cost of tens of thousands of military dependents located
in Seoul, a mere twenty-five miles from the DMZ, make it highly probable some form
of reduced presence in South Korea is in the future interest of the United States. 19 The
United States commitment to peace in Korea may change in structure, but not in
essence, until a peaceful resolution on the peninsula is reached.
Third, Japan is the keystone to U.S. security interests in Asia. Cooperation and
convergent interests with Japan remains basic to U.S. relationships in the region. 20 The
two nations produce almost forty percent of the world's GNP and half of the world's
overseas development assistance (ODA). Global economic growth and prosperity will
16Far Eastern Economic Review , 12 May 1988, p. 25. (Hereafter referred to as
FEER).
'The Economist , "Survey South Korea," 21 May 1988, p. 12
'"Carlucci, Annual Report to the Congress FY 89, previously cited, p. 35.
19New York Times , 21 October 1988, p. A4, reports President Reagan stated
reduction is a "possibility should tensions wane."
20Reagan, previously cited, p. 30.
remain highly dependent on U.S. and Japanese economic and technological
achievements for the foreseeable future. 21 Economic interdependence between the United
States and Japan makes security of Northeast Asia imperative. For example, nine out
of ten of the world's largest commercial banks are Japanese. Japan is the worlds
leading creditor nation, holding roughly $500 billion in overseas assets in 1987, and
the Tokyo stock exchange total capitalization exceeds the N.Y. stock exchange. 22 Japan
is a vital co-leader of the world economic system, and as such, has convergent interests
with the United States in maintaining the current international order. The United States
finds in Japan a market for eleven percent of U.S. exports ($28 billion), including
almost seven billion in foodstuff-the world's best market for the U.S. agriculture. Thus,
Japan is a better market for U.S. exports than West Germany, France, and Italy
combined. In 1986 Japanese investors placed $65 billion into U.S. money markets,
reducing interest on the U.S. budget deficit. 23 In 1988 that figure had grown to $160
billion, with Japan financing approximately thirty percent of the U.S. deficit.
Japanese democracy should make for a favorable influence in the region as that
nation exercises more political power commensurate with economic status. Japan has
played a key role in providing capital in Asia, fueling growth, stability, and prosperity
2,Mike Mansfield, "The U.S. and Japan: Sharing Our Destinies," Foreign Affairs
,
Vol. 68, No. 2, 1989, pp. 3-5.
"Michael H. Armacost, "The U.S., Japan, and Asian Pacific Security in
Perspective," Current Policy , No. 974, U.S. Department of State, p. 2. Also, Chace,
previously cited, reports that Nomura Research Institute estimates Japanese overseas
assets will exceed $1 trillion by 1995.
"Will Clark Jr., "U.S.-Japanese Relations in Focus," Department of State Bulletin
,
April 1988, pp. 58, 59.
in the newly industrialized countries (NICs) of the region. Continued growth of the
NICs may well depend on the availability of open Japanese markets to absorb regional
exports.
24 Of most importance, Japan's consistent defense force growth may have a
significant impact on the conventional balance of power in Northeast Asia during the
1990s. This potential shift in the current conventional balance of power, based on a
"
modernization gap ," with the U.S.S.R. will be discussed in Chapter Three. Finally,
Japan depends on the nuclear umbrella of the United States to prevent blackmail and
coercion. As the United States approaches the 21st Century it would seem prudent to
restructure the United States-Japanese security relationship towards an alliance of
increased responsibility sharing and decision sharing. This could help increase the
credibility of achieving convergent interests and help reduce economic friction.
Fourth, the United States promotes the expansion of free markets and human
rights in the People's Republic of China (P.R.C.). A multi-power balance in Northeast
Asia depends on a stable, effective government in China to help prevent hegemony in
the region. 25 Thus, the United States has welcomed the significant contribution China
provides to regional stability, especially tension reduction in Korea and Indochina. 26 As
a consequence of recent democracy demonstrations, the future orientation of the P.R.C.
may be increasingly unpredictable, but in the long-run, a modern China can only come
about with increased personal freedoms, the free flow of information, and competing
24FEER, 8 June 1989, pp. 51-56.
"James Chace, previously cited, p. 17.
26Gaston Sigur, "East Asia and the Pacific: An Era of Opportunity," Current
Policy
.
No. 971, U.S. Department of State, p. 3.
10
ideas.
27 This was the essence of the Chinese people's demonstrations for free speech,
democracy, and removal of the back door, guanxi , corruption of the communist party. 28
As China's leading dissident, scientist Fang Li-Zhi, stated, "there can be no four
modernizations without a fifth one—democracy." During the largest demonstrations in
modem Chinese history, students at Tiananmen were quoting Patrick Henry, Lincoln,
and Martin Luther King, but little from Marx or Lenin. Thus, the United States has an
important role to play in supporting the human rights of the people of China. The
possibility of a freer China is real, and in the long-term, a far more reliable ally than
a geo-strategic relationship with a hard-line, totalitarian P.R.C.. A China which has
opened up to free markets and becomes increasingly Western via freedom of speech
and incremental democracy could alter the global balance in favor of those nations
which hold similar values. The intellectual elite of China may be just as ready for
democracy and increased personnal freedoms as their unprepared counterparts were in
East Europe. 29 As Gaston Sigur astutely observed, "rapid socio-economic modernization
juxtaposed with occasions for political succession may fuel popular pressures for
political reform within, increasing popular support for democratization at the expense
"Michael Armacost, "The U.S. in the Changing Asia of the 1990s," Current
Policy , No. 981, U.S. Department of State, p. 1, reports that if Chinese GNP growth
continues at 7%, by the year 2000 the PRC would be on par with the UK or France
as a trading nation. Without meeting popular demands, continued unrest or
disenchantment with the communist regime has appeared to lower this forecast.
"John King Fairbank, The Great Chinese Revolution, 1800-1985 (New York, N.Y.:
Harper and Row, 1987), p. 368.
"See "Helmsmen's Lost Bearings" and "Things Fall Apart, The Center Cannot
Hold" in FEER , 27 October 1988, for discussion of loss of legitimacy in the CCP,
economic warlordism, and increasing official corruption in China before the Tiananmen
demonstrations.
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of authoritarianism." 30 As the Chinese hard-line octogenarians pass away and the
economy compounds recent poor performance with a preference of "reds" over
"experts" in management, demands for democratic reforms may well return to
Tiananmen in the near-term. 31
Last, the United States has a vital stake in promoting democratic values and
institutions throughout Asia, along with an "open door" attitude towards commerce.32
This enhances the security of Northeast Asia. Such a policy fosters respect for law,
economic growth, stability and ability to resist subversion. This protects our own
security and prosperity as well as advancing our fundamental ideals. 33 Taiwan, South
Korea and the Philippines are examples of increasing democratization. The people of
China have shown the world that opposing tyranny is worth dying for; indeed, they
have reaffirmed our own core values expressed by the "Goddess of Democracy" statue
erected by Chinese students at Tiananmen. As the leader of the free world, the United
States should not deny the responsibility of assisting those who cry out for freedom
against tyranny. Asians have looked to the United States for protection of human
rights, demonstrated by the safe haven provided Ninoy Aquino, Kim Dae-Jung, and
30Gaston Sigur, "An East Asia-Pacific Prognosis: The Vital Signs are Strong,"
Strategic Review , Vol. XIV, No. 2, Spring 1986, p. 41.
31 United Press International Newswire , 1 October 1989, reports that Premier Li
Peng stated on the 40th Anniversary of communist rule that, "all schools should...give
top priority to steering a firm and correct political orientation."
32Walter S. Mossberg and John Walcott, "US Shifts Strategy on Security Policy,"
Asian Wall Street Journal , 6 August 1988, p. 1, reports that Mr. Bush remarked that,
"economic growth is now as much a matter of foreign policy as it is a monetary
policy."
"George Schultz, "Matching Foreign Policy Resources With Goals," Current
Policy , No. 992, U.S. Department of State, p. 3.
12
Fang Li-zhi. Turmoil in Southeast Asia will likely remain in the 1990s as the Khmer
Rouge remains a militant force in Cambodia and the behind-the-scenes dictatorship of
Ne Win in Burma continues in power. The United States has the duty as a world
leader to induce our wealthy allies in Northeast Asia to join in a multinational effort
in resolving these crisis areas.
The United States interests in Asia are many and likely to increase as the nation
enters the 21st Century. The basis for an expanding national interest in Northeast Asia
is also contingent on a shifting economic balance of power from the European theater
to the Far East. Over the past decade, East Asia has surpassed all other regions of the
world in economic development, GNP growth, and expansion of its share of
international trade. 34 In 1986 the United States transacted $219 billion in gross trade
with Asia, some seventy-five percent more gross trade than with Atlantic nations. 35
This creates a shifting balance of power with both new opportunities and new dangers
for U.S. security. The danger is based in the lack of an established geopolitical
alignment in Asia and no indigenous historical context (outside of the "tributary
system" of Imperial China) to look back to. 36 Also, only in Northeast Asia do four
major world powers, the United States, Japan, U.S.S.R., and P.R.C. have direct
interests. Consequently, many, like ex-Secretary of the Navy James Webb, have called
34Gaston Sigur, "East Asia and the Pacific: The Roads Behind and Ahead," Current
Policy , No. 1084, U.S. Department of State, pp. 2, 3. Thirty-five percent of US global
commerce is in Asia, surpassing all other regions.
35James H. Webb, Remarks to National Press Club , Washington D.C., 13 January
1988.
36James Chace, previously cited, p. 4.
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for an appropriate shift of U.S. interest and military posture towards Asia. For example,
in 1986 U.S. commitments in Asia cost $42 billion in the U.S. defense budget,
compared to $134 billion spent for the defense of Europe. 37 As Japan is the regional
economic power of Northeast Asia, a revised U.S. strategy, which takes into account
domestic fiscal restraints, should increase security ties based on convergent interests
and maximizing each other's national assets. As such, a new United States-Japan
security alliance should seek to enhance convergent interests based on a rational
division of security labor and power sharing. However, American-Japanese values may
differ at times regarding certain economic and political issues. As such, each nation
will ultimately seek those policies which promote their respective national interest. This
is to be expected among nations in a full-partnership alliance. The strength of any
alliance may ultimately be judged by the convergence of values over the long-term.
B. JAPANESE NATIONAL SECURITY IN NORTHEAST ASIA
Japan was totally exhausted from conflict at the completion of World War II.
Never before in Japanese history had destruction and despair so totally encompassed
the archipelago. To Japan's leaders who had terminated the war, the most important
issue was preserving Kokutai, or "national essence." 38 The importance of kokutai, and
relevance to Japan's national security today, will be discussed in Chapter Four. The
United States commenced the occupation of a surrendered enemy with great attention
directed towards the Japanese people. Their main objective was mere survival. At the
"Webb and Chace, both previously cited.
3SOdawara Atsushi, "No Tampering with the Brake on Military Expansion," Japan
Quarterly , Vol. XXXII, No. 3, 1985, p. 250.
14
height of Japan's food crisis (1946-47) it was believed that 10 million people would
starve. Gen. MacArthur rerouted food from the Philippines to Japan in order to reduce
suffering. Once the threat of mass starvation was checked, the United States
implemented NSC-13 in 1948 to bring about recovery of the Japanese economy and
strengthen the nation's resistance to communism. 39 To the Japanese, the threat became
apparent as the Kuomintang fled mainland China after being defeated by Mao Ze
Dong's 8th Route Army in 1949. In February, 1950, the threat was highlighted by a
Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance between Communist China and
the Soviet Union regarding Japan as their hypothetical enemy. The threat became real
with the outbreak of war in Korea on June 24, 1950. Upon regaining sovereignty in
1952, Japan concluded a Security Treaty with the United States. Japan viewed this as
not a mere military pact but as a high level political treaty covering military,
economic, and cultural fields, especially when it was revised in I960.40
Japan concentrated on "economics first" while the United States assumed total
responsibility for defending the islands. At first, the United States did not expect Japan
to develop the economic wherewithal to fully defend itself. Within Japan, constitutional
questions also hindered assuming full responsibility of defense. The constitution of
Japan will be examined in Chapter Four. Japan pursued a policy of seikei bunri to
further economic growth. This policy separated politics from economics regarding
39Hata JJkuhito, "The Postwar Period in Retrospect," Japan Echo , Vol. XI, Special
Issue, 1984, p. 14, mentions NSC-13 concluded that instead of throwing an unarmed
Japan in to the midst of the Cold War, a better policy would be to prolong the
occupation, preventing a weak Japan from facing communism.
40Kajima Morinosuke, Modern Japan's Foreign Policy (Rutland, Vt.: Charles E.
Turtle, 1970), pp. 77, 121, 122.
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foreign trade. Japan's exports were largely directed to Southeast Asia until the mid-
1960s when the production of high quality, inexpensive products began to penetrate the
U.S. market. 41
Japan's export-oriented foreign policy, U. S. security assistance, and the diligence
of the Japanese people produced an "economic boom" in the 1960s that exploded into
today's "economic superstate." However, total reliance on economics as the basis of
foreign policy began to receive Japanese review after the United States withdrew from
Vietnam, the proclamation of the "Nixon Doctrine," and the achievement of
conventional and nuclear parity with the United States by the U.S.S.R. during the years
of detente in the 1970s. The era of Pax Americana in Asia had come to a close. Prime
Minister Ohira announced a "Comprehensive National Security" policy in 1979 that
stressed more self-reliant efforts, strengthening U.S.-Japanese alliance relations,
expanding contacts with the U.S.S.R. and P.R.C., and emphasizing diplomacy in
securing food and energy supplies. 42
Comprehensive security, in short, relied primarily on political and economic
means, in addition to military self-strengthening, to protect Japan's national interests.
In the 1980s the Japanese government began to increase defense expenditures to meet
the guidelines of the 1976 National Defense Program Outline (NDPO). 43 While these
4,
Hata, previously cited, p. 21, reports that in 1960, S.E. Asia received 33.5% of
Japan's exports.
42
Robert W. Barnett, Beyond War: Japan's Comprehensive National Security Policy
(Mclean, Va.: Brasseys, 1984).
43Frank Langdon, "The Security Debate in Japan," Pacific Affairs , Vol. 58, No. 3,
1985, pp. 399-401. The Comprehensive Security group had recommended an annual
increase of twenty percent in defense spending, but the government settled for an
16
expenditures will acquire the force structure recommended in the NDPO to provide the
required, stated minimum to defend Japan from low-scale aggression by 1990, Japan
has contributed little to international and regional security outside of foreign aid. This
"minimalist" foreign policy has been criticized as a "cheap ride" on one hand, to a
policy that is unbecoming of a nation-state on the other hand. Congress has passed
resolutions calling for the Japanese to spend at least three percent of GNP on
security.
44 While frictions between the United States and Japan in economic matters
rise, the security relationship is also coming under increased scrutiny from both sides.
As the United States-Japanese relationship appears to be heading into new waters,
Japanese national interests are extremely similar to U.S. interests.
The paramount Japanese interest, a vital one, is to secure access to resources and
markets for exports. The nation is heavily dependent upon food and raw materials
imported from all over the world.45 A disruption of the free-flow of commerce would
have severe consequences on the well-being of Japan. No nation has so much to lose
from a break-down of the current international order of free trade. For example, fifty-
five percent of Japan's oil passes through the strait of Hormuz. At any one time up
to twenty Japanese owned or operated tankers are in the Gulf. 46 Over eighty percent
average six percent increase.
44Richard L. Armitage, "Our Security Role in Asia and the Pacific," Defense 88 ,
May-June 1988, p. 31.
45Martin E. Weinstein, "Trade Problems and US-Japanese Security," The
Washington Quarterly , Winter 1988, pp. 26, 27. Japan depends on foreign sources for
87% of energy, 98.6% of iron ore, 95% of copper. 82% of lead, and 100% of
aluminum and nickel resources.
4(The Economist , 7 November 1987, p. 40. Seven Japanese tankers were attacked
in the Gulf during 1986. Oil comprises 60% of Japan's energy.
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of Japan's oil and LPG imports pass through the Malacca strait. This extreme reliance
on foreign resources is equally matched with the eighty-five percent of Japan's exports
which are sea-borne.47 The primary destination of Japan's exports is, of course, the
United States, which receives approximately thirty-eight percent. As mentioned before,
Japanese investment overseas has reached such an unprecedented level that virtually no
area of the globe is without some degree of interest to Japan. Consequently, regional
stability promotes the security of the $1 trillion that the Japanese will have invested
overseas by 1995.
The second vital interest to Japan is peace on the Korean peninsula. This has
been a historical interest based on simple geography. Japan was willing to go to war
with Imperial China, and then Imperial Russia, over influence in Korea to ensure that
no threat neared the home islands. Prime Minister Sato stated in the joint Nixon-Sato
communique of 1969 that security of the Republic of Korea is "essential" to Japan's
security. 48 Despite this traditional interest in Korea, Japan declines to directly contribute
to the security of the Republic of Korea, outside of financial assistance, for
Constitutional reasons. Japan's foreign policy of neglect, when it concerns the military
defense of Korea, lessens the United States ability to maintain a credible security
posture on the peninsula. Unlike NATO, where allies are willing to share the burden
of a common defense, the United States would likely find no initial or direct assistance
from Japan if the D.P.R.K. attacked the R.O.K.. This diminishes the prospects of the
47Tsuneo Akaha, "Japan's Response to Threats of Shipping Disruption in S.E. Asia
and the Middle East," Pacific Affairs , Summer 1986, pp. 356-364.
48Hong Nack Kim, "Japan's Korea Policy in the Post-Seoul Olympic Era," Korean
Observer , Vol. XIX, No. 3, Autumn 1989, p. 245.
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the U.S. public supporting military intervention in Korea during a conflict while Japan
awaited the outcome. However, the United States should not assume that since Japan
has no declared defense strategy regarding Korean security that an undeclared,
indigenous strategy does not exits. The Republic of Korea, United States and Japan
have convergent interests in preserving the peace on the peninsula, yet only the latter
is willing to forego a stated commitment of military assistance if aggression occurs.
Since Japanese security is directly linked with security of the Korean peninsula,
Japan hopes for "peaceful coexistence" on the peninsula and desires cross-recognition
of the two Koreas by the four powers (Japan, U.S., U.S.S.R., and P.R.C.). This would
reduce tensions, introduce both nations into the U.N., and pave the way for peaceful
reunification. However, Prime Minister Nakasone's proposal for a four power
conference (U.S., P.R.C., D.P.R.K., and R.O.K.) was rejected by Beijing.49 Meanwhile,
Japan has shown keen interest in Soviet diplomatic maneuvers and policies on both
sides of the 38th parallel. Concerning the D.P.R.K., Japan has been alarmed by the
Soviet's transfer of large quantities of modem military equipment to the Kim Il-Sung
regime, including MIG-23, SU-25, and MIG-29 aircraft, and also SA-5 missiles.50 The
SA-5 system has a range covering Seoul's Kimpo international airport. Even though
the D.P.R.K. may prefer to be independent of the U.S.S.R., Japan has tried to dilute
Soviet influence in the North via trade with Pyongyang. 51 Japan has also enticed the
49Kim, previously cited, pp. 245, 246.
50Janes Defense Weekly , 3 September 1988, p.4.
5IEdward Olsen, "Keeping North Korea out of Soviet Hands," FEER, 14 May
1987, pp. 40, 41. Prof. Olsen points out North Korean desires to unify Korea on its
own terms would be constrained by Moscow if it became "Finlandised."
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D.P.R.K. to assume a moderate political foreign policy in exchange for economic
incentives of increased trade. Prior to the Seoul Olympics, Tokyo and Seoul offered
Pongyang economic ties with an implicit understanding that peaceful behavior during
the games would be rewarded. The United States followed those initiatives by easing
restrictions on travel and limited trade to the D.P.R.K.. 52 Pyongyang allowed the
Olympics to occur without an incident, but has done little else to ease tensions and
match R.O.K., U.S., and Japanese diplomatic initiatives. Joint ventures and increased
trade is limited by the D.P.R.K. 's default on numerous Japanese loans. Moreover,
Kim's dictatorship rejects glasnost, perestroika, and continually expresses a deep hatred
for Japan. Soviet moves on the peninsula, especially military-related efforts, will
continue to attract Japanese national security interest.
South Korea is increasing economic ties with North Korea's ideological
supporters, the U.S.S.R. and P.R.C.. The R.O.K. has promoted economic transactions
with the communist giants via third parties, hoping to loosen their ideological ties with
the D.P.R.K. in exchange for capitalist ventures with the R.O.K. . Trade with the P.R.C.
stands at $2-3 billion annually. 53 East European trade offices in Seoul are seen as
providing the opportunity for eventual official Soviet trade leading to possible
normalized political relations.54 Poland and Hungary have already diplomatically
recognized South Korea. Clearly, both the P.R.C. and U.S.S.R. can use R.O.K.
"New York Times , 1 November 1988, p. 1.
53FEER . 8 September 1988, p. 83.
54
"South Korea Nears Trade Pact," The Asian Wall Street Journal , 18 October
1988, p. 3.
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technology and capital in joint ventures to help their respective modernization efforts.
In return, South Korea is receiving de facto recognition from Moscow and Beijing,
hoping such economic ties will force Pyongyang to "open up" and join the relaxing of
tensions between East and West. However, Japan's role in contributing to Korean
reunification is limited by historical animosity. The legacy of Japanese colonialism in
Korea continues to impede Korean-Japanese relations. The legal status of 700,000
ethnic Koreans living in Japan and the question of Japanese reparations for Koreans
residing in Sakhalin remains a central issue between the governments. 55 Japanese efforts
at "internationalization," and assuming a larger political status in the region may be
hindered without a resolution of Japanese responsibility towards non-Japanese who are
or were members of the Japanese nation.
Stability in China is very important to Japanese interests. President Nixon's 1972
trip to Peking, playing the "China card" to counterbalance Soviet moves in Europe, was
followed with a visit to the People's Republic by Prime Minister Tanaka to
counterbalance Soviet moves in Asia. Subsequently, a Treaty of Peace and Friendship
was signed between Beijing and Tokyo in 1978. It including a statement against "anti-
hegemony" in the region. This codeword for anti-Soviet expansion brought fears in
Moscow of a Tokyo-Beijing entente on their eastern borders in conjunction with NATO
in the west. Some scholars believe this warming of Japanese-Chinese ties hardened the
Soviet position on the Kuriles. Deployment of SS-20s also may have been a further
"Foreign Broadcast Information Service , 17 August 1989, p. 36, reports the ROK
has asked the Japanese government to assist in the relocation of Koreans residing in
Sakhalin. These Koreans were under the jurisdiction of the Japanese Empire prior to
World War II.
Soviet reaction to diminish a possible Tokyo-Beijing alliance.56 The United States
reassertion as a power in Asia during the Reagan years has partially altered Sino-
Japanese relations. A dramatic U.S. military buildup combined with a new strategy
emphasizing horizontal escalation in the Pacific, relieved China's security concerns of
encirclement by the U.S.S.R.. No longer feeling the full threat of Soviet hegemony,
Beijing has refocused political attention on Tokyo. The P.R.C. has chided Japan
politically while at the same time desiring economic aid and assistance. Deng Hsiao-
Ping's refusal to meet Japan's Defense Agency Director Kurihara Yuko, when he
visited China in 1987, was not received well in Japan." Continuing flaps over Japanese
revisions of its account of Japan's role as an aggressor in the Pacific War have been
met with Chinese consternation. 58 Cabinet Minister Okuno Seisuke was forced to resign
in 1988 after China protested his view of history, and even Prime Minister Takeshita
Naboru retracted statements concerning the war after offending the Chinese. Such
actions do little to further Sino-Japanese relations.
Mainland China has vast potential for economic growth, and is a close market
for Japanese exports. To develop this market, the P.R.C. has been Japan's principle
ODA recipient since 1982.59 Besides economic reasons, the P.R.C. has considerable
"Richard H. Solomon and Masataka Kosaka, ed., The Soviet Far Eastern Military
Buildup: Nuclear Dilemmas and Asian Security (Dover. Ma.: Auburn House, 1986), p.
146.
"Defense and Foreign Affairs , October-November 1987, p. 54.
58Yu Wen, "Okuno Seeks to Reverse Verdict of War," Beiing Review , 9-15 May
1988, p. 13.
59Robert M. Orr, "The Rising Sun: Japan's Foreign Aid to ASEAN, the Pacific
Basin, and the ROK," Journal of Northeast Asian Studies . Spring 1986, p. 39.
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influence on the Korean peninsula and Southeast Asia, areas of great concern to Japan.
A potential power struggle after the death of Deng Hsiao-Ping that leads to an extreme
leftist hard-line regime in China would have profound implications for Japanese
security. A leftist hard-line regime, adhering to strict Marxism, would close the "open
door" to Western capital and have fewer restraints in the conduct of foreign policy. For
example, the future status of Taiwan has immense importance to Japan. A forceful take
over attempt of the Republic of China by the P.R.C. would certainly indicate an
aggressive, radical foreign policy by the mainland which could threaten vital lines of
communications which pass through the Bashi Channel separating the R.O.C. and the
Philippines. A hard-line regime that adopts a "Maoist" foreign policy reemphasizing
revolution in Southeast Asia may be a worst-case scenario, but a hard-line government
in Beijing that was willing to ignore international condemnation regarding the June 3rd
1989 massacre may also be willing to sacrifice restraint regarding Taiwan's
"reunification with the mainland." Taiwan's dramatic economic growth has deepened
the social contradictions between the two countries, lowering the prospects for future
reunification. This trend may become increasingly ominous unless the P.R.C. renounces
the "four conditions" to use forceful reunification. 60
Democracy demonstrations and subsequent hard-line approach have not diminished
Japan's long-tenn economic interest with China. After the Tiananmen massacre Japan
^etts, previously cited, p. 51, mentions, "over the long-run, the most probable
point of inflammation (in Asia) is Taiwan. Terminating the formal commitment to
defend Taipei was facilitated by the judgement the mainland lacks a capability to attack
the island. This could change." The P.R.C. s stated four conditions to allow for a
forceful reunification are, 1) Taiwan becoming a nuclear power, 2) Taiwan declaring
independence, i.e. Republic of Taiwan, 3) Taiwan concluding a military pact with the
U.S.S.R., and 4) an extraordinary time to reach reunification.
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was the first Western nation willing to resume economic relations in a "business as
usual" manner. However, China's economic direction is presently uncertain. Beijing is
debating over expanding reform or revision, and this places Japanese investment at a
disadvantage. 61 Japanese economic projects are hesitant on expanding without knowing
if the Chinese economy will become increasingly planned by communist cadres or
follow the laws of supply and demand. Also, certain pro-democracy elements in China
have regarded Japanese economic policy as leaning towards economic domination and
supportive of the Deng-Peng-Jiang regime. Death threats directed at Japanese economic
circles in China by dissidents must surely remind all parties concerned of the May 4th
movement and subsequent anti-Japanese economic boycotts in the 1920s. 62 Instability
in China not only threatens Japanese economic interests but security interests as well.
As a consequence of China's turmoil and the unpredictability of the final status of the
current regime, Japan has a necessary role as a decision-maker in promoting peace in
Northeast Asia.
Southeast Asia has been a traditional source of resources and markets for Japan.
Large quantities of commerce pass through the waters of Southeast Asia with some
form of economic link to Japan. Indonesia, Malaysia, and Brunei supply Japan with
about twenty-five percent of its oil and large sums of tin and aluminum. 63 In return,
6,
see Nicholas Kristoff, "Beijing's Course: A Fractured Party Spinning in Circles
Without Direction," New York Times , 1 November 1989, p. A7.
"New York Times , 22 June 1989, p. 11.
63Sheldon W. Simon, "Is There a Japanese Regional Security Role," Journal of
Northeast Asian Studies
.
Summer 1986, pp. 31, 47. Mr. Simon states forty-four percent
of ships in Malaccan straits over 30,000 tons are Japanese.
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ASEAN states have been receiving over half of their bilateral ODA from Japan to
develop their economies (roughly thirty to thirty-five percent of Japan's total aid). This
aid has been labeled the "New Asian Industries Development Plan" by MITI Minister
Hajime Tamura in January, 1987, focusing on more assistance in the development of
export industries. 64 Economic growth not only provides stability, but also a larger
market for high-value Japanese exports. Thus, development of Southeast Asia promotes
Japanese security. For example, Japanese aid to the Philippines exceeds that of the
United States, and for good reason. The Philippines border the crucial Bashi Channel
that funnels sea-borne commerce to Japan. As the Philippine Islands continue to display
economic and political disorder, Japan's interests are likely to increase as U.S. base
rights at Subic Bay and Clark field appear less certain. 65
Japan's Foreign Ministry in 1986 stated, "Japan's international responsibilities are
growing as the United States declines from the position of dominant economic power."
A Japanese sense of responsibility in Southeast Asia is growing among Japanese
government and academic circles, much like the way the United States views Latin
America. 66 Japan has begun to assert a more visible foreign policy in the region. For
example, Japan claims to represent Asian states during international conferences of
Western powers, such as the group of seven, and also attempted to influence the Ne
^Orr, previously cited, pp. 42-50.
"Edward A. Olsen, "Determinants of Strategic Burden Sharing in East Asia," US
Naval War College Review , May-June 1986. Prof. Olsen commented that if the US
relinquishes bases in the Philippines and the Soviets coopt them. "Tokyo would be
faced with regional instability."
66Hiaoko Yamane, "Japan as an Asian-Pacific Power," Asian Survey
.
Vol. XXVII,
No. 12, December 1987, pp. 1303, 1305.
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Win regime in Burma by linking reform as a condition to continued aid. 67 As Burma
receives the majority of its foreign aid from Japan, the Japanese were capable of
exerting a measure of influence beyond other nations during the popular revolt crisis
in 1988. Japan's attempt to assist reform in Burma failed, however, and that nation
remains in a precarious position of economic stagnation and police-state rule.
Nonetheless, given the vast potential Burma has since it is blessed with abundant
natural resources, Japan may yet play a key role in rebuilding Burma after political
reform takes place.
Japan's emergence in a more activist foreign policy may soon take place in
Cambodia. The removal of Vietnamese troops from foreign soil in Indochina may lead
to reduced tensions and promote economic development throughout the region. To
assist in ensuring a peaceful resolution in Indochina, and preventing civil war and a
return to power of Pol Pot in Cambodia, Japan announced in July, 1984 at the ASEAN
Foreign Ministers Conference it would: 1) contribute to expenses of peace keeping
activities, 2) provide personnel for an internationally supervised election, and 3) grant
economic assistance to the countries of Indochina.68 If this policy is actually
implemented, Japanese standing in the region would increase dramatically while
removing the old fears that stimulated anti-Japanese riots in the region during the
67Margaret Shapiro, "Once Shunned, Japan is Again a Giant in Asia," Washington
Post
.
14 October 1988, pp. Al, A32. Ms. Shapiro points out that at the Toronto
economic summit in 1988, Prime Minister Takeshita took the role of Asia's advocate
on issues from protectionism to the Seoul Olympics. Also, Ms. Shapiro states Japan
attempted to force the authoritarian government of Burma to make some economic
reforms.
6RSuedo Sudo, "Japan-ASEAN Relations," Asian Survey , Vol. XXVHI, No. 5, May
1988, p. 519.
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1970s. The Director General of Japan's Defense Agency emphasized, during the JDA's
first official visit to Southeast Asia in 1988, that Japan is now a nation to be trusted. 69
If Cambodia returns to a state of war, leading to another Khmer Rouge regime, then
Japanese policy, or lack of policy, centering on resolving conflict in Southeast Asia
will be closely monitored by ASEAN nations as a gauge of Japanese leadership.
Relations with the United States hold a key position in Japan's national security.
The economic, military, and political relationship between the nations is crucial to the
continued prosperity of Japan. Americans also are coming to realize the importance of
Japan to U.S. security, especially in economic matters. As former Ambassador Mike
Mansfield has frequently stated, "The most important relationship in the world-bar
none-is that between the United States and Japan." 70 Despite economic and defense
frictions, the strategic relationship Japan has with the United States is far more
beneficial to Japanese interests than a scrapped alliance and a neutralist policy. Japan
and the United States agree on matters of foreign policy importance, such as China,
Korea, and IndoChina. 71 Furthennore, at current defense expenditures, Japan is
becoming increasingly able to unilaterally guarantee vital national security interests
outside of the nuclear realm. In particular, the safe passage of resources and trade
along the sea lanes of communication in the Far East is not beyond the capabilities of
69Michael Richardson, "Japan and the Soviet Union Extend Their Influence,"
Pacific Defense Reporter , August 1988, p. 20. Defense Agency Chief Kuwara asked
Singapore and Indonesia to cooperate in assuring the safety of Japanese ships through
the Malacca straits.
70
Mansfield, previously cited, p. 15.
7, Sato Seizaburo, "Appraising the Japan-US Partnership," Japan Echo , Vol. XV,
No. 3, 1988, p. 39.
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Japan's Self-Defense Forces in the 1990s. Japan's maritime build-up will be a
addressed in Chapter Three. Japan's previous dependence on the United States to
provide an anzen hosho , security guarantee, that ensures access to the world's markets
via the SLOCs is receiving increasing criticism on both sides of the Pacific. The U.S.
insists upon more burden sharing from Japan, while Japanese are demanding a less
ideological, more equitable decision making process concerning security policy in the
Pacific. 72 For the continued prosperity of the alliance between Japan and the United
States an adjustment of the security relationship seems in order. A security
readjustment which provides economic relief to the United States (so that it may direct
more resources to promote economic competitiveness) could set the framework for
closer cooperation between the United States and Japan in the decades to come. This
strategy will be addressed in Chapter Five.
Among the major powers, only relations between Japan and the Soviet Union
continue to be in a strained and uncompromising state. Despite perestroika and
unilateral Soviet arms cuts, Japanese-Soviet relations may not follow the general East-
West trend of lowered tensions. Because of geography, historical animosity, differing
but related security interests, and a possible shift in the conventional balance of
military power between them, these two nations may become antagonistic in the
coming decade and beyond, discussed in the next two chapters. Therefore, U.S. security
72Susan Chira, "Japan Ready to Share Burden, But Also Power, With US," New
York Times
. 7 May 1989, p. A4. Ms. Chira quoted Mr. Makato Kuroda, fonner top
trade negotiator for Japan, as saying, "Burden sharing is the other side of the coin of
power sharing."
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policy in Northeast Asia during the 1990s may not be soley founded on a strategy
dealing with a United States-Soviet confrontation.
29
H. JAPANESE AND SOVIET RELATIONS
International relations appear to have reached a post-war record of reduced
tensions as the 1980s come to a close. Withdrawal of Soviet, or Soviet-sponsored,
armed forces from Cambodia, Afghanistan, and Angola reverses the temporary
territorial gains Moscow achieved in the 1970s during the United States retrenchment
after Vietnam. The Reagan Administration's policy of rebuilding U.S. military might
and a willingness to support "freedom fighters" eager to "roll back" recent communist
take overs has been successful. However, part of the success is derived from the failure
of central planning to revive stagnant economies in communist countries. Following the
People's Republic of China's example, the Soviet Union seeks negotiation and dialogue
to provide a period of peace in order to mend their economic order without
maintaining an amis race. Mikhail Gorbachev has gone beyond Deng Hisao-Ping's
policy of opening China to Western capital, by appealing to the West for a new
international order beyond the Cold War. The West should remember during this period
of change that neither Deng or Gorbachev have introduced reforms, the fomier
economic and the latter political, from a position of relative strength.
The Intermediate Nuclear Force (ENF) treaty between the United States and
U.S.S.R., political policies of perestroika and glasnost in Soviet society, and requests
for joint ventures with capitalists are part of Moscow's "peace objective." A policy of
"new thinking" has evolved with the rise of General Secretary Gorbachev, which has
been partially successful in removing from the general population of Europe a fear of
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threat and animosity towards Russians. The Sino-Soviet summit may have laid the
framework for reduced tensions along the Soviet Union's eastern borders. Meanwhile,
the Bush Administration has made overtures to the Kremlin to bring the U.S.S.R. back
into the community of nations. Some national security analysts believe the Cold War
is over and the West won. However, one major bilateral relationship remains abnormal.
Despite some improvements, Japanese-Soviet relations are virtually as cold as ever.
Within the increasing cooperation between East and West, the strained relations
between Japan and Russia stand out as an aberration. 73 This is of significance because
of three factors. First, the Soviet Union desires to extend influence in Asia. Second,
the Soviets want to promote economic development in the Soviet Far East through
expansion of trade with Asian nations. 74 Without assistance from Japan in the latter, the
former goal will be difficult to achieve. Third, Japan is an ever increasing economic
and conventional military power. Japan's Gross National Product is triple that of the
People's Republic of China, North and South Korea, Philippines, Malaysia, Taiwan,
Thailand, IndoChina and Indonesia combined. 75 Japan's defense budget in the early
73
"M.S. Gorbachev's meeting with Takako Doi," Prayda, 7 May 1988, pp. 1, 2,
in The Current Digest of the Soviet Press , Vol. XL, No. 18, 1988, p. 15. M.S.
Gorbachev told JSP Chairperson Takako Doi "it is completely abnormal for Japanese-
Soviet relations to be like a smoldering fire that doesn't bum but is more apt to
smoke."
74See FEER, August 7, 1986 for text of Gorbachev's Vladivostok speech outlining
Soviet economic-political goals in Asia.
"Far Eastern Economic Review, Asia 1988 Yearbook . 1988, pp. 6, 7. Japan's 1988
GNP was $1,980 billion while the PRC, DPRK, ROK, Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines,
Thailand and Taiwan combined GNP was $633.5 billion. No figures available for
IndoChina. Japan's GNP is also larger than the USSRs.
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1990s may also surpass all-before-mentioned nations combined for the first time. 76 As
a result of the yen's devaluation, Japan's military expenditures measured in dollars
have more than doubled from twelve billion in 1985 ($1=260 yen) to thirty two billion
dollars in 1990 ($1=125 yen). Despite the yen's devaluation, Japan has funded an
aggregate increase of over five percent per annum on defense spending since regaining
sovereignty. 77 During the 1980s this nominal defense increase has averaged over six
percent per annum. 78 Outside of the Soviet Union and United States, Japan is the major
power in Greater East Asia (to use the Japanese term of Northeast Asia and Southeast
Asia combined). An increased Japanese defense budget of three percent GNP, as
advocated by many in the U.S. Congress, during the 1990s could approach $90 to $120
billion. Even with incremental increases in defense expenditures during the next decade,
the Soviets may perceive Japan's forces as the strongest conventional security threat
near any Russian border in the 1990s after East-West Conventional Force Europe
(CFE) negotiations have been implemented.
Japan and the Soviet Union appear to be unable to improve relations without a
resolution of the Northern Territories issue. In general ternis, the Northern Territories
included former Imperial Japanese domains in Southern Sakhalin and the Kurile islands
76Asia 1988 Yearbook , previously cited, pp. 8, 9. In 1987 Japan spent $24.03
billion on defense while all other's concerned spent $33.58 billion. Japan's 1990
defense budget is $32 billion. If pensions are included, the FY 90 budget is $42
billion-third largest in the world.
^International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1988-89
(London, England: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1988), p. 220. Japan
surpassed the PRC in defense spending, $11.08 to $11.07 billion respectively, in 1983.
78
"Japan Flexes Defense Muscle," Defense Attache , No. 6 1988, p. 20.
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until World War II. Specifically, the term used today means the islands of Kunashiri,
Etorofu, Shikotan, and the Hobomai group which are just due northeast of Hokkaido
and south of the Soviet controlled portions of the Kurile island chain ending with Urup
island. This issue of sovereignty over the islands, like the separation of Korea and
Germany, is a direct result of the outcome of World War II
.
Soviet troops entered the Japanese Empire in Manchuria and Korea after the
atomic bombing in direct violation of the Neutrality Pact between the two nations.
Additionally, Japanese efforts to negotiate an end to the war, prior to Soviet
intervention, were ignored by Stalin in July 1945. 79 Japanese have not forgotten this
"back stabbing" or the cruel treatment administered by the Red Army to Japanese
civilians, millions of whom were fleeing the Asian mainland. Soviet forces followed
the path of least resistance, stopping only when U.S. forces were met. 80 Southern
Sakhalin and the Kurile chain (including the islands in dispute) were taken next.
General MacArthur rejected Stalin's demand for participation as an occupation force
in Hokkaido. Clearly, U.S. actions concerning the Soviet presence south of the 38th
parallel in Korea and in Hokkaido set the framework that assisted eventual economic
success in South Korea and Japan.
Truman and Churchill induced Stalin to fight in the Pacific in exchange for
territory lost to Japan in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5. The Cairo Conference
Declaration stated "Japan will be expelled from all territories which she has taken by
79Mikiso Hane, Modem Japan: A Historical Survey (Boulder. Co.: Wesrview,
1986), p. 334.
80In Korea, the Red Army could have moved all the way to Pusan if there had not
been prior agreement with the U.S. to stop at the 38th parallel.
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violence and greed." Additionally, the secret agreement at Yalta included the Kuriles
as territory to be taken from the Empire of Japan and reverted to the U.S.S.R.." Did
Yalta consider all islands north of Hokkaido part of the Kurile chain? No treaty
between the Russians and Japanese exactly defined "the Kuriles." Russians first
explored Kamchatka in 1700 and visited the Kuriles in 1713-14 in an effort to find
Japan. They gathered information on Japan from Ainu and Japanese who had settled
in the Kuriles some decades earlier. It appears both countries had an interest in
settlement of the area at nearly the same time. In 1860 the Russian ship Nadiezhda
raided points on Sakhalin and the Kuriles, attacking Japanese trading posts and "took
possession" in the name of the Tsar. Another expedition by the warship Diana in 1811
investigated the southern Kuriles, landing in Kunashiri, where they were captured by
Japanese. 82 Is there a separation of traditional sovereignty in the island chain? Japan
exchanged sovereignty of the Kuriles with Imperial Russia in exchange for southern
Sakhalin by treaty in 1875. Did this include the islands in question? Many Japanese
strongly believe the islands in question today, Kunashiri, Etorofu, Shikotan, and
Hobomais, have always been inherent Japanese territory—koyu no ryodo . 83
81Kenichi Ito, "Japan and the Soviet Union—Entangled in the Deadlock of the
Northern Territories," The Washington Quarterly , Winter 1988, pp. 41, 43.
"George B. Sansom, The Western World and Japan (New York, NY.: Alfred A.
Knopf, 1951), pp. 213, 214, 244. The captured Russians were released in 1813.
"Ito, previously cited, p. 36. According to Ito, unlike Southern Sakhalin and the
Kuriles north of Etorofu, the islands in question have never before belonged to any
other nation besides Japan and therefore did not meet the Cairo Conference definition
of "territories...taken."
34
Japanese are of the opinion that the occupation of the islands by the Soviets has
no legal standing since Japan was not a participant to the Yalta Conference and the
Soviet Union was not a signatory to the San Francisco Peace Treaty. Without returning
the islands in question, Soviet occupation is seen as a continuation of the illegal entry
into the Pacific War. The opinion that the Soviets won the war and therefore have
legitimate claim to the Northern Territories contrasts with the United States return of
the Bonin (Iwo Jima) and Volcano islands in 1968, and the return of Okinawa to
Japanese sovereignty in 1972. 84 Japanese must feel that patience will pay off on this
territorial issue since no peace treaty has been signed officially ending the war between
the U.S.S.R. and Japan. 85
Moscow's determination to influence post-war Japan did not end with General
MacArthur's rejection of Soviet occupation rights in Hokkaido. At the San Francisco
Peace Conference in September, 1951, the Soviet delegation attempted to introduce an
amendment to the treaty essentially making Japan another Finland under Soviet
hegemony. Included were demands to: 1) place limitations on Japanese rearmament, 2)
prohibit Japan from entering into any military alliances, and 3) agreement to exclusive
rights of free passage for Soviet warships through Japan's four strategic straits
84Roy U.T. Kim, "Wanning Up Soviet-Japanese Relations?" Washington Quarterly
,
Spring 1986. Mr. Kim observed on p. 88, that, "even the U.S. return of Okinawa in
1972, while appreciated by the Japanese, did little to further U.S.-Japanese relations."
Perhaps the Soviets seek a quid pro quo on the issue.
""Forward to 1986," The Economist
,
25 June 1988, p. 42 points out Japan's
desire to have the Kurile issue included in broader East-West negotiations, which
Moscow has rejected.
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(Tsushima, Tsugaru, Soya, and Nemuro). 86 It seems Moscow's concerns for safe
passage had not diminished since the days of the Tzar.
Imperial Russia had inherent concerns over safe passage and warm water ports
in the Far East. With the acquisition of vast areas of eastern Siberia from China by
treaty in 1860, Russia had additional territory to protect and promote along with the
setdements in Kamchatka and Sakhalin. Those outposts in the Far East, during the
18th and 19th Century, were highly dependent on sea-borne supply. Overland support
was unreliable and uneconomical given the vast distances involved. Moreover, Japan's
geographic position was a natural barrier to logistical support of the Russian Far East
before the construction of the Trans-Siberian railroad. Russian efforts to supply the
Maritime Provinces by trade with Tokugawa Japan failed. In 1861 the Russian warship
Passadonick arrived at Tsushima island. The captain requested anchorage and repairs
from the local leaders, and then commenced to build permanent shore facilities. Other
Russian warships soon visited Tsushima, whose location between Korea and Japan
strategically commanded the strait. 87 The Tsar's designs were clear: establish Tsushima
as a naval base, ensuring safe passage to the Pacific allowing unhindered lines of
communication to the Maritime Provinces. This attempt failed when the Japanese
86Osamu Miyoshi, "Soviet Strategy in Asia: A Japanese View," Comparative
Strategy , Vol. 6, No. 1, 1987, p. 15. Nemuro strait is between Hokkaido and the
Northern Territories. Exclusive rights of free passage for Soviet warships in the Tsugaru
strait would have effectively isolated Hokkaido from Honshu. John Foster Dulles chided
the intentions of the Soviets, who later refused to sign the peace treaty.
87Kim Key-Hiuk, The Last Phase of East Asian World Order (Berkeley, Ca.:
University of California, 1980), p. 19.
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Bakufu government requested England to send warships to evict the Russians from
Tsushima.
Japan held similar security concerns over safe passage as the Russians, but there
was a difference. Russia's primary interest was in economic supply, whereas Japan's
primary interest was in territorial integrity. Japan in the mid- 19th Century was in the
midst of responding to foreign demands that she "open up" after over two hundred
years of self-enforced isolation. 88 The Japanese were suspicious of Western designs,
fearing a similar fate that had befallen the Ch'ing Dynasty in China from the policies
of British Imperialism. The Japanese meet this challenge by reforming their institutions
during the Meiji Restoration and sought to control or influence Okinawa, Taiwan and
Korea to keep the West at bay. 80 Geography confronted Russian development in the Far
East with Japanese security concerns. In Korea the two nations vied for preeminent
influence. Japan could no longer accept the status quo when Russia established a naval
base at Yongampo and negotiated with the Korean government for further warship port
rights near the Tsushima strait. These competing desires for spheres of influence
culminated in the Russo-Japanese War of 1 904-5.
^
88Edwin O. Reishauer, Japan: The Story of a Nation (New York, N.Y.: Alfred A.
Knopf, 1974), pp. 113-125.
89See Kim, previously cited, Chapters JJI-V for detailed explanation of Japanese
expansionist rationale, means and objectives.
^Japanese claims in Manchuria after the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95 were
rejected by the Triple Intervention of France, Germany, and Russia. The Anglo-
Japanese Alliance of 1902 prevented a similar recurrence of outside interference after
the defeat of Russia. As a result of the Treaty of Portsmouth, Russia ceded Southern
Sakhalin, interests in Korea and southern Manchuria to Japan.
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Soviet perceptions of Japanese intentions in the Far East are influenced by
historical animosity. As stated, competing spheres of influence in Korea and Manchuria
increased antagonism between the two nations to the point of war in 1904. Russian
distrust of Japan continued after the communist revolution. Japanese troops entered
the Maritime Provinces as part of a U.S.-led international force in 1918. The United
States became alarmed over Japanese intent when Imperial troops went beyond
Vladivostok and all the way to Irkutsk. 91 U.S. troops were withdrawn in 1920, but
Japanese forces remained in the Maritime Province until 1922. A Japanese pledge to
withdraw them had been made at the Washington Conference. However, Imperial
troops were not withdrawn from Northern Shakhalin until 1925. 92 Japan's militarism
and anti-communism drew Soviet notice during the 1930s. Within Japan the militarists
were forming factions divided over how best to promote perceived national interest.
Two major factions arose between the "strike north" and "strike south" policies. The
Imperial Army favored the former, while the Navy endorsed the latter. 93 After the
Marco Polo incident in 1937, "strike north" anny officers instigated an incident along
the Soviet, Manchukuo, and Korean border with the Soviets. Japan was not as
successful against the Soviets as they were against the Manchurian army of Chang Tso-
lin. The Soviets quickly repulsed Japanese intrusion. Still, the Imperial Army persisted,
91
Julius W. Pratt, A History of United States Foreign Policy (Englewood Cliffs,
N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1972) p. 309. Secretary of State Hughes opposed Japanese
expansion at the expense of Russia no less than at the expense of China.
92Hane, previously cited, p. 202.
93W.G. Beasely, The Modem History of Japan (New York, N.Y.: Praeger, 1973),
pp. 260, 267, 268.
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and in 1938 border disputes with the Soviets along the Outer Mongolia-Manchuria area
culminated in the routing of Japan's army at Nomonhan, despite the size of their force
(56,000).94 Only Russia's concern with Hitler and a two front war kept the Soviets
from dealing with the Japanese on the Asian continent.
Yalta clearly revealed inherent Russian Far Eastern security concerns, in regard
to safe passage, by providing Port Arthur as a Soviet naval base and "preeminent
interests" in an international port at Dairen. 95 A return to this sphere of influence,
legitimized by Yalta, was prevented by revolution in China. Today, Soviet interest in
safe passage from the Sea of Japan may increase with Moscow's desires to become an
economic power in the Pacific. Moscow's political position on the Northern Territories
reflects Soviet national security concerns regarding safe passage to the Pacific sea lanes
of communications (SLOCs).
The traditional Soviet policy line has stated the disputed islands are part of the
U.S.S.R. as a matter of historical fact. For decades Moscow refused to admit that there
was any issue to discuss. To negotiate over the island's status implied redrawing an
inviolable border formed at the completion of the war. 96 Also, returning the Northern
Territories to Japan could set a dangerous precedent. This is especially so since the
94Hane, previously cited, pp. 281, 283, 287. Over eight thousand Japanese died
during the fighting.
95
Ito, previously cited, p. 41.
96
"Japanese Dissonance," Pravda, 24 June 1988, in The Current Digest of the
Soviet Press , Vol. XL, No. 25, 1988, p. 22. In response to P.M. Takeshita's statement
that "Perestroika has no visible effects in Asia" and Japan and the U.S.S.R. had a
"territorial issue," Pravada asserted "... we have stressed repeatedly that Japan's claims
are illegal and unfounded. The issue has been decided on...historical and...legal basis."
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occupied Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have become ever more vocal
in seeking self-determination. According to Soviet judgment, the Helsinki accords
legitimizing Soviet security concerns in Eastern Europe are seen as an appropriate
precedent for the Northern Territories.97 The political status of Eastern Europe and the
boundary of the Northern Territories were determined by the outcome of the last world
war, and to negotiate the status of one may jeopardize the legality of the other. It
appears Japan has no intention of participating in a "Helsinki-type" forum legitimizing
Soviet occupation of the Northern Territories. 98
If the dispute over the Northern Territories and historical animosity were not
enough to further strain Japanese-Soviet relations, current events may have. In 1987
Japanese Self Defense Forces fired their first shot in anger in recent memory when a
Soviet Badger reconnaissance flight overflew Okinawa. An ASDF F-4 fired warning
shots after the Badger had violated Japanese airspace. 99 Those shots seem to reflect the
political frustration between the two nations. To make matters worse, in 1987 diplomats
were expelled from each other's capital over spying charges, followed by the arrest of
97Genrikh Apalin, "Peace and Security for Asia and the Pacific," International
Affairs (Moscow), November 1986, p. 22.
98Masahiko Asada, "Confidence Building Measures in East Asia," Asian Survey ,
Vol. XXVIIl, No. 5, May 1988, p. 507. Mr. Asada states, "there is little likelihood
that Japan would join in such a conference without a sure guarantee that it would not
have any negative effect on Japan's territorial claim against the Soviet Union."
"Defense Asia Pacific . 2/1988, p. 4. Much criticism had been made of JSDF
inability to even defend themselves without prior approval of the government (IAW
Constitutional interpretation). After the shooting one wonders if this is no longer the
case, or was there prior approval for warning shots to be fired at Soviets violating
Japanese airspace.
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Japanese base employees selling F-15 and E-2C technical manuals to the Soviets. 100
However, this all paled in comparison with the embarrassment the Japanese government
experienced during the Toshiba case. Toshiba sold milling machines to the Russians
that reduced the tonal signatures of propellers. These new propellers were then installed
i
A-
on very noisy submarines, improving stealth capabilities. Many-, the United States felt
Japan appeared to be sacrificing Western security for economic self-interest. Future
trade across the Sea of Japan will no doubt be scrutinized to prevent further scandal.
Economic competition, perhaps the only card left for the Soviets to play, may
induce Japan to invest in Soviet Far Eastern projects. Japan rarely turns down an
economic challenge, be it with the Sandinista regime in Managua, amidst apartheid in
South Africa, or in Vietnam after that nation had invaded Cambodia—despite past
protests from ASEAN. This idea of separating politics from economics, seikei-bunri
,
has been used throughout the world as an adjunct to Japan's comprehensive security
policy. An example of seikei bunri at work was during the Iran-Iraq war, where Japan
maintained close ties with both nations and tried, but failed, to mediate between the
two. With South Korea, and perhaps Taiwan, discussing investment and profit in
Siberia, will Japan follow? 101 Japan has conducted trade with the U.S.S.R., but appears
hesitant to expand economic relations with the Soviets and, going beyond seikei-bunri,
make the political decision to assist in development of the Soviet Far East.
100Chalmers Johnson, "Japanese-Soviet Relations in the Early Gorbachev Era,"
Asian Survey , Vol. XXVII, No. 11, November 1987, p. 1158.
,0,
"Russia, Very Pacific about the Pacific," The Economist , 15 October 1988, p.
42 explains Moscow's intent of increasing trade with Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore.
However, to fully develop the Soviet Far East only Japanese capital and technology
will suffice.
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Comprehensive security places primary emphasis on economic and diplomatic
initiatives, but it does not negate military strategy as part of security, i.e., Japan still
finds the Soviets a potential military threat. 102 Japanese security diminishes if there is
a militarily strong and economically sound Soviet Far East. Japan's rearmament in
response to the Soviet military buildup in the Far East is a partial reflection of these
concerns. The other part is denying full seikei bunri in Japanese-Soviet economic
relations. 103 Japanese financial assistance for perestroika may follow, to a certain degree,
U. S. aid to the Kremlin. However, Japanese and American financial institutions would
approach any Soviet bond offerings "with great caution." 104 The Soviet's dismal
economic prognosis in itself may hinder Western aid. Return on investment may also
be questioned depending on Soviet internal disorder, i.e., the nationalities problem, and
the very future of perestroika and glasnost should Gorbachev be removed. Furthermore,
Japanese aid to the U.S.S.R. should be considered in the context of historical
animosity, the unresolved Kuriles, lack of a Peace Treaty between the two nations
102Janes Defense Weekly , 3 September 1988, p. 5. Japan's Defense White Paper,
published by the government, stated a commitment to defense expansion because of an
increasing threat from the Soviet Union. Besides the Soviet military build up, Japan
also cited increased Soviet naval and air activity including violations of its air space
as primary examples of the Soviet threat.
,0J
Sato, previously cited, p. 40. Mr. Sato points out that the Toshiba event
reminded Japan of the importance of the US over the USSR, and "reduced the
likelihood of any move to scrape the US-Japanese security arrangement and adopt a
nonaligned status-even in the event of the Northern Territories are returned."
'"New York Times , 1 November 1989, p. A4.
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ending World War II, and Japan's traditional concern of a strong power positioned near
the home islands.' 05
After the summit between Moscow and Beijing, Japan may find itself in quite a
different security position facing an entente of convenience between dictatorial powers
relying on brute force to maintain rule. For example, the Russian people's desires for
increased freedoms may receive a hard-line reaction, leading to similar events that
occurred in China. In such a scenario, increased ties between hard-line leftists seeking
to remain ideologically pure to Marxism in Beijing and Moscow may weaken Japan's
regional status. For example, both now are vehemently opposed to any increase in
Japanese Self-Defense Force military capabilities. 106 As Japan's defense structure
assumes new status in the next decade, Moscow and Beijing may come forth with joint
condemnations. China and Russia have found common ground opposing a well armed
Japan before. The 1897 Li-Lobonov Treaty allowed Russian warships port rights in
China if Japan attacked that nation. The U.S.S.R. supported the K.M.T. and C.C.P. in
1937 with a treaty of nonaggression and military aid after Japan invaded China. Also,
Soviet support continued during the K.M.T.-C.C.P. United Front against Japan. Finally,
Mao and Stalin agreed on mutual assistance against Japan if militarism arose from the
ashes of WW II.' 07 Also, Beijing holds similar views on nuclear free zones and
l05Hisahiko Okazaki, A Grand Strategy for Japanese Defense (New York, N.Y.:
Abt Books, 1986) pp. 7-13, points out most historical threats to Japan have come from
great powers via the Korean peninsula.
,06See Gengu, "Japan Tones Up Defense Policy," Beijing Review
,
6-12 March
1989, for PRC concerns.
,07David Nelson Rowe, Modern China (Princeton, N.J.: Van Nostrand, 1959), p.
163. Article One of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of February 14, 1950 dealt singularly with
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disarmament talks which have been proposed by the Soviet Union. 108 Japan's security
relations with the United States may increase if hard-line communists in the U.S.S.R.
and P.R.C. find common ground against Japan's increasing military, economic, and
political power.
United States relations with the Soviet Union and People's Republic of China
appeared to be entering the 1990s in an unsurpassed condition of cooperation and
lowered tensions. However, the Tiananmen massacre severly altered U.S.-P.R.C.
relations. Moreover, if the communist regimes fail to reform, lose political legitimacy,
and rely solely on the terror of tyranny to maintain power, the contradictions between
free and closed societies may increase global tensions. In this context, United States-
U.S.S.R./P.R.C. relations do not have the vital economic interdependence, similar
dependence on the existing international system, nor complementary security interests
found between the United States and Japan. As the Cold War has proven, the United
States has been able to prosper without friendly relations with the U.S.S.R., P.R.C, or
both. In fact, Beijing's volte face on Marxist ideology regarding economics, and
Moscow's reversal on class struggle, shows the converse to be true. However, it
remains to be seen if the United States and Japan can prosper with a "Cold War"
between themselves. Considering the importance of United States-Japanese relations and
uncertainty of reform after Deng and Gorbachev, an entente between the P.R.C.-
U.S.S.R. directed at Tokyo should foster a U.S. response of support for Japan. Until
opposing Japanese militarism.
10fi
Ivan Glebov, "For New International Relations in Asia and the Pacific,"
International Affairs (Moscow), October 1987, p. 29.
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U.S. and Japanese interests differ on a scale similar to United States-P.R.C./U.S.S.R.
interests, Washington and Tokyo will remain strong allies. 109
General Secretary Gorbachev has pushed his "new thinking" into every area of
the globe, appearing to make concessions showing the sincerity of Soviet policy. Soviet
diplomats cross the globe with a willingness to directly negotiate differences. With one
exception, Gorbachev has conducted personal diplomacy with every major world power
after the Sino-Soviet summit. Somehow, Japan remains outside the "new thinking"
agenda. 110 Meetings between Foreign Ministers Shevardnaze and Uno in December 1988
ended with little accomplished except the reaffirmation that neither side will move on
the Kurile issue." 1 Instead, the Soviet preference is to increase economic cooperation
and trade now, removing the Kuriles as the first issue to be resolved. 112 Gorbachev's
Asian speeches in Vladivostok, Krasnoyarsk, and Beijing failed to mention the dispute
over the islands. However, a return of the Northern Territories to Japan is possible and
109Olsen, previously cited, p. 12. Prof. Olsen remarked, concerning US-PRC
strategic alignment, that "China can be a useful adjunct for the US and its Allies, but-
as long as it remains poor and adheres to any variant of Marxism-it cannot play roles
comparable to those Japan can fill."
110While the General Secretary of the CPSU has a standing invitation to visit
Japan, it is unlikely Gorbachov will go without providing a resolution to the Kurile
issue.
''"They Ran Aground on the Usual Isles," The Economist , 24 December 1988,
p. 44. Moscow did agree to press the D.P.R.K. to release two Japanese sailors detained
since 1983 and allow limited visitation rights for some Japanese in the Kuriles.
112Mikhail Kapitsa and Konstanin Sarkisov, "Promoting Bilateral Relations," Asia
and Africa Today (Moscow), No. 4, 1988, p. 63. Referring to a recent Japanese-Soviet
symposium, Kapitsa stated, "old political thinking made itself evident when discussions
centered on bilateral issues, especially the so-called 'territorial problem'." Sarkisov
believes "the U.S.S.R. and Japan should orient themselves to setting up joint ventures."
Kapista is Director of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the U.S.S.R. Academy of
Sciences, while Sarkisov is the Head of the Japanese Department.
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will be discussed later. Still, the Soviets do not appear to be willing to negotiate the
issue as the 1980s come to a close. This is very peculiar since Japan is expected to
provide most of the technological expertise and investment required to develop Soviet
Far Eastern projects. To consider the matter settled and beyond discussion contrasts
with Moscow's bending over backward to remove the "three obstacles" that had
restrained better relations with Beijing. As in Europe, Moscow is withdrawing troops
in Mongolia to underscore Soviet "sincerity."" 3 Does the Kremlin believe development
of Siberia as a powerful economic entity in Asia will come from P.R.C. capital and
technology? Why won't the Soviets return some of the islands now and promise future
negotiations on the remainder? Clearly, the economic benefit would be substantial.
Japanese joint ventures and technological aid could ensure that development of the
Soviet Far East would not lag behind the development of the Russian heartland.
Considering that the Soviets were just on the verge of offering just such a proposition
to Japan in 1956 (partial return), but refuse to do so now in the age of "new thinking,"
reveals a perceived strategic high cost far outweighing potential economic advantages." 4
While traditional Russian concerns over safe passage of SLOCs were based in logistical
strategy, modem strategic nuclear policy has placed a new, higher interest on the
Kurile Island chain as a guarantor of safe passage. The military significance of the
islands increased so much they have been vital to Soviet security during the 1980s.
" 3FEER , 16 March 1989, p. 14.
" 4Leszek Buszynski, "International Linkages and Regional Interests in Soviet Asia-
Pacific Policy," Pacific Affairs , Summer 1988, p. 231.
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A. MILITARY VALUE OF THE KURILE ISLANDS
A solution to the dispute over the islands becomes more remote as the military
value of the territory increases. As previously stated, there has always been an inherent
Russian concern over safe passage out of the waters of the Sea of Japan. Today,
traditional interests are reinforced by the role of nuclear strategy in defense of the
Soviet Union. The strategic military value of the Kuriles is derived from the
importance of maintaining secure areas of operation for Soviet nuclear-powered ballistic
missile submarines (SSBNs).
Nuclear strategy is extremely complex, but the central notion of nuclear
deterrence is to posses adequate nuclear forces to deter attack. In order to maintain
adequate nuclear forces, they must be deployed in such a manner that an incoming first
strike will not diminish their number to such a level that enough strike forces to
threaten "unacceptable" damage does not remain. In other words, after receiving a first
strike there must be enough nuclear weapons left to administer sufficient retaliation so
that an opponent would not rationally strike first—without risking unacceptable
retaliation." 5 This is a central part of nuclear deterrence. Survivability is one key to a
credible nuclear deterrence, and SSBNs are considered the most survivable delivery
system due to the difficulty in finding and targeting them. Soviet SSBNs are a primary
1,5Bryan Ranft and Geoffrey Till, The Sea in Soviet Strategy (Annapolis, Md.:
Naval Institute Press, 1988), pp. 165-175 contain theory on Soviet SSBNs as a strategic
reserve providing war-termination on favorable terms to the USSR during a global
conventional war. Strategic reserve is an additional role for SSBNs complementing the
traditional deterrent role.
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part of Soviet deterrence. 116 If they are vulnerable, then Soviet nuclear deterrence
strategy comes into question and the Soviet Union's national security is threatened.
In 1978 the Soviets commenced deployment of Delta I-class SSBNs in the Far
East. Unlike the earlier Yankee, Hotel, and Golf-classes, the Delta I nuclear-tipped
ballistic missiles have sufficient range to reach targets in most of the United States
from the Sea of Japan and Sea of Okhostk. Nine Delta I SSBNs have been augmented
by eight newer Delta IH SSBNs in the Soviet Far East. Nine Yankee SSBNs and six
lesser-range Golf SSBs (nonnuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines) are also
deployed in the Far East. The latter class remains in Vladivostok, their importance
increased after completion of the INF treaty. After the removal of SS-20s from the
Soviet Far East, Soviet SSBs remain a direct threat to cities and military installations
in Japan. The SSBNs are primarily stationed in Petropavlovsk on the Kamchatka
peninsula, but three or four may be in Vladivostok. 117
With regard to SSBNs, theories on Soviet nuclear strategy options during a global
war are numerous. A major hypothesis contends that the Soviets desire a safe sanctuary
for their SSBNs in the Sea of Okhotsk and Sea of Japan. 118 Other theorists believe the
vast number of Soviet submarines deployed in the area will require some of them to
n6Geoffrey Till, Maritime Strategy and the Nuclear Age (New York, N.Y.: St.
Martins, 1987), see pp. 217-221 for critical role of SSBNs in strategic nuclear strategy.
1,7Derek da Chunha, "The Growth of the Soviet Pacific Fleet's Submarine Force,"
International Defense Review , 2/1988, pp. 127, 128.
118
U.S. Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power 1988 (Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988), p. 48.
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break out of the Sea of Japan and Sea of Okhotsk to relieve congestion. 119 No matter
which theory is correct, bastion or break out, or a combination of the two, the straits
around Japan and the Kuriles are of strategic significance to the U.S.S.R., United
States, and Japan. 120
If the Northern Territories are returned to Japan one-third of the Kurile island
chain leading to Petropavlovsk will leave Soviet control. Besides the straits "locking
up" the Sea of Japan, the Kuriles are the keys to "lock up" the Sea of Okhotsk. The
primary military reason for the Soviets to maintain control of the islands is to control
entrance and exit to the sanctuary of their primary nuclear counterforce/strategic
reserve. Without control of access or exit, opposing attack nuclear-powered submarines
(SSNs) may be able to hunt SSBNs like "fish in a barrel." The Sea of Okhotsk may
be a big "barrel," but in relation to the Pacific, detecting SSBNs may be relatively
easier. Soviet ability to mine the Kurile strait, if sovereignty of the Northern Territories
is returned to Japan, would be contingent on control of the Soya strait. Also,
Petropavlovsk is not constrained by any strait blockade, but it is constrained by
possible resource denial if the straits "locking up" the Sea of Japan are closed. 121 Soviet
119Capt. Richard Sharpe, ed., in forward, Jane's Fighting Ships 1988-89 (London,
England:Jane's Publishing Ltd.), 1988, p. 111.
120Soviet Military Power 1988. previously cited, p. 123, points out the strategic
significance of Japan and the Kuriles. In a global war, the Soviets may intend to
conduct "sea control" in the waters around Japan to defend their SSBN sanctuaries.
Such actions would have unknown consequences regarding Japanese maritime
commerce.
12,There are no pipelines or railroads leading to Kamchatcka from Siberia. Thus,
supplies required to sustain Soviet naval forces there, i.e. SSBNs, are highly dependent
on safe passage from the Maritime Provinces.
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occupation of the Northern Territories enhances an ability to secure the Soya strait if
required during conflict. The eastern "flank" of the strait is already secured via
occupation of the disputed islands. Without the Northern Territories, this ability is not
only diminished, but increases the ability of an opponent to close the strait. If an
opponent of the Soviet Union deployed cruise missiles, aircraft, and anti-submarine
helicopters in the Northern Territories, exit from the Sea of Japan would be in jeopardy
and security of the Sea of Okhotsk could become more difficult. 122 This would have
vital implications for Soviet strategic nuclear policy.
Soviet nuclear deterrence in general, and strategic reserve in particular, could face
a disturbing disruption of the status quo if the Northern Territories were returned to
Japan. Without all of the Kuriles, the U.S.S.R. must be able to guarantee safe passage
to Petropavlosk without threat of blockade in the Soya strait. Additionally, the Soviets
must still be able to control the whole Kurile chain protecting their SSBN force in the
Sea of Okostk. To rely only on the Sea of Japan as a bastion may induce congestion
of SSBN operating areas. Perhaps the Soviets could make a guarantee of safe passage
in the 1970s. However, growing Japanese conventional ability in the 1990s makes
future certainty of strait control by the Soviets unpredictable. Consequently, the
U.S.S.R. may try to enhance security of Sakhalin and Kamchatka by political means,
discussed later.
,22John O'Connell, "Strategic Implications of the Japanese SSM-1 Cruise Missile,"
Journal of Northeast Asian Studies
,
Summer 1987. The former U.S. Naval Attache to
Japan points out the navigable waters of the vital straits are within SSM-1 range. With
this missile deployed on the Northern Territories, vessels in the Sea of Okhostk can
be targeted. Future Japanese missiles may double or triple the SSM-1 range.
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Soviet-Japanese relations have become more strained by Japan's so-called role in
the U.S. maritime strategy. 123 This strategy intends to threaten Soviet bases in the Far
East and attack Soviet SSBNs in the Sea of Okhotsk/Sea of Japan during a global
war, i.e., a war in Europe. The former action is intended to open a second front on the
Soviets, denying resupply for the central front in Europe, while the latter is to provide
war termination on favorable terms by altering the nuclear correlation of forces. 124
Japan has agreed to mine the straits during an emergency denying Soviet access to the
Pacific. 125 The possibility of mining the straits is very real since they are relatively
shallow and not very wide. 126 Conflict in the Persian Gulf revealed that dedicated
minelayers are not necessary to create a mine field. The Soviets may prefer, however,
to do defensive mining themselves so they can control entrance and exit to the Sea
of Japan and Sea of Okostok. Control over all of the Kuriles is required to create an
effective mine barrier. Certainly, the U.S.S.R. believes a Japanese defense policy of
locking up the straits of Tsushima, Tsugaru, and Soya endangers their national
123
see Konstantin Deribas, "New Leaders in Tokyo," International Affairs
(Moscow), March 1988, pp. 81-85 for Soviet concerns over Japan and the maritime
strategy. The Soviets state Japan has an offensive role against Russia during the
execution of the Maritime Strategy.
124
U.S. Naval Institute, Proceedings , January 1986.
125Chalmers Johnson, "Reclining Dragon on a Free Ride?" Speaking of Japan
,
December 1986, pp. 30, 31.
,26
Daniel I. Gallagher, Sealane Defense: Japanese Capabilities and Imperatives
,
Master's Thesis (Monterey, California,: Naval Post Graduate School), December 1987,
p. 83 contains an excellent account on mines necessary to blockade the straits.
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interest.'
27 To enhance security of the straits, the Soviets have increased their
amphibious lift capability in the Far East and reinforced their forces in the Kuriles. 128
Despite Soviet increases in military force at or near the Kuriles, Japan's decision to
mine the straits in an emergency is not viewed by the Soviets as an action of inherent
Japanese interest. Instead, it is simply seen as following the dictates of U.S. global
security strategy. 129
B. PROSPECTS FOR JAPANESE-SOVIET RIVALRY
Japan's geographic position is a Soviet security nightmare if that nation is hostile
to Soviet interests; but conversely, it is a potential economic asset if relations are
normal and trade expands across the Sea of Japan. Resource rich, but lacking in
capital, technology, and labor, the Soviet Far East has been touted as a logical
'"Foreign Broadcast Information Service , 18 July 1988, pp. 26, 27. Colonel
General V.N. Lobov expressed concern over US-Japanese military cooperation and a
concept of an air-land operation to seize the Kurile islands and Sakhalin. Furthermore,
he stated "we cannot underestimate the danger of this naval might close to our borders
in the Far East."
'"Dereck da Chunha, "Soviet Naval Infantry and Amphibious Lift in the Pacific,"
Armed Forces , October 1988, pp. 446-450. SNI doubled from 4,000 to 8,000 men in
the Far East during this decade, while amphibious lift more than doubled during the
same period. Primary mission of these "Soviet marines" in conflict would be to secure
critical positions in northern Hokkaido near the Soya strait, preparing the way for the
Red Army. To arrive quickly, with supporting armor, the Soviets have increased their
hovercrafts from twelve to twenty-four in ten years. They can move 2,000 troops to
Hokkaido in thirty minutes from Sahkalin. Four hundred SNI are stationed in Etorofu,
where ground support aircraft have also been deployed.
129Alexander Vorontsov, "Dangerous Geometry," Asia and Africa Today (Moscow),
No. 4, 1987. Vorontsov repeats Gorbachev's Vladivostok statement declaring a
"militarized Washington-Tokyo-Seoul 'triangle' is taking shape" under U.S. pressure.
According to Mr. Vorontsov, Japan has developed an offensive military capability, and
the U.S. desires Japan to supplement U.S. strikes on the Soviet Union during the
execution of the Maritime Strategy.
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economic match for Northeast Asia. The Soviets envision Siberian exports to resource-
poor Japan and the newly industrialized countries of Asia in exchange for technology
transfers and high quality goods. The U.S.S.R. has attempted to enter Asian economic
and financial institutions to supply the capital for this goal. 130
Transportation to the Soviet heartland of valuable Far Eastern resources is still
very dependent on ship-borne cargo since the Trans-Siberian, and recently completed
Baikal-Amur Mainline (BAM), are insufficient and overworked. BAM is not expected
to be fully operational until the mid-1990s. Also, since they are the only two overland
sources of transportation of resources between Siberia and the Soviet heartland, they
are prime targets during a potential conflict. Within the U.S.S.R., Siberia and the
Soviet Far East comprise fifty-seven percent of the land, three quarters of fuel and
energy resources, and half of Soviet industrial raw materials and forest resources. ,31 The
Soviet Far East could almost become like the Kamchatka peninsula-a virtual island
when it comes to supply-if these railroads are destroyed. Therefore, the Soviets still are
concerned with safe passage of resources in and out of the Soviet Far East by sea
lanes of communications.' 32 If the Soviet Far East is to develop into a real economic
130
Peter Juviler and Hiroshi Kimura, ed., Gorbachev's Reforms: U.S. and Japanese
Assessments (New York, N.Y.: Aldine de Gruyter, 1988), Chapters Five and Seven
point out Soviet economic desires in Asia.
13,Satoshi Takayama, "The Soviet Union Smiles at Japan," Japan Quarterly
,
Summer 1988, p. 134. Mr. Takayama believes as development efforts shift to Siberia
and the Soviet Far East region, the relative political weight of Japan, closer
geographically, increases.
,32Seth Cropsey, "The Bear Facts," National Review , 5 June 1987, p. 28. The
former Deputy Under Secretary of the Navy stated, "nearly all fuel, supplies and other
material support for the Soviet's remote Asian-based forces must be transported, at
great cost, across half the globe."
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Asian power, as stated in Gorbachov's Vladivostok speech, then concern over supplying
resources and finished goods to and from the area will increase Soviet concerns over
secure SLOC passage. Soviet control of the disputed islands in the Kuriles has
enhanced safe passage out of the Sea of Japan.
Japan's growing military power may make Soviet military security of safe
passage in time of war increasingly difficult during the 1990s. Instead, Moscow may
attempt to achieve security of Soviet SLOCs by political means. Japan's economic and
rising political-military power and influence is of central importance to the Soviet
concept of an Asian forum to create "a comprehensive system of international security
in the Asia-Pacific Region (APR)." 133 The broad theme of Soviet "new thinking"
concerning security affairs depends on the premise that offensive warfare is no longer
viable in the nuclear age. It appears that Gorbachev is trying to refute Clausewitz's
dictum that "war is politics by other means." 134 According to Gorbachev, offensive
strategy is counterproductive leading to an arms race, and should therefore be replaced
with a strategy of "reasonable sufficiency." A nation will supposedly increase its
security by embracing a strategy that relies on defensive warfare and maintains only
enough forces sufficient for defense. This "reasonable sufficiency" is to be guaranteed
by "confidence building" measures of dual verification, force structure reduction, and
limitations on force deployment, i.e., tactical and nuclear weapons. To accept
133Kapista asserted in his Asia and Africa Today interview, previously cited, p.
62, that "the system of peace and security in Asia and the Pacific is inconceivable
without a highly developed system of Soviet-Japanese relations." (Author's emphasis)
,34Mikhail S. Gorbachev, Perestroika (New York, N.Y.:Harper and Row, 1987), p.
141.
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Gorbachev's proposals one must also accept his basic premise-that offensive warfare
is no longer possible in the nuclear age. This theory is not unique to President
Gorbachev. The idea that nuclear war cannot serve political goals was the primary
reason a flexible response strategy was created. 135 Even with sufficient flexibility to
respond conventionally without escalation into an all-out nuclear war, many in the West
believe any offensive war will become unmanageable. In a historical context, the idea
that war is obsolete is not novel. Gorbachev's viewpoints on reasonable sufficiency and
war certainly must bring to mind the efforts of the Kellog-Briand Pact and the
Washington Conference to outlaw or reduce the prospects of war during the 1920s. The
nations which eventually violated these treaties were not the Democracies. Clausewitz's
axiom has not been rejected en toto by leading Soviet military figures. 136 Continued
Soviet military aid to Nicaragua, then funneled to the F.M.L.N. in El Salvador, is
nothing less than "politics by other means." In this context, Japan considers Soviet
proposals for comprehensive security.
The Soviet comprehensive security system is divided into economic, political,
and military spheres. In Asia, the economic sphere consists of Moscow's desires to
gain access to financial institutions, removal of economic barriers, and multilateral
cooperation to carry out regional programs and projects. In the political sphere, an
Asia-Pacific forum would concentrate on lowering the risk of nuclear war, i.e.,
establish nuclear free zones. To relax tensions and settle regional contradictions, the
135Gaddis, previously cited, p. 214.
,36
Juviler and Kimura, previously cited, p. 138, quotes Marshal Sokolov as saying
"World War in the nuclear-cosmic era has outlived itself," implying there are other
wars that do not necessarily develop into World War.
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Kremlin emphasizes the Bandung and Pancha Silla principles of nonaggression, respect
for territorial boundaries, and noninterference in internal affairs of other nations.
Finally, in the military sphere, limitations on naval activities in the busiest sea lanes,
class of vessels (anti-submarine and major classes), and similar "confidence building"
measures.
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The Soviets have traditionally desired to decouple the U.S. military presence from
Asia, as in Europe. After the opening of the Iron Curtain, this Soviet strategy appears
to be in a stage of transformation. For example, in Europe, the fear of a unified
Germany has lead to the Soviets to call for a continuation of NATO and Warsaw Pact
military alliances. Perhaps in Asia, Soviet fears of a conventionally powerful Japan in
the 1990s may also lead to a call for a continued U.S. military presence in North East
Asia as a counter to possible Japanese military expansionism. Nevertheless, current
Soviet strategy prefers to separate the United States and Japan in security efforts. 138
Playing on Japanese public opinion, Gorbachev has stated a desire to convene a
regional conference in Hiroshima to establish nuclear free zones in the APR. The
Soviet ideal would have nuclear free zones in Southeast Asia, the Indian Ocean and
Korean peninsula. Soviet Far Eastern nuclear weapons, besides SS-20s removed by the
'"Mikhail L. Titarenko, "The Soviet Concept of Security and Cooperation in the
Asia-Pacific Region," Journal of Northeast Asian Studies , Spring 1988, pp. 55-69.
138
Juliver and Kimura, previously cited, p. 155, quotes Gorbachev's Vladivostok
speech declaring, "The Soviet Union is a convinced advocate of disbanding the military
groupings, renouncing the possession of military bases in Asia.. .and withdrawing troops
from the territories of other countries."
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INF treaty, are not included since they are claimed to be for defensive purpose only. 139
Soviet talk of nuclear free zones has not been followed with appropriate deeds in the
APR. During a 1987 Merdeka newspaper interview Gorbachev announced the Soviets
would not increase the number of nuclear-weapons-carrying aircraft in Asia. 140 This
pledge was expanded by Gorbachev, during his Krasnoyarsk speech of 1 September
1988, to include any type of nuclear weapons in the region. M1 Therefore, no Blackjack
bombers, or new SSBNs should have entered the APR since the pledge. However,
Japan's Defense Agency has reported that the Soviets have deployed in the Soviet Far
East additional Akula-class submarines (supposedly capable of carrying strategic cruise
missiles) and a new Delta in ballistic missile submarine since Gorbachev's pledge. 142
Also, Moscow at first refused to accept "global double zero" and stated that the INF
would not include Far Eastern SS-20s. 143 A determined effort by the Reagan
Administration negotiated the removal of SS-20s from Asia, to the enhancement of
security for Japan and the P.R.C.. The Soviets consider it a major concession.
'"Gorbachev's Vladivostok speech defended SS-20 deployment in Asia, saying
there was no reason for any Asian to be concerned since the Soviet missiles were
strictly defensive.
,40
Titarenko, previously cited, p. 60.
,4,
U.S. Naval Institute, Proceedings , April 1989, p. 14.
,42Dennis Warner, "No Change in Soviet Military Buildup," Pacific Defense
Reporter , March 1989, pp. 40-41. CINCPACFLT, ADM. Jeremiah, commented in
Proceedings , April 1989, p. 14, about the significance of this broken promise.
14,
Herbert Y.Schandler, "Arms Control in Northeast Asia," Washington Quarterly ,
Winter 1987. Mr. Schandler believed there would be difficulty in meeting PRC/Japanese
security concerns regarding the SS-20 in Asia during the INF negotiations.
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Moscow's confidence building measures limiting naval ships near international
straits, e.g. Malacca, limitations on anti-submarine warfare vessels in the Indian ocean,
and withdrawal of nuclear weapons-carrying vessels from prescribed areas, e.g.
Southeast Asia, contrast to European conventional force reduction talks. The Soviet
approach in the APR is primarily concerned with naval forces. 144 Such an agreement,
under the banner of an Asian Security Conference, would remove the United States
ability to respond quickly to any military threat to the SLOCs of Asia. The United
States could find itself in a security position similar to the period of the "open door"
policy. Without military presence in Asia, the United States must rely on treaties to
promote national interest. If such agreements are violated, and written agreements
become mere scraps of paper, the United States may have the "open door" shut. U.S.
naval forces would then be required to fight their way across the Pacific. This lesson
of World War II, regarding U.S. security interests in Asia, still applies. For this very
reason, the United States has insisted on excluding naval forces in CFE negotiations
with the Soviets. The Soviets have proposed to play a role in sea lane protection. 145
Besides commerce, Middle Eastern oil enroute to Japan and the Four Tigers of South
Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong would be forced to fend for themselves if
the United States is decoupled from Asian SLOC security. Simply removing naval
144
Titarenko, previously cited, p. 58.
,45
see Armacost, Current Policy, previously cited. The Soviets made similar
proposals concerning the Persian Gulf. Despite criticizing US escorting of reflagged
Kuwaiti oil tankers and presence in the Gulf, Soviet combatants were in the Gulf
escorting Soviet merchants carrying military equipment bound for Iraq, hi fact, the
Soviets transported Kuwaiti oil prior to US reflagging. Their first escort also struck an
Iranian mine.
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forces from the sea lanes does not remove the threat from ashore, be it piracy in
Malacca or Soviet Backfire bombers from Soviet Central Asia.
U.S. Navy carrier battle group presence in the Indian Ocean and South China Sea
prevents Soviet land-based aviation, such as Backfire bombers, from attacking targets
of opportunity in the Hormuz and Malaccan straits without significant risk. Without
U.S. naval presence, aerial mining of these straits, by the Soviets, could severely
restrict critical energy supply to Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore. Until
success of Soviet reforms has been ascertained, to withdraw U.S. naval forces in favor
of "zones of peace" appears to place U.S. and allied national security interests at
unnecessary risk.
Soviet statements on comprehensive security in the APR make much talk of the
need for naval limitations, but there is no mention of limiting land based naval aviation
which is very capable of interdicting the sea lanes Asia depends upon. Despite
legitimate, traditional concerns over Far Eastern SLOC security, Soviet rhetoric is not
in line with offensive capabilities. 146 Ever since Vasco de Gama arrived in the Orient,
trade over the SLOCs there has been protected by navies. First the Portuguese and
Dutch, then the British. Now the United States protects sea lanes, and the general
principle of freedom of the seas on behalf of others. The current international system
of free trade relies on unhindered SLOCs-protected from harm by the traditional
presence role of naval forces. However, the Soviets feel that the nations of Asia can
only achieve comprehensive security when the United States reduces or limits naval
,46
see ADM Jeremiah's assessment of Soviet rhetoric and capabilities in
Proceedings, previously cited.
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forces in the APR, leaving only the Soviets with long-range conventional power
projection capabilities in the area. Can the nations of Asia, especially Japan, so heavily
dependent on resources and exports transported over sea lanes, rely on a reasonable
sufficiency which leaves only the Soviets with offensive projection capabilities in the
area? President Reagan remarked that the United States must "continue to judge the
Soviets by their actions, rather than their words, and found our national security
strategy on a realistic view of Soviet aims and capabilities." 147 Likewise, Prime Minister
Takeshita remarked that "perestroika has no visible effects in Asia." Because the Soviet
government relies on a political party and not institutions with the rule of law, perhaps
Soviet good intentions may change with new leadership. 148 Events in China highlight
the contradictions between dictatorship and institutions. Since no one can predict the
outcome of glasnost and perestroika, the Bush aclministration has emphasized a cautious
approach in dealing with the Soviets while supporting perestroika. The Soviets
themselves did not know if their reforms will succeed, and for tins very reason it
would seem prudent for the Western world to "keep the powder dry." Likewise, it his
highly unlikely given historical animosity and traditional security concerns that Japan
147Reagan, previously cited, p. V, preface.
14
*Asada, previously cited. Mr. Asada points out on p. 495 that in 1969 Brezhnev
proposed an Asian Security Conference in the context of a "Collective Security" system
in Asia. Brezhnev revised his views on an ASC in 1972 which included principles of
"renunciation of the use of force in relations between states, respect for sovereignty,
and the inviolability of borders." Afghanistan, of course, discredited Brezhnev's ASC
concept.
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will depend on a Soviet concept of regional security that seeks to remove U.S. forces
from Northeast Asia. 149
Soviets desires to promote regional security by joint Japanese-Soviet economic
efforts may be accepted by Japan, however, as long as Soviet military capability
remains to threaten Japan's SLOCs, Moscow's intentions will continue to be scrutinized
by Tokyo. Therefore, Soviet "peace objectives" in the Indian Ocean and Southeast
Asian SLOCs are a legitimate security threat to Japan if Gorbachev's proposals are
accepted by a regional conference, Soviet military capabilities remain, and the U.S.
forward deployed forces, especially naval, are decoupled from Asian security. A retreat
of U.S. naval presence in Asia would diminish the credibility of existing U.S. security
treaties and obligations. For example, the U.S. would be unable to comply with
security arrangements, i.e., South Korea and the Taiwan Relations Act, in sufficient
time to assist allies during the critical first week of conflict if U.S. naval forces had
to transit across the Pacific.
Yasuhiro Nakasone has stated that if the Soviets are sincere about becoming a
Pacific power, their military force levels in Asia must decline.' 50 No doubt the ex-
Prime Minister was alluding not only to the Soviet military build-up threatening Asia,
but also the structural imbalance within the Soviet Far East. Siberia and the Maritime
Provinces remain little more than military outposts as industry, cultural and civilian
enterprises lag far behind. Perhaps this is why seven out of ten Russians moving to the
149
Juviler and Kimura, previously cited, pp. 164, 165.
'
^omiuri Shimbun , 7 August 1988, p. 2 in "Daily Summary of Japanese Press,"
American Embassy, Tokyo, 17 August 1988.
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Soviet Far East leave the area within three years. 151 Asians would certainly feel more
secure if Vladivostok became an open city for more than a week and not merely a
naval port for the Soviet Pacific Fleet. If the Soviets actually reduce their offensive
capabilities, especially land-based naval aviation which threaten SLOC security, the
Cold War in Asia may finally come to a close. Only until the military forces of both
East and West have become decoupled as a threat to each other's security will military
capability no longer remain a primary determinate in major power relations.
The Soviets may attempt to politically decouple Japan from the United States by
offering all, or some, of the Northern Territories in exchange for increased trade and
joint ventures. 152 However, Moscow must continue the guarantee of safe passage,
especially to Petropavlosk, after such a diplomatic move. Also, a political arrangement
would need to reduce Japanese military capabilities of the 1990s. The Soviets would
prefer a demilitarized Sea of Japan and Sea of Okhotsk, or at least naval restrictions
in the area, prior to a conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan. 153 Due to the nature of
Soviet Pacific naval force structure, discussed later, very large reductions of up to fifty
percent may be offered by Gorbachev to induce Japan to make a deal on the Northern
Territories. Such a diplomatic move may be well received by the Japanese population
at large. With the Northern Territories returned to Japan and the U.S.S.R.'s maritime
151The Economist
.
15 October 1988, p. 42.
152Sato, previously cited, p. 40, remarked that the "growing strategic value of the
Sea of Okhotsk makes it highly unlikely that Moscow will move in that direction."
153Asada, previously cited, wisely commented in p. 505 that "anns control measures
between any two of the three (PRC, USSR, and Japan) may jeopardize their respective
security positions vis-a-vis the third state."
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force structure reduction completed, the Soviets would certainly desire an economic
quid pro quo. Japan may agree to increase economic ventures and accept confidence
building measures with the Soviets, especially if excessive U.S. protectionism forces
Japan to seek additional markets. In such a case, Japanese-Soviet relations would reach
an unprecedented level of cooperation and trust. This scenario tends to follow the
general lowering of East-West tensions, in favor of mutual cooperation. The United
States would probably concur with such a move as long as it follows an incremental
process, just as it has supported East-West European trends, and if it appears
perestroika and glasnost are succeeding. Any sign of Soviet revisionism into a hard-
line regime would naturally alter East-West relations, including Japanese-Soviet
relations.
Japan may choose to meet the Soviets half-way in a Kuriles resolution. For
example, it is unlikely the Japanese will accept the islands with demilitarization strings
attached. 154 Japan knows the Soviets are dealing from a position of economic weakness,
and while economic ventures may be provided by Japan in exchange for the islands,
would Japan limit defense structure based solely on Japanese-Soviet relations? Japan's
concern over the Korean peninsula, and a declining U.S. presence in the Western
Pacific due to financial restraints, is also a part of Japanese security planning. The
Soviets appear to be cutting defense expenditures regardless of what Japan does. While
Soviet economic failure threatens to decrease Soviet military power, Japan's economic
success can provide a dramatic increase in Japanese military power. At only three
,54
Ito, previously cited, p. 38, points out the Japanese government favors the
iriguchi-ron (the entrance theory), which states the territorial issue should be at the
entrance of Japanese-Soviet relations, with other issues, i.e. economic, to follow.
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percent GNP defense spending, $90-120 billion in the 1990s, Japan could be a
conventional equal to any power in the region. If it were to choose, it could also
maintain as many nuclear weapons in the region as any other country. Sato Seizaburo,
commenting on military power and its link with economic power, stated:
...an ambitious challenger...will voluntarily limit the growth of its military only
when it judges itself powerful enough or when financial constraints preclude
further spending. Such a challenger is likely to cooperate in arms limitation talks
only when it judges that this will not be to its detriment and that failure to
cooperate will put it at a disadvantage relative to its richer opponents. Exactly
these considerations were what convinced Japan to accept a 1922 treaty limiting
naval power at the time of the famous Washington Conference. 155
The Soviet Union, not Japan, fits Mr. Sato's description of an ambitious
challenger. While Japanese acceptance of Soviet offering of demilitarization in exchange
for the islands would lower tensions between the two nations, Japan's conservative
leadership (LDP) may be more concerned with the long-range implications of a
economically strong Soviet Far East. Japan's defense structure should also be viewed
in the context of a nation heavily dependent on overseas resources and markets, in
addition to an estimated $1 trillion invested overseas by 1995. Japan's growing
economic power will mean a growing Japanese national interest in overseas areas. In
other words, the more Japan has to gain, the more it has to lose, and protection of
economic assets is a historical justification for strengthening defense forces. Japan's
consistent increases in defense expenditure reflect this interest. Therefore, Japanese
5
Sato, previously cited, pp. 68, 69.
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acceptance of demilitarization or naval limitations in the area regarding the Kuriles
may not last long after the transferal of sovereignty. 156
The Recruit scandal, the forced resignations of Prime Ministers Takeshita and
Uno, and a very unpopular consumption tax, portends a possible shift away from
conservative-dominated government in Japan. A lower-house victory by the Japanese
Socialist Party (JSP) in the Diet during the 1990 election, matching their upper-house
victory in 1989, could have immense implications for Japanese relations with the
United States and Soviet Union in the security sphere. The JSP, like all other Japanese
political parties, including the Japanese Communist Party, insists on a return of the
Northern Territories to Japanese sovereignty.' 57 However, the traditional "unarmed
neutrality" stance of former JSP Chairman Isihibashi Masashi, that gained public
support in the 1970s, seems inappropriate for the 1990s. 158 In 1986 Takako Doi was
selected as the Chairwoman of the JSP and began to formulate a viable alternative to
the conservative LDP, which has virtually controlled the Diet since World War JJ. Ms.
Doi places U.S.-Japanese relations as top priority and recommends that the security
treaty and defense forces be accepted on "defense only" and Japan continue the one
percent GNP limit on defense spending.' 59 If the JSP attains a majority in the lower
house, Japan's defense spending may return to below one percent GNP. Also, Doi
,56The Economist, 24 December 1988, previously cited, points out that Japan is in
no rush to do business with the USSR after experiencing difficulty in economic
relations with the PRC in the midst of economic reforms. Also Siberia's natural
resources are in less demand by Japan than during the 1970s.
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Ito, previously cited, p. 36.
' 58Sato, previously cited, p. 63.
159
Endicott, previously cited, pp, 48, 49.
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would be more inclined to accept "demilitarization" of the Northern Territory area in
exchange for the islands. However, the JSP may find immense opposition from Japan's
powerful bureaucrats. 160 It remains to be seen, even after unprecedented LDP political
failures, whether the JSP can break the public's personal loyalties to the LDP, no
matter the candidate or issue, and become the first non-conservative party in decades
to gain power in Japan. This political phenomenon will be discussed in Chapter Four.
Without resolution of the Kuriles issue the possibility of future antagonism
between Japan and the U.S.S.R. remains. If Japan continues development of
conventional military power the potential for friction increases with a Soviet perception
of rising risk to Far Eastern security. The importance of Japanese military strength in
the 1990s to U.S. security interest in Asia will be addressed in Chapter Five. If a well-
armed Japan assumes an international/regional role commensurate with Japanese
economic power, Japanese-Soviet relations may proceed from bad to worse. ,6) Japan's
consistent increases in defensive spending, in conjunction with possible reductions in
military expenditures in the U.S.S.R. by Gorbachev in the next decade, may narrow the
military gap between Japan and the U.S.S.R. Similar events occurred between Japan
and the P.R.C. in the 1980s.
160Karel van Wolferen, The Enigma of Japanese Power (New York, N.Y.: Alfred
A. Knopf, 1989), p.73 mentions that "the collusion of the industrial-bureaucrats behind
the merger of the conservatives into the LDP, and the symbiotic relationship of the
ruling party with the ruling elite hat had served in the pre-war and war time
bureaucracy, indicated to the realists among the Japanese left that there was very little
if any chance that alternative political forces would ever be allowed to take over."
161The firing of warning shots at Soviet aircraft by Japan indicates the potential
for hostilities on a low-intensity scale.
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HI. SOVIET FAR EAST AND JAPANESE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES
Soviet military power in the Far East has increased dramatically in the last two
decades. However, this increase has not occurred in a vacuum, Japan has also
modernized her Self-Defense Forces (SDF). By comparing each respective conventional
force (ground, sea and air) a "modernization gap" appears to be emerging in the
maritime balance between the SDF and Soviet Far East Forces. Indeed, in the areas
where high technology is critical, Japan is superior not only in quality but also
quantity . Since sufficient military capability is harder to accumulate than redirecting
political intentions, this may have a profound impact on future Japanese-Soviet relations
in the next decade, especially concerning the Northern Territories.
A. SOVIET-JAPANESE GROUND FORCES
Today Soviet Far Eastern ground forces stand 500,000 strong. The Far Eastern
Theater of Military Operations (Teatr Voennykh Deistvii [TVD]) consists of fifty-
seven divisions, 14,900 tanks, 17,500 armored personnel carriers, and 13,700 pieces of
artillery. These ground forces are deployed from Tashkent to Petropavlosk, mostly
along the P.R.C. border. Four Districts (MDs) are situated within the TVD. The Far
Eastern TVD has direct responsibility of defending the Maritime Provinces, while the
Far Eastern MD provides the TVD commander with the forces he will fight with. The
adjacent MD (Transbaykal) is headquartered in Chita, some 1,200 miles from
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Sovetskaya Gavan. 162 Gorbachev's unilateral reductions in Soviet forces announced at
the U.N. reportedly allocate 200,000 of the 500,000 troop cuts to the Far Eastern
theater.
The Far Eastern MD, headquartered in Khabarovsk, hosts two tank, twenty-two
motor rifle, and one coastal defense divisions, plus two artillery and one air assault
brigade and some six hundred and seventy supporting helicopters. Tlus is slightly less
than half of the total TVD force. Additionally, the Far Eastern MD deploys at least
half of the two hundred and twenty-five Frog, eighty-plus Scud, and forty SS-12
surface to surface missiles (SSMs) in TVD inventory. 163 Some missiles of these types
were used in the Iran-Iraq "war of the cities" and are a definite threat to some
Japanese population centers.' 64
Moscow has indicated an intention to reduce 120,000 troops from the TVD along
the Chinese border. Tliis reduction was formalized during the Deng-Gorbachev
meeting. 165 Nonetheless, the Soviets have more than sufficient forces to meet any
conceivable ground threat from the P.R.C. or Japan. In the former case, the P.R.C.
numerical advantages are offset by vastly superior Soviet military technology and
162Soviet Military Power 1988, previously cited, p. 15. Four Divisions are to be
withdrawn from Mongolia, reducing total TVD ground forces to fifty-three divisions.
,63The Military Balance 1988-89, previously cited, p. 44.
'"Distance between Teheran and Baghdad is approximately equal the distance
across the Sea of Japan.
'^FEER, 25 May 1989, p. 13. Gorbachev also declared an intention to remove
eleven air force regiments and sixteen warships from the Far East.
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nuclear superiority, while Japan has a relatively small ground force. 166 Comparing the
Soviet's nuclear superiority over Japan's conventional forces will not be discussed since
that nation relies on the U.S. nuclear umbrella. However, given Japan's wealth, nuclear
expertise, and nuclear material processing ability from domestic nuclear power plants,
it should be mentioned that Japan could develop a nuclear weapons capability, if it
perceived it to be necessary for the national interest, quicker than any other non-
nuclear power in the world. The Constitutionality of possessing nuclear weapons will
be addressed in Chapter Four.
The Sea of Japan protects the archipelago from invasion from the continent much
the same way the English channel held the armies of Napoleon and Hitler at bay for
the British. It would be a difficult, if not impossible, task for the Soviets to invade and
occupy all the islands of Japan. The terrain of the archipelago reduces mobile armor
advantages, and the Soviet's amphibious capabilities are insufficient to transport the
required personnel to subdue all the islands.' 67 An invasion of Hokkaido, however, is
much more feasible. It is less populated than the other islands, and the Soviets would
only need to maintain control of the northern periphery to guarantee passage through
the Soya strait. This scenario in a conventional war between Japan and Russia is given
increased credence by the Soviet deployment of a full arniy division with long range
,66Edward L. Rowney, "Arms Control: The East Asian and Pacific Focus," Current
Policy , No. 904, U.S. Department of State, p. 3. Mr. Rowney mentions that even with
SS-20s removed from Asia, the Soviets will still have a formidable and preponderant
nuclear and conventional military presence in East Asia.
,67An armada of six hundred ships was required to subdue Okinawa during the
Pacific War.
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13mm artillery and approximately forty MIG-23 aircraft in the Northern Territories.' 68
The Soviet naval port of Korsakov in southern Sakhalin is ideally situated facing the
Soya strait, a mere half-hour away by hovercraft. To meet this threat Japan has
deployed two-thirds of the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) in Hokkaido.
Japan's GSDF has a force of 156,000 men, which is divided into twelve infantry
divisions, two composite brigades, one airborne brigade, one artillery brigade, and other
support brigades. 169 Japan has finally begun to modernize her ground forces, especially
tanks and air defense. The GSDF has 1,150 tanks of which one half are the new
domestically produced type-74. By 1990 the number of type-74 tanks is to be increased
to 1,250.
170 SSM-1 ground launched anti-ship missiles are being procured and they will
play a primary role in GSDF anti-invasion strategy. To protect against air attack, Japan
has purchased the Patriot SAM system. As the GSDF continues modernization in the
1990s, it will be increasingly difficult for the Soviets to successfully invade Japan,
especially the Northern periphery of Hokkaido.' 71 Since Soviet ground forces would
have difficulty conquering Honshu, Japan is concerned with the Soviet's power
projection capabilities, such as naval and air assets, that can threaten the archipelago
without invasion.
168Defense Attache . October-November 1987, p. 50.
16<The Military Balance 1988-89, previously cited, p. 160.
170
"Japan Flexes Defense Muscle", Defense Attache , 6/1986, p. 20.
17,See O'Connell, previously cited, for importance of SSM-1/Patriot in GSDF
strategy.
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B. SOVIET-JAPANESE NAVAL FORCES
Soviet ability to project conventional power against Japan relies heavily on naval
and air power. In the 1980s the Soviet Pacific Fleet (SOVPACFLT) became the largest
of the four fleets in the U.S.S.R.. However, Soviet naval forces are facing an increasing
"modernization gap" in comparison with the JMSDF . In determining the war-fighting
capability of SOVPACFLT one should consider the status of major combatants
commissioned prior to 1970. The term major combatant includes only warships over
1,000 tons, a "blue water navy." Their size allows for sufficient power generation
required to operate major combat weapon systems such as long-range missiles, high-
quality radars, and the like. Mere "bean counting" will not do, especially if the beans
are of differing quality. For example, since 1970 the advent of anti-ship cruise missiles
(ASCM), such as the air-launched version of Harpoon and Exocet, have revolutionized
naval warfare much like the carrier did in World War II. Surface ships which are not
able to destroy the air-launched ASCM platform before it shoots, in other words at the
ASCM's maximum range, are highly vulnerable. The idea is to get the "archer" before
he launches his "arrow." In the surface warfare realm, only modern major combatants
are able to carry weapon systems of sufficient capability that can engage opposing
fighter-bomber aircraft at ranges exceeding medium-range air-launched ASCMs, i.e.,
Harpoon and Exocet. Major combatant defense against extremely long-range ASCMs,
such a the Soviet AS-4 and AS-6 ASCMs, remains dependent on supporting sea-based
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air power to intercept the bomber before it reaches weapon release range (WRR). This
may change in the 1990s. 172
The ASCM revolution has produced a little heard of counter-revolution in ships'
defense. Modem ships equipped with Anti-Air Warfare (AAW) systems such as surface
to air missiles (SAM) which have a range exceeding the ASCM turn the table on the
"archer." Now, the aircraft may be vulnerable before he can shoot his ASCM. Warships
may be equally vulnerable from surface to surface (SSM) or submarine launched
missiles without an effective SAM system. Of course, any SSM platform may be
equally threatened by another SSM platform, with the advantage usually in favor of
longer range. A modem major combatant, with a top-of-the-line SAM system such as
SM-2 ER, can engage opposing air threats at ranges of approximately 100 miles. These
systems provide a combatant the opportunity to commence engagement of even sea-
skimming ASCMs at the radar horizon, 15-18 miles. Thus, the ASCM can be engaged
with more than one salvo, increasing kill probability, while a lesser combatant, with
a short-range SAM system, may have only one salvo at the opposing ASCM. Meeting
this challenge requires the highest technology, in short, a "state of the art" Navy.
Refitting outdated ships, i.e., those built before 1970, is both costly and time
consuming, if one has the technology. Ships which do not have this AAW SAM ability
suffer the consequences. Afghanistan has shown how vulnerable aircraft can become
to SAMs. Britain experienced the liability of insufficient AAW ability in the Falklands,
'"Development of a next generation surface to air missile, SM-3, may have
sufficient range and altitude capability to strike at AS-4 and AS-6 carrying aircraft
before the WRR. Also, laser and particle beam technology during the next decade may
provide surface combatants with a weapon system that could make ASCMs obsolete
and severely restrict air power at sea.
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as did Iran in the Persian Gulf. U.S. naval operations in the Persian Gulf in 1987-88
provide the most recent examples of modem naval warfare in a combat zone. Iraqi air
strikes at merchant shipping, during the Tanker War, provided an indication of how
modem warfare at sea may be conducted. British, French, Soviet, and U.S. combatants
in the Gulf were under the tlireat of inadvertent attack by Iraqi Mirage III fighter-
bombers carrying Exocet missiles. Only U.S. cruisers and destroyers, equipped with
long-range SAM systems, could threaten Iraqi Mirage His beyond the Exocet WRR.
In other words, other combatants could only hope to destroy the ASCM, but not the
aircraft, if inadvertently attacked at the WRR. Introduction of U.S.N, cruisers in the
Gulf and a strengthed rules of engagement, after the Stark incident, prevented any
further inadvertent attacks on U.S. combatants.' 73
Ships which do have modem SAM and SSM ability are part of the coming new
revolution in naval warfare at sea. SOVPACFLT is severely limited by inadequate
AAW defense afloat because most ships were commissioned prior to 1970. This is the
basis of a modernization gap that appears to be increasingly favorable to Japan's
maritime forces over SOVPACFLT into the 1990s. An analysis of Japanese and Soviet
warship classes reveals the severity of the modernization gap, bloc obsolescence in
certain Soviet warship classes, and an indication of a Japanese maritime force in the
1990s that may become second to only the U.S. Pacific Fleet in conventional strength.
SOVPACFLT became respectable in the 1980s when it received two Kiev-class
Very Short Take Off and Landing (VSTOL) aircraft carriers (CV). These vessels carry
'"Author's observations as Tactical Action Officer aboard USS Reeves, CG-24,
assigned as Anti-Air Warfare Commander (AAWC) in the Persian Gulf under
Commander Middle East Forces during the first nine Ernest Will convoys.
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approximately a dozen Forger aircraft, excellent for interdiction of merchant vessels.
However, Forgers do not carry missiles with a range exceeding a few miles and are
vulnerable to medium and long range AAW SAM systems on major warships. 174 Forger
is also a poor air-to-air interceptor in comparison with F-14, F-18, (Navy) or F-15, F-
16 (Air Force) modem jet fighters deployed by the United States in Asia. Japan's F-
15s and even the older F-4s are far superior to the sea-based Forger. The two Kievs
do have a powerful strike ability even if their aircraft do not. Their SS-12 missiles
have a range of approximately 200 miles and one can easily put an ill-prepared
combatant out of commission. 175 Still, such long-range weapons require excellent
targeting data, especially since the waters around Japan are the world's busiest.
To counter the Kiev-class, there are strong indications Japan intends to build a
VSTOL CV during the next 1990-95 Defense Guideline. 176 The CV, if built, will
probably be based on the British Royal Navy's Invincible-class design. In comparison
with the Kiev-class, the Japanese CV itself will lack long-range ASCM capability, but
the Harrier aircraft it will carry will have a comparable long-range ASCM ability. The
number of Harriers the CV will carry is approximately the same as the Kiev's Forgers.
The big difference between the two is the Harrier's ASM-1 ASCM in comparison with
the Forger's Kerry ASCM. The ASM-1 range will soon be 70-plus nautical miles,
,74Department of the Navy, Understanding Soviet Naval Development (Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985), p. 49.
,75Norman Polmar, Guide to the Soviet Navy (Annapolis, Md.:Naval Institute Press,
1983), p. 365.
,76
. Defense and Foreign Affairs Weekly , 6-12 February 1989, p. 1. Also see
Defense Asia-Pacific , 2/1988, p. 4 for similar indications of Japanese CV procurement.
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while the Kerry's range is less than 10 nautical miles.' 77 Thus, Harrier can launch
ASM-1 near or outside SAM range, but Forger will not have that luxury. The Japanese
Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) has four escort flotillas so it is logical that
eventually each will have a CV, but probably only two will be commissioned during
the next decade. If two Japanese CVs are deployed in the 1990s, SOVPACFLT may
be at a disadvantage in sea-based air strike warfare vis-a-vis the JMSDF. The Soviets
may deploy their first large aircraft carrier in the early 1990s, which is to eventually
carry conventional (probably SU-24) or VSTOL aircraft. 178 Even if the Soviets deploy
the new full-deck carrier to the Far East, they could still be at a disadvantage in sea-
borne strike warfare unless they develop a sea-based air-launched ASCM comparable
to ASM-1.' 79 Sea-based air superiority will depend on the number of CVs Japan and
the U.S.S.R. deploy in the Pacific during the 1990s.
The next signal that the Soviets intended to become a Pacific maritime power
occurred when SOVPACFLT received a Kirov-class cruiser in 1987. This nuclear
powered "battle cruiser" (in excess of 25,000 tons, they are the largest cruisers built
177
Jane's Weapons Systems 1988-89 (London, England.: Jane's Publishers, Ltd.,
1988), p. 718, describes the Kerry's range as eight KM. Other Soviet ASCMs, such
as the AS-9 (75 KM range), and AS- 14 (30 KM range) are carried on the SU-24
Fencer. Jane's states the ASM-1, in service since 1983, has a range of 50 KM.
However, the new SSM-1 micro turbojet engine will probably be utilized for the ASM-
1, increasing the range to at least 150 KM, when it is deployed with the FSX fighter
and Sea Harrier. Japan's development of a SSM-2 may increase ranges up to 700 KM,
and could be converted into a sea-based version (ASM-2).
178Soviet Military Power, previously cited, p. 84.
,79
Harrier with ASM-1 should be considered primarily an anti-surface ship strike
weapon for the JMSDF, with a secondary role of flotilla air defense. Harrier would be
a poor interceptor of Backfire bombers due to range limitations.
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since World War II) is the most versatile vessel of SOVPACFLT. Equipped with long
range SS-19 ASCMs it is a major threat to opposing warships. Another feature of the
Kirov is an improved long-range SAM system. If the Kirov radar can detect enemy
aircraft in sufficient time, SA-N6 SAM can destroy aircraft beyond or near the ASCM
release point.' 80 Because the Soviets previously had no warship capable of shooting
down aircraft beyond ASCM range their vessels were extremely vulnerable. Now Kirov
provides some measure of air defense to SOVPACFLT, but the fleet remains precarious
with only one ship of this class for the job.
Meanwhile, the JMSDF has already laid the keel and funded construction of two
AEGIS SAM destroyers (DDG). Weighing over 7,000 tons they will be cruisers except
in name. The ultimate force structure has been proposed from four to eight vessels. 181
Like the CV(s) to be built in the next decade, it is logical to assume that there will
eventually be at least one for each of the four escort flotillas. Japan probably will have
at least that many deployed during the next decade with the first ship commissioned
in 1993. Japanese shipyards can easily build a total of eight before the year 2000. The
AEGIS DDG will be a quantum leap in AAW effectiveness for the JMSDF. These
vessels will be vastly superior to Kirov in SAM range, radar capability, and high-tech
reliability.
182
If SOVPACFLT does not double surface AAW capability during the
,80Jane's Fighting Ships 1988-89, previously cited, p. 571.
""Jane's Fighting Ships 1988-89, previously cited, pp. 307, 308.
182Jane's Weapons Systems 1988-89 (London, England.: Jane's Publishing, Ltd.,
1988), p. 110 states, "AEGIS AAW system is probably the best anti-air missile system
afloat within any Navy." Furthermore, p. 479 reports the SAM range may be up to
ninety miles.
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1990s, and four-eight JMSDF AEGIS ships are procured, then the JMSDF could have
a technological and numerical advantage in that field of warfare. Such an advantage,
in conjunction with JASDF fighters, may give Japan an opportunity to control the skies
over the Kuriles in the next decade. The consequences of this ability and Soviet land-
based aviation will be discussed later.
The newest cruiser addition to SOVPACFLT is the Slava-class. Only one has
been introduced to the Far East, but it carries sixteen long-range ASCMs. Another will
probably be deployed in SOVPACFLT in the next few years. Slava's air defense
capabilities, the SA-N6 missile, are sufficient to meet the Japanese ASCM threat. 183
Slava and Kirov-class ships will be required to provide afloat ASCM AAW support
for all of SOVPACFLT if it deploys beyond the range of land-based tactical support
aircraft. Ten other SOVPACFLT cruisers are stationed in the Far East. They are the
Kara, Kresta I/II, Kynda, and Sverdlov-classes. Their mission is primarily anti-surface
warfare (ASUW) and anti-submarine warfare (ASW), but with a AAW SAM range of
about 30 miles they are insufficient to meet the ASCM threat. While Sverdlov was
commissioned in the early 1950s, the newest of the other classes, the Kara and Kresta
II, were built in the 1970s. 184 In other words, Soviet cruisers will begin to face bloc
obsolescence in the 1990s.
Destroyers (DDs) have traditionally been considered the most versatile of surface
ships, the jack-of-all trades, able to fend for themselves in AAW, ASUW, and ASW.
'"Slava's SA-N6 missile is identical to Kirov's SA-N6.
,84
Jane's Fighting Ships 1988-89, (Hereafter referred to as Jane's), p. 544 reports
eleven CGs in the Pacific. Sam range and class age are reported in pp. 572-575 of
Jane's.
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The newest classes in SOVPACFLT are the Sovremmeny and Udaloy; four of each
have been deployed in the last three years. The former class emphasizes ASUW with
the world's fastest sea-skimming ASCM. The latter class was built with strong ASW
capabilities in mind. Neither is able to face up to the ASCM threat with limited SAM
systems that have ranges of only 15 miles at best. These new DDGs cannot engage
opposing aircraft, carrying even medium-range ASCMs, before the weapons release
range. After the ASCM has been released, the SAM system can only hope to defend
the ship, not threaten the opposing aircraft. All other DDGs/DDs in SOVPACFLT
include Kashin/Mod-Kashin-class vessels constructed from 1962 to 1972, and Kilden,
Kotlin, Kanin, and Sory-classes of which none were built after 1962, very outdated,
and unable to meet the ASCM challenge. 185 Thus, Soviet DDs also face bloc
obsolescence in the 1990s.
The JMSDF has emphasized ASW/ASUW during the construction of DDs in the
1980s. Consequently, during this decade Japan commissioned twenty-one DDG/DDs
with ASW/ASUW capability. 186 This compares with only eight SOVPACFLT DDGs and
two CGs commissioned and deployed to the Far East during the same period.' 87 If this
trend continues into the 1990s, and it appears it will based on shipbuilding efforts,
Japan's maritime superiority will be self-evident. To meet the requirement of protecting
sea transportation in accordance with the 1976 National Defense Program Outline,
""Jane's, pp. 577-583 report class age, construction, and weapons range. P. 544
reports there are sixteen DDGs and two DDs active in SOVPACFLT.
,86
Jane's, pp. 309-312.
,87Four Sovremmeny and Udaloy each, and one Kirov and Slava.
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JMSDF vessels are deployed in four escort flotillas comprised of eight ships and ten
Divisions (three ships per Division). Each flotilla is to have eight warships with eight
ASW helicopters. This is known as the eight-eight program. 188 The mainstay of each
flotilla is one "Shirane" or "Haruna" class DDH. These ships carry an impressive ASW
capability unsurpassed by any Soviet cruiser or destroyer. The reason being, DDHs
carry three ASW helicopters which provide a rapid localization/attack feature for
prosecuting submarines. However, they have no long-range ASUW/AAW ability besides
two 5" guns and point defense systems. Two Shirane DDHs were commissioned in the
early 1980s, while the two Haruna DDHs have undergone major refits in the mid-
1980s after only ten years of service. 189
For AAW defense each flotilla will have two DDGs. Until AEGIS is deployed,
the JMSDF currently has three Tachikaze, one Amatsukaze, and two Hatakaze-class
DDGs. They carry SAM systems with a range of only about twenty-five miles. All
were commissioned after 1975 with the exception of Amatsukaze. For ASUW/ASW
each flotilla will have five DDs. These general purpose DDs include twelve Hatsuyuki-
class DDs, all commissioned in the 1980s. They are armed with eight Harpoon surface
to surface missiles (SSM) and 76 MM rapid firing guns. Additionally, the first ship of
the new Asagiri-class destroyer completed sea trials in 1988. An improved Hatsuyuki-
class, these are very capable ASW-ASUW platforms, carrying Harpoon, short-range
SAM, 76 MM gun, and ASW helicopters. These ships carry indigenous sonar,
electronic warfare (EW) equipment, and fire control radars, a marked departure from
,88
"Gunji Kenkyu," JPRS , 30 August 1988, p. 7.
189
All data on JMSDF DDG/DDs from Jane's, pp. 309-313.
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the U.S. designed equipment of the past.' 90 Japan intends to build a total of eight
Asagiri by 1991, with probably two for each Flotilla.
SOVPACFLT has deployed fifty-six frigates (FF/FFG), which is near one half of
the total major combatants in the Soviet Far East. A dozen Krivak TJ-class FFGs have
been deployed and they were introduced in the 1970s. Krivak I-class ships were built
in the early 1970s and Krivak III, which is the newest, remains under operational
control of the KGB. The remaining majority of FFs, such as Riga, Grisha, Mirka, and
Petya-classes are 25 to 35 years old, and will have little value in the 1990s. None of
these Frigates can meet the ASCM threat effectively. 191
The JMSDF has seventeen FFs, and only three were commissioned prior to 1970.
Composed primarily of eleven Chikugo-class ships, the JMSDF is in the process of
further modernization. The new Yubari-class FF will be commissioned next year and
will be comprised of four to six vessels. 192 It is interesting to note that almost all of
Japan's combatants carry ASROC (anti-submarine rocket), including the Chikugo-class
FF, making them the smallest vessels in the world with that weapon. Japan has far
more rocket delivered anti-submarine torpedoes than SOVPACFLT. 193
190James Auer and Sadao Seno, "Japan's Maritime Self-Defense Force," NAFO
,
p. 187, reports that the 1986-1990 programme contains increased funding targets for
critical sustainability items needed by the JMSDF, namely missiles, mines, and
torpedoes.
191Jane's, pp. 584-589 contain data on Soviet FFs. Page 544 reports eleven FFGs
and forty-five FF/FFLs in SOVPACFLT.
'"Jane's, pp. 314-316.
193
Fifty JMSDF vessels carry ASROC, while SOVPACFLT has similar SSN-14s
deployed on only half as many vessels. Figures derived from counting ASROC
launchers in Jane's pp. 307-316 (Japan) and pp. 569-589 (Soviet).
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In the final analysis, SOVPACFLT has a little more than a dozen ships
commissioned in the 1980s and less than twenty more commissioned in the 1970s. 194
Considering that most warships have neared the end of their usefulness after twenty
years, without a major refitting of modem weaponry, the major combatants of SOV-
PACFLT are approaching a bloc obsolescence crisis in the 1990s. From 1970 to 1989
the Soviets have added just over thirty major combatants (not commissioned prior to
1970) to SOVPACFLT, while over seventy warships deployed there were built prior
to 1970. The older ships will have little value during the next decade, reducing the
effectiveness of the Soviet Union's maritime power in Northeast Asia. Meanwhile,
Japan has approximately forty-three major warships built since 1970, expects to
commission fifteen more in the next five years, and has only eleven built prior to 1970
still in commission.' 95 The trend in naval combatant force levels is clear. SOVPACFLT
surface combatants are facing a growing "modernization gap" with their Japanese
counterparts . This is most evident in ASW and ASUW weaponry, such as ASROC and
in the numbers of surface to surface missiles carried aboard the respective fleets. In
comparison with SOVPACFLT, the JMSDF has one hundred and ninety-two SSMs
(Harpoon missiles with a range of 70plus miles) aboard her major combatants, while
"Two Keiv, one Kirov, one Slava, four Sovremmeny, four Udaloy, and a handful
of Krivak FFGs were deployed in the 1980s. Ships deployed in the 1970s tabulated
from Jane's. The figures for SOVPACFLT are approximate, the uncertainty caused by
the exact number of pre- 1970 CGs and FFs deployed there.
195Force Structure of JMSDF and SOVPACFLT derived from Jane's. Also, Jane's,
p. 544, reports the Soviet Navy has twenty major warships under construction (CG-
FF), which must be divided between the four Soviet Fleets.
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the Soviets have only ninety-six SSMs with a range greater than fifty miles. 196 The
Soviets do have a handful of old combatants in the Far East which carry the Styx
SSM, with a range of approximately forty miles. They also have a large number of
ships which can fire their AAW and SSN-14 missiles in an ASUW mode, but the
range is restricted to the radar horizon of about seventeen miles. Their value against
a longer-ranged SSM-armed warship is questionable. Japan will build two Aegis, seven
Asagiri-class, and six Yubari-class major warships in the next three-five years. This
will enable the JMSDF to increase their SSMs to a total of 280 by 1993. Likewise,
Japan's ASROC superiority over SOVPACFLT will be strengthened. Meanwhile,
Gorbachev has announced an intention to decrease the Soviet military budget by up to
fifteen percent. Even if the Soviets maintain their defense spending, it is doubtful they
can keep pace with the modernization effort of the JMSDF in the 1990s. For example,
the Soviets are having difficulty now maintaining current technology weapon systems,
such as the Udaloy SAM system.
The greatest feature of JMSDF vessels is their technology. They are truly unique
in an Asian (United States excluded) context. They have state-of-the-art fire control
systems, sonar, guns, torpedoes, close in weapons system (CIWS), SSM, chaff, EW
equipment, gas turbine engineering systems, and the like. 197 Japan's shipbuilders are at
the forefront in applying super conductors for propulsion systems in maritime vessels.
,96Figures tabulated from Jane's (no. of ASCM launchers per vessel).
,97G. Jacobs, "Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force Preparing for the 1990s,"
Defense Asia Pacific , 2/1988, pp. 17,18. Mr. Jacobs states all ships are to have updated
ESM/ECM systems, and Japan is developing new radar and sonar systems.
Additionally, a new GRX-3 ASW torpedo built in Japan will be introduced in the early
1990s.
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A recent study by the Naval Research Laboratory in Washington stated, "the use of
magnetohydrodynamic propulsion for ocean going vessels provides potential for
advances in ship performance analogous to the advances in aircraft performances which
followed from the development of the jet engine." 198 To meet this "modernization gap"
SOVPACFLT will have to receive four major combatants annually into the next decade
to replace an aging fleet or face a technology gap with the JMSDF. Excluding air-
power and submarines, the JMSDF is on solid ground vis-a-vis SOVPACFLT in
ASUW and ASW now, and will probably be superior in AAW during the next decade.
Japan is also building replenishment ships for their growing fleet-a traditional Soviet
deficiency. It remains to be seen if SOVPACFLT can meet the JMSDF technology
challenge during the 1990s. Of course, in naval warfare one cannot exclude land-based
air force and submarine force structure, yet in the 1990s Soviet Far Eastern warships
may be at a distinct disadvantage vis-a-vis the JMSDF.
Soviet deployment of submarines in the Pacific has also increased significantly
during the last two decades, however SOVPACFLT submarines could face a
"modernization gap" challenge from the JMSDF in the 1990s . Vladivostok centered in
the middle of the Sea of Japan, and Petropavlovsk on the Kamchatka peninsula, are the
main SOVPACFLT submarine ports. The introduction of a new submarine facility on
Shimushir in the middle of the Kurile chain demonstrates Soviet efforts to make the
,98Stephen Kreider Yoder, "Japanese Ship Will Use Super Conductors," Asian Wall
Street Journal , 17 August 1988, p. 3. Mr. Yoder also noted that Japan has built a 150-
ton experimental vessel, named the Yamato I, and expects to build full-size ships and
submarines by the early 21st century that can cruise at 70 plus knots.
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Sea of Okhotsk an inland lake. SOVPACFLT submarines have been considered a major
power projection force in the APR. 199
One major conventional threat to Japan's sea lanes consists of SOVPACFLT's
twenty-seven SSG/SSGNs (ASCM armed diesel and nuclear-powered submarines).
These boats are more a threat to combatants than merchants, since torpedoes instead
of expensive ASCMs are the preferred weapon on the latter. A modernization gap is
reducing the effectiveness of these mostly pre- 1970 produced boats. Only eight of
twenty-seven were built from 1967 to 1989, with the rest commissioned before 1967. 200
With no primary defensive weapons, a submarine must rely on stealth to survive. The
nuclear power plants of these older boats are very noisy, which makes them easier to
find.
201 This was the central issue of the Toshiba scandal (better propellers partially
reduced the noise signature of these old boats). The six non-nuclear powered diesel
SSGs are very quiet, but these Juliet-class boats are approaching thirty years of age.
199
"Chernavin Responds," U.S. Naval Institute, Proceedings , February 1989, p. 77.
ADM. Chernavin declared, "We consider both nuclear and diesel submarines, along
with naval aircraft, to be the main forces of our fleet."
200Derek da Cunha, "The Growth of the Pacific Fleet's Submarine Force,"
International Defense Review , 2/1988, p. 130, reports eight Charlie I/II, thirteen Echo
II (SSGNs), and six Juliet (SSGs) in SOVPACFLT. Jane's, pp. 554-559, reports only
the Charlie II-class of SOVPACFLT SSG/SSGNS were built after 1973.
20,Capt. John Moore, "Soviet Submarine Technology Forges Ahead," Jane's Naval
Review , 1987, p. 85. Capt. Moore stated "the early days of nuclear propulsion Soviet
boats were extremely noisy. ..the first class to benefit from efforts to overcome this
problem were the Victor Ills, with a sound signature 20% less than previous boats."
According to Jane's, the first Victor Ills were completed in 1978. Therefore, the
"newest" SSGNs, Charlie lis, in the Pacific are, in Capt. Moore's words, "extremely
noisy."
84
The twenty-five SSN (nuclear powered attack) and forty-three SS diesel boats in
SOVPACFLT have been a traditional threat to merchant shipping in Asia. However,
only two Akula, ten Victor HI, and probably two Victor I SSNs along with six Kilo
SSs have been designed, built and deployed to SOVPACFLT after 1970. The Akula,
Victor in, and Kilo-classes are the most modem, commissioned in the 1980s. Of a
total of one hundred and twenty-nine submarines in SOVPACFLT, only twenty attack
(SSN/SSs) were built in the 1980s. None of the SSB, SSGN, or SSGs were. In fact,
over half of all one hundred and twenty-nine SOVPACFLT submarines were built prior
to 1970. Thus, SOVPACFLT submarines, like their sister surface ships, face mass bloc
obsolescence. This is clearly evident in SSs diesel boat forces, where thirty-seven of
forty-three are of pre-1970 design. 202 The greatest limitation of these older boats is their
lack of modem sonar. They are ineffective in ASW operations, that is hunting other
submarines. New submarines, with modem hydrophones and noise processing
equipment, can hunt down older boats which lack such equipment.
Japan has sixteen Yuushio/Usushio-class diesel SS, all of which were built since
1970. All ten boats of the Yuushio-class were produced during the 1980s, and seven
of them carry Harpoon, while the other three may be backfitted. The first improved
Yuushio-class boat will be commissioned in 1990 with production at one per year.
They will no doubt carry Harpoon, effectively making them SSGs. Today, Japan has
a favorable advantage in modern SSG/SSGNs over SOVPACFLT, which has not
deployed any of these boats built since 1980. The Soviets will have to introduce new
202SOVPACFLT submarine force structure derived from Derek da Cunha,
International Defense Review, p. 130 and Jane's, pp. 554-563, both previously cited.
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SS/SSNs to the Pacific annually to keep up the technological pace since Japan has only
four less attack submarines built since 1970 than SOVPACFLT. 203 The Akula appears
to be in a production rate of one per year, however SOVPACFLT will certainly not
receive all of them. The Akula and Victor Ills in SOVPACFLT are top-of-the-line
submarines with a quiet nuclear power plant. To counter the SSN threat, there has been
considerable discussion in Japanese defense circles that a SSN is needed for JMSDF
service. 204 SSN production for the JMSDF would certainly alter the remaining
submarine balance between Japan and the Soviets. Constitutional questions, regarding
Japanese nuclear elements in the defense realm, while be addressed in Chapter Five.
If Japanese SSN production comes on line in the next decade JMSDF SSNs may
counterbalance Soviet Akula and Victor JJI SSNs. Therefore, the traditional Soviet
advantage in submarines may become inferior due to a "modernization gap."
The water around Japan is ideally suited for submarine operations, since it is both
very shallow in some areas and very deep in others making ASW difficult. One of the
submarine's main role is to interdict aggressors in the "choke points" of the Tsushima,
Tsugaru, and Soya straits and Kurile island chain. This applies to both Japanese and
Soviet submarines. ASW plays a major role of Japanese and Soviet naval forces given
the importance of safe passage and SSBN sanctuary in the waters near Japan. The
JMSDF surface fleet has better ASW capabilities than SOVPACFT surface fleet
because of the "modernization gap," i.e., JMSDF sonar, anti-submarine rocket
(ASROC), ASW helicopters, etc. are newer and of higher quality than their Soviet
203JMSDF submarine force structure is reported in Jane's, p. 308.
204James Auer and Sadao Seno in NAFO, previously cited, p. 187.
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counterparts. 205 For example, the JMSDF has purchased sixty-six HSS-2b ASW
helicopters during the current five year defense plan, increasing the number of
helicopters to nearly one hundred. 206 SOVPACFLT has approximately the same number
of ASW helicopters, yet only one fifth are as new. 207 Additionally, Japan is producing
new ASW helicopters, of the U.S. SH-60 design, but incorporating Japanese electronic
components. 208
Japan has a further advantage in land-based naval aviation ASW forces over the
Soviets. This is evident in the approximately one hundred P-3C ASW aircraft deployed
in JMSDF naval aviation, which is four times the U.S. P-3C aircraft in the Western
Pacific and a larger number than the eighty Soviet Bear-F, Mail, and Mays deployed
in the Far East. 209 These aircraft also have another function as maritime air patrol,
looking for surface targets of opportunity and passing locating data to JMSDF surface
forces. This targeting information is of great importance in employment of SSMs,
which Japan has an advantage vis-a-vis SOVPACFLT.
To ensure control over entrance and exit to the Sea of Japan and Sea of Ohkostk,
both Japan and the U.S.S.R. have large, efficient mine sweeping capabilities. The
205JPRS, previously cited, p. 11, reports JMSDF requested Edamoto to develop a
SSM with one-third more range than Harpoon. Additionally, the JMSDF desires
domestically produced towed-arrays, sonars, and other high-tech equipment that is
second to none.
206Japanese Defense Agency, Defense of Japan, 1987 , p. 147.
207The Military Balance 1988-89, previously cited, p. 45 reports only one out of
five SOVPACFLT ASW bns is composed of the modem Helix helicopter.
208G. Jacobs, previously cited, p. 17.
209
Jane's, p. 544 (Soviets), and Auer, previously cited, p. 187 (Japan).
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Soviets have ninety-six of these vessels while the JMSDF has forty-five, of which the
Japanese have built twenty-one during this decade. 210 The JMSDF also has twelve
minesweeping helicopters. This equipment allows Japan to ensure her ports are not
closed from mining. Japan's ability to mine the straits is not equal to that of the
Soviets for one reason, that being the large Soviet stockpile of mines and the relatively
few in Japanese inventory. Approximately 6,000 mines of various kinds would be
required to block the three straits, and the JMSDF has only 1,200 in stock. 211
Minelaying does not require a dedicated minelaying force, as experienced in the Persian
Gulf. However, since JMSDF force structure is in a favorable position vis-a-vis the
SOVPACFLT, Japan can afford to purchase mines in quantities sufficient enough to
effectively block the straits. Minesweeping must be conducted with adequate AAW,
ASW, and ASUW forces nearby for obvious reasons.
The purpose in comparing Soviet surface and submarine forces with their
Japanese counterparts is to analyze their possible function in future conflicts and
ascertain the maritime balance between the two nations. Maritime power has played a
central role in modem Asian history, particularly Northeast Asia. This thesis concludes
the majority of SOVPACFLT naval forces are best suited for coastal defense, i.e., the
large number of old destroyers and submarines. Their value hundreds of miles away
from port, where combat air patrol support will be scarce, must be questioned against
modem ASW platforms such as JMSDF P-3C sonobouy-carrying aircraft and
210Both SOVPACFLT and JMSDF MCMV force structure derived from The
Military Balance 1988-89, previously cited, pp. 45 and 161 respectively, and Jane's
p. 318.
2
"Gallagher, previously cited, p. 83.
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ASUW/ASW destroyers carrying SSM missiles, ASROC, and ASW helicopters. Because
of the "modernization gap" it is highly unlikely aging Soviet surface combatants and
conventionally powered submarines will attempt a break-out of the Sea of Japan and
Sea of Ohkostk on a SLOC interdiction mission. The Soviets may desire to use these
assets to control the Kuriles and critical straits. Modem assets, such as the fourteen
Akula and Victor l/Ul SSNs, along with the slightly older eight Charlie I/II SSGNs
may be tasked to oppose enemy naval forces far from home waters. However, defense
of Soviet SSBNs may not allow the twenty-two efficient boats of the one hundred and
twenty-nine submarines to effectively threaten Japan's sea lanes in the Indian Ocean,
South China Sea and Pacific Ocean.
Perhaps the growing "modernization gap" in favor of Japan is one reason why
Gorbachev calls for regional naval limitation talks in the APR. Because of the limited
value of half of SOVPACFLT, Gorbachev may propose to scrap the older half of the
fleet (up to sixty warships and an equal number of submarines) as a political gesture
to induce Japan to demilitarize as part of a resolution to the Kurile problem. 212
Replacing the aging fleet with modem combatants and submarines at a pace that can
keep up with the modernization gap will be increasingly difficult as the Soviet
economy continues dismal perfonnance. Gorbachev's proposal to cut Soviet spending
by fifteen percent should be taken seriously since Soviet defense spending in 1989
appears to be slowing. 213 Soviet troop reductions in Europe, and along the Chinese
212The Economist , 1 April 1989, p. 30 mentions the Soviets have considered the
possibility of de facto "joint-occupation" of the Northern Territories.
213New York Times , 20 November 1989, p. 1.
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border, have set a precedent for a "peace offensive" directed at Japan. With Soviet
naval forces facing bloc obsolescence such a move would hardly diminish Soviet
security in the Far East. Additionally, it could promote a questioning of the necessity
of the United States forward deployment strategy among our Asian allies. Japan may
accept such proposals if it decided that restraining its military force structure is in its
national interest. In the context of perestroika succeeding, the U.S. may favor such a
demilitarization of the Northeast Pacific between Japan and the U.S.S.R. compared to
an independent Japanese defense strategy, supported by three-six percent GNP, that
might take advantage of Soviet weakness. If the U.S. and U.S.S.R. implement CFE
troop reductions in Europe, cut their respective defense budgets, and Washington-
Moscow relations continue to become normalized, a continued Japanese defense build-
up would require a reappraisal of Japan's intent in Asia.
C. SOVIET-JAPANESE AIR FORCES
Having examined the status of ground, surface and subsurface assets, aviation has
been reserved for last. The Soviet Far Eastern Air Force and SOVPACFLT Naval
Aviation is the one conventional sector of power projection that has remained modern
and in vast quantities. Soviet Naval Air Forces are stronger in the APR than in any
other area of Soviet interest. For example, as of 1986, SOVPACFLT has deployed one
hundred and sixty-five naval strike aircraft (Backfires, Badgers, and Blinders) compared
to ninety-five such aircraft in the Northern fleet, one hundred and fifteen in the Baltic
and one hundred and twenty in the Black Sea area. In 1980 TU-25 Backfire bombers,
capable of carrying very long-range ASCMs began deployment in the APR. Soviet
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Pacific Naval Aviation (SPNA) now has forty-five of these aircraft as of 1987. 2 ' 4
Commercial shipping which does not have the protection of long-range AAW, either
SAM or aircraft, is extremely vulnerable to these supersonic bombers. With an
unrefueled combat radius of 2,000 miles, and capable of Mach 2+ dash to evade air
defense, this aircraft gives the Soviets unprecedented capability to interdict the SLOCs
in the Pacific, South China Sea, and Indian Ocean which Japan's economy depends on.
Given the density of shipping in the Hormuz and Malaccan straits, pre-strike
surveillance and targeting is not necessary for missile attacks or mining efforts. The
one hundred and twenty-five other bombers of SPNA, the Badgers and Blinders, are
rapidly approaching thirty years of age since they came into production in the early
1960s. While reliability will come into question in the 1990s, these aircraft are still
valuable now because they can fire very modern missiles, which fly long distances and
at a very high speed. Backfitting such aircraft with modem ASCMs is much easier,
cheaper, and less time consuming than similar high-tech backfitting on warships and
submarines.
SOVPACFLT is augmented by Soviet Air Force Long-Range aviation (LRA).
Since 1978 LRA has deployed another forty-five Backfires, thirty Bear-Gs and twenty-
five Bear-Hs in the TVD. These aircraft have the same capability to interdict the sea
lanes with ASCMs, and the new Bear-H is armed with the Soviet version of the U.S.
Tomahawk strategic cruise missile. Some twelve ASCM-armed Badgers are located in
2MDerek da Cunha, "Soviet Strike Warfare in the Pacific," U.S. Naval Institute,
Proceedings , February 1989, p. 58.
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Vietnam, only a few of hours from interdicting the straits of Malacca. 213 Japan must
also be concerned with Soviet bombers stationed in Soviet Central Asia, and their
ability to reach the sea lanes in the Indian Ocean. 216 The only means of defeating such
a weapons system at sea is by advanced carrier aircraft or the high-tech Aegis missile
system. The United States Navy had a monopoly on these defensive systems, but with
the sale of AEGIS to Japan that will change. The wisdom of selling AEGIS, which can
defeat any current carrier aircraft, to Japan without forging formal operational U.S.-
Japanese security roles, remains to be seen. 217 Japan must rely on the United States for
the foreseeable future to defend Indian Ocean and Southeast Asia SLOCs which her
economy, and national interest, so vitally depends on.
The Soviets have some 2,000 combat aircraft in the Far Eastern TVD, however
they are spread from Tashkent to Petropavlovsk. Moreover, Gorbachev has pledged to
cut 800 aircraft from Soviet airforces west-of-the-Urals. 218 Japan is primarily concerned
with tactical aircraft deployed in the Far Eastern MD, headquartered in Khabarovsk.
215da Chuna, Proceedings, previously cited, pp. 61, 62.
216Soviet Military Power 1988, previously cited, p. 120, mentions, "the Soviets
might attempt to deny oil to the West by conducting air strikes or by mining operations
against oil production sources, pipelines, handling facilities, and shipping channels."
217Gaston J. Sigur, "Proposed Sale of AEGIS Weapon System to Japan,"
Department of State Bulletin , September 1988, p. 13. Mr. Sigur said, "the
administration views the proposed role of AEGIS as important in enhancing joint
military capability of the United States and Japan in the Pacific...and AEGIS will
greatly enhance the interoperability of the U.S. Navy and the JMSDF." This
interoperability appears to be based on contingency, not current naval operations.
21g
U.S. Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power 1989 (Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988), p. 72.
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The Soviets have 360 attack fighters and 180 interceptors in the Far Eastern MD. 2"
How many are to be reduced by unilateral cuts remains to be seen. These aircraft are
top-of-line SU-25, Mig-27, Mig-29, and Mig-31s. Tactical aircraft are a very mobile
force, capable of being deployed in a very short time. A successful Sino-Soviet summit
may allow the Soviets to redeploy a larger number of warplanes within the TVD to the
Far Eastern MD. 220 A conventional conflict over the Kuriles would require such a
redeployment.
The rapid and high quality build up of SPNA/LRA has caused the Japanese to
devote a large segment of their 1990-1995 five-year plan for AAW sea-lane defense.
This is in contrast to earlier five-year plans which raised JMSDF's ASUW and ASW
capabilities to a soon to be respectable, if not superior, position vis-a-vis the Soviets
in East Asia. To meet the air threat, Japan now has over 100 F-4s, which are receiving
modem refitting of equipment, and will have some 200 F-15 interceptors by 1990,
roughly the number of tactical aircraft defending the continental United States. 22 ' Japan
may arm her 100 P-3C aircraft with long-range Phoenix air-to-air missiles as a means
to obtain the requisite level of sea lane air defense capability. Additionally, Japan
intends to build an over-the-horizon radar (OTHR) located in the Bonin islands to
2l9The Military Balance 1988-89, previously cited, p. 44.
220
Neil Munro, "Keeping Watch on the Amur and the Sea of Okhotsk," Pacific
Defense Reporter , October 1986, p. 17. Mr. Munro remarked that in any war, some
of the 500-odd Su-24s and supporting aircraft of the Soviet Central Reserve could be
made available to the Far East MD.
22,Gaston J. Sigur, previously cited, p. 13.
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provide early warning of Soviet air activity in the Far East, and is studying the
purchase of AWACS and inflight refueling capabilities.222
Japan's real step towards increasing air power in the 1990s is linked with the
development of the FSX fighter. This aircraft has a primary role of firing ASCMs at
enemy ships or supporting ground forces, with a secondary role as an air-interceptor.
Japan may build between one hundred and fifty to two hundred of these aircraft during
the 1990s. They will replace the seventy-seven obsolete F-l attack aircraft. The
traditional Soviet edge in tactical aircraft over the JASDF may be challenged by the
introduction of FSX in the 1990s and a Soviet inability to redeploy tactical aircraft
within the TVD to the Far Eastern MD, i.e., if the Soviets maintain the belief that
China could be a potential threat. 223 After the introduction of the FSX, Japan's ASDF
tactical aircraft may reach rough parity with the Soviet tactical aircraft of the Far
Eastern MD, with both forces comprising approximately 500 aircraft. Only in long-
range strike aircraft will the Soviets appear to maintain a distinct advantage over the
Japanese in the 1990s.
The vast superiority in numbers has traditionally given the Soviets a conventional
edge over Japan's Self Defense Forces. In the 1990s this quantitative edge may be
surpassed by a qualitative edge in favor of the Japanese due to the "modernization
gap." For example, Japan currently has more tactical aircraft than the United States has
222James Auer and Sadao Seno, NAFO, previously cited, p. 187.
223Okazaki Hisahiko, "Burden Sharing for a Military Balance," Japan Echo , Vol
XV, No. 3, 1988. Mr. Okazaki points out that "China's autonomy has great strategic
significance...the Soviets cannot withdraw all of its troops from the Sino-Soviet border
and concentrate its military might on Japan."
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deployed in all of Asia. 224 The United States has traditionally relied on such a
qualitative edge to counter Soviet numerical superiority. With the FSX fighter, CV sea-
based aviation, and a surface navy superior to SOVPACFLT in the 1990s, Japan's
military force structure may be viewed by the Soviets as a major threat to Kuriles, and
therefore, their Far Eastern Security. 225 This perception would certainly be reinforced
with the introduction of JMSDF nuclear submarines. JMSDF nuclear submarines would
indicate Japan has sea power interests beyond the choke-points of the three straits and
is willing to expend resources required to become a great military power. The Soviets'
concern over SSBN defense near Japanese waters would increase with the development
of Japanese SSNs. With Japanese diesel submarines tasked to straits control, Japanese
SSNs would be free to interdict Soviet shipping and conduct ASW operations against
Soviet SSNs and possibly SSBNs. To counter this development, Moscow may attempt
a "peace offensive" to limit or reduce Japanese force structure, or increase Soviet force
structure in the Far Eastern MD. The latter may be difficult given Gorbachev's pledge
to not introduce any more nuclear weapons systems in the APR~effectively ruling out
an increase of Backfires or deployment of new Blackjack bombers there. Additionally,
perestroika may require less defense spending in favor of Soviet consumer goods.
224Armacost, previously cited, p. 2.
225Japan Economic Newswire , 5 February 1988, reports: "Deputy Commander in
Chief of the Soviet Navy, Vladimir Sidorov, said that a buildup of Japan's MSDF
constitutes part of an invasion plot by the US and it would erode Japan's security
rather than cementing it. The JMSDF buildup is causing uneasiness in the USSR and
is based in replacing the US Navy functions (attack), rather than being for the defense
of Japan."
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In the context of United States-U.S.S.R. Conventional Force Europe (CFE) troop
reduction possibilities and China's internal problems, Soviet security concerns in the
next decade appear to have no major threat. However, if Japanese force structure in the
1990s has the capability to control the seas and skies around the Kuriles, which may
be a strong possibility after FSX is produced, no other area of the Soviet border may
be faced with such a conventional threat perceived by the Kremlin. The U.S. regional
security policy in Asia should take into account the Japanese-Soviet balance of
conventional power in the 1990s. The notion that "Japan simply does not have the
capability to defend itself against the U.S.S.R.-that only the United States has that
capability" 226 seems to ignore the significant development of Japanese conventional
defense capability in the 1980s. Japan's incremental rearmament has not, in general,
been taken seriously. Perhaps this is due to Japan's Constitution, discussed later, but
it also due to the fact the Japanese Self-Defense Forces are under-deployed. In the case
of the JMSDF, they rarely operate far from the home islands. Of course, defense
structure can be built up from scarce funds if operational requirements are fulfilled by
a willing ally. So, while the Japanese force structure has grown to respectability, it
remains a generally unrecognized military force shadowed by long-standing
misconceptions. 227 Nevertheless, if Japan appears capable of achieving maritime
226Weinstein, The Washington Quarterly, previously cited, p. 25.
227Joseph K. Woodard, "The Soviet Navy and Command of the Seas," Global
Affairs , Vol. IV, No. 2, Spring 1989, p. 43 inaccurately remarked, "The Soviet Pacific
Fleet is ever more disproportionate to its respective opposition, the American Pacific
Fleet and the relatively benign Japanese. The once proud Japanese Navy now
contributes barely two dozen destroyers and frigates." Mr. Woodard' s statement is an
example of the widespread misunderstanding of Japan's defense capabilities.
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superiority over the Soviets in the Far East, it does not necessarily equate to an
increased U.S. security posture in the region, especially under the existing U.S.-
Japanese security arrangement.
Japan's maritime superiority over the Soviets in the Pacific in the 1990s provides
the Japanese government with heretofore non-existing security options. Since Japan has
no indigenous nuclear deterrence to the U.S.S.R., any antagonism between the two
nations would probably be in the low to middle intensity scale of combat. However,
Japan's capability to seize the Northern Territories in the next decade is real. A
Japanese takeover of the islands could happen as follows: At the appropriate tune
Japanese FSX fighters might strike at Soviet airfields and other military sites in the
Northern Territories, destroying opposing air power and Soviet SAM systems. Japanese
troops might be deployed to the islands by helicopter and secure airfields. Additional
troops and equipment would then be flown in, such as SSM-1 anti-ship and Patriot
anti-aircraft missiles. In such circumstances, a Soviet counter strike, from Sakhalin,
would probably be limited to air power. Any Soviet surface craft attempting to land
troops on the islands in this scenario would likely face SSM-1 attack from Hokkaido
as well as the islands in question. Soviet air power would face further initial opposition
from the 450 plus Japanese fighter-attack aircraft likely to be in Japan's inventory by
the end of the next decade. AEGIS DDGs would provide additional AAW support.
Japan could then have the islands by fait accompli before the Soviets could shift
sufficient air power from other regions. The main questions of such a hypothetical
Japanese contingency plan would be surprise, sufficient force, and prospects for a quick
ending. Since Japan currently deploys two-thirds of its ground forces in Hokkaido, any
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attacking forces in the future could probably be mustered covertly. Such a scenario,
similar to the Falklands War, would probably contain the hypothetical conflict to the
islands in question and surrounding seas.
Japan's current political intentions prefer diplomacy and denying full economic
joint-ventures to the Soviets to regain the islands, but this could change with a failure
of perestrokia, a dismissal of Gorbachev, and social instability in the U.S.S.R.. In short,
a Falklands-type scenario over koyu ryodo, inherent territory, in the Kuriles is a remote
possibility. A Japanese-Soviet middle-intensity conflict over the Kuriles should be
prudently considered a possible contingency of the 1990s based on the following: 1)
Territorial dispute, 2) shifting balance of conventional military power in the maritime
sphere, 3) domestic turmoil distracting the U.S.S.R., and 4) historical antagonism based
on the Soviets "illegal" entry into World War U and no peace treaty signed between
the two nations. An increase of Japanese defense spending from 1-3 percent GNP will
only further Japan's ability to regain the islands by fait accompli if negotiations fail.
Regardless of Soviet-Japanese antagonism, a shift of maritime conventional
capability in favor of Japan vis-a-vis the Soviets could allow the United States to
develop new security strategies and arrangements in Asia pursuant to the national
interest. However, ever increasing military strength and resurgent ultra-nationalism in
Japan could be detrimental to U.S. interests and will be discussed in Chapter Five.
While Japan is attaining a favorable maritime conventional balance vis-a-vis the
Soviets, the Japanese people appear to be unprepared for the consequence of the nation
becoming a great military power. With increased military capability Japan can excersise
military power to influence events and protect and promote national interest, as other
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nations likewise conduct international affairs. How well Japanese democracy can
excercise the use of power while recognizing political restraint remains to be seen. The
U.S. security guarantee had allowed Japan to conduct international relations without
military considerations. In the context of great powers, such as Japan, this is ahistorical
and abnormal. A revised security arrangement with Japan will require the Japanese to
reappraise their position in the world in a realistic manner in accordance with their
Constitution. Such a reappraisal would be an exercise in democracy, since the question
of defense is equated with the "Peace Constitution" in the minds of many Japanese. A
Japanese acceptance of a security pact that allocates primary areas of security
responsibility could lessen fears of a potential ultra-nationalist Japan seeking an
independent security policy that upsets the Pacific balance of power. Until Japanese
defense forces take full conventional responsibility of the archipelago, and the Japanese
people deal with their national security on a realistic basis, the Western notion of
civilian control over the military in accordance with the Constitution remains untested.
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IV. JAPAN'S FLEXIBLE CONSTITUTION
During the Tanker War in the Persian Gulf, the United States initially assumed
sole responsibility of defending Kuwaiti oil bound for nations other than the U.S..
Voices of criticism within Congress questioned the merit of defending resources of
certain nations, such as Japan, unwilling to assist in a joint security effort. Criticism
of Japan was countered by the traditional Constitutionality question of Japan's Self
Defense Forces. For example, the U.S. State Department remarked that Japan's
Constitution and its politics deprive it of any military role in the Persian Gulf. 228
However, before the Gulf crisis ended, Prime Minister Nakasone declared that
deploying Japanese minesweepers to the Gulf was Constitutional, and no different than
"sweeping mines of the coast of Maizuru." 229 It seems a Kempo no Kaishaku
,
Constitutional interpretation, problem exists in Japan and in the defense circles of her
neighbors who speculate on what Japan can or can not do in the military realm. A
close examination of Japan's Constitution, and specifically Article Nine, reveals a
flexible document that has been interpreted various ways to suit the needs of the
Japanese polity. A revised United States-Japanese security agreement should be based
in accordance with Japan's Constitution and the Japanese interpretation of that
document.
228Armacost, previously cited, p. 5
229Clyde Haberman, "Nakasone Says Law Permits Japan to Sweep Mines in Gulf,"
New York Times , 29 August 1987, p. A4. Mr. Nakasone said such operations would
be for "protecting Japanese vessels."
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Before discussing aspects of how law is interpreted in Japan, it is appropriate to
examine the place Constitutions have held in Japanese society. In Western countries the
Constitution embodies the polity of a nation. Most Western Constitutions were brought
about with an exchange of rulers, i.e., from monarchy to republican forms of
government, and often with revolution. The essence of modem democratic Constitutions
was that political power was made of the people, for the people, and by the people.
Japan's original Constitution, promulgated in 1889, was quite different than the Western
norm.
230 Baron Kentaro Kaneko explained this fundamental difference in 1906, after
Japan's sensational victory over Russia and international interest on Japan was at an
early peak, when he stated:
There is an important difference between the Constitutions of Western nations
and that of Japan. The former are the outcome of popular uprisings against the
tyranny of rulers. ..the Japanese Constitution, on the other hand, emanated from
the Emperor, the fountain head of all power. Before the people dreamed of
popular rights or a parliament, the Emperor had already marked out the grand
policy of establishing Constitutional government in the future, because of his
evident desire and purpose to elevate the country to an equal place among the
civilized nations of the world, not only because he wished it, but also in strict
accordance with the national policy bequeathed by his imperial ancestors.
Following that policy, out Constitution was drawn up with close adherence to and
careful preservation of the fundamental principle of the Imperial government from
time immemorial. 231 (author's emphasis)
The Constitution was a part of the Meiji reforms, policies of rapid modernization
by the Japanese elite to strengthen the nation in order to prevent colonization by some
230Sansom, previously cited, p. 350, observed that, "in the limited sense they came
under Western influence. ..it becomes clear that what was finally adopted was, if
Western in shape, thoroughly Japanese in colour and substance."
23,Kentaro Kaneko, "Resources and Ideals of Modem Japan ", p. 482, in David
Murray, Japan (New York, N.Y.: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1906).
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Western power. 232 Before Western intrusions, Japan's political policy was not based on
a Constitution, but on an unwritten acceptance of a social order founded in a cult
worship where the Emperor symbolized the apex. This is Japan's Kokutai , national
essence, polity, and structure of the state combined, referred to by Baron Kaneko as
"..the national policy bequeathed by. ..imperial ancestors." It does, indeed, date back to
the most ancient of recorded times. The Nihongi , Japan's ancient historical work,
begins with the divine conception of the fust Emperor, Jimmu, and his role in
spreading the "divine mission" to remote areas of Japan. 233 Prior to the World War JJ,
militarists utilized the cult of Shintoism, intertwined with notions of Kokutai, to
consolidate national power. Three basic tenets of the cult were: 1) the Emperor is
divine because he is the extension in time of the very bodies and souls of the great
divine ancestors of the past and, in particular, of the physical and spiritual attributes
of the Sun Goddess, 2) that Japan is under the special guardianship of the gods and,
therefore, its soil, its people, and its institutions are unique and superior to all others,
3) that it is Japan's divine mission to bring "the whole world under one roof (hakko
ichi-u ) and thus extend to the rest of humanity the advantage of being ruled by the
Emperor. In ancient times hakko ichi-u meant unifying the world as Emperor Jimmu
knew it, i.e., Japan proper, but ultra-nationalists expanded this vision. As early as 1869,
the government initiated the policy of deifying and enshrining in Yasukuni Shrine the
232Murray, previously cited, p. 397, quotes the author of the Constitution, Ito
Hirobumi, as saying "the constitution will. ..open a wider field of activity for serving
the Emperor," and that it does not provide for a government of the people by the
people.
233W. G. Aston, Nihongi (Rutland, Vt.: Rutland, Vt., 1980), pp. 110, 111.
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souls of those who died in the cause of the Emperor. 234 Japanese militarism in the
1920-30s grew from an ultra-nationalist ideology that was in place when Japan was
opened to the Western world."5
China and Korea have strongly protested official visits by Japanese ministers to
Yasukuni Shrine, fearing a revival of pre-war ultra-nationalism. Emperor Hirohito used
the ideology of Kokutai when he spoke to the Japanese people for the first time and
told them the war was over. To fight on meant the destruction of the nation, and an
end to humanity. 236 After the Pacific War, Japanese diplomats were mainly concerned
with the status of Kokutai during the occupation. Post-war Japan is increasingly
recognized as a modem Western nation, but the social order and polity, while
influenced by the West, remains, to a large degree, as Prof. Sansom said, "thoroughly
Japanese in colour and substance." Japan had a social order that received very little
influence from foreign countries for hundreds of years before Commodore Perry arrived
in 1853, and for this reason Japanese culture influences the Constitution and political
institutions to a far greater extent than Western nations. Indeed, if a Constitution can
be called the hallmark of a nation, then Japan has been termed "in the (Western) world
234Tiedeman, previously cited, pp. 25, 26.
235FEER, 27 November 1981, p. 18, mentions Nobuhiro Sato, who wrote in his
"Secret Strategy for Expansion" in 1823 that "Japan is the foundation of the world,"
which was, he said, destined to become "provinces and districts" of Japan. His master-
plan was to begin with conquest of China, with the first blow at Manchuria, "so easy
to attack and hold." In short, an outline of Japan's pre-war version of a "New Order"
in Asia-the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.
236Edwin P. Hoyt, Japan's War (New York. NY.: McGraw-Hill, 1986). Appendix
D contains Hirohito 's speech, which started with, "...the solemn obligation which has
been handed down by our Imperial Ancestors... (and concluded with). ..enhance the
innate glory of the Imperial State and keep pace with progress in the world".
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but not of it." 237 An expectation that Japan should follow the Western norm in structure
(institutions) and essence (polity) has contributed to economic friction over trade
agreements, fair competition, and other issues between the West and Japan. Japan
modernized under the ideal of wakon yosai , Japanese spirit and Western knowledge,
but modernization was carried out not by changing the traditional social structure but
by utilizing it. 238 As Japan exercises political power commensurate with economic
power, political frictions based on differing values may also develop if
misunderstanding between the West and Japan is not cleared.
Kokutai is more than a social order based on historical institutions and ancient
culture, it is a social way of life that does indeed make Japan unique in the Western
world. Personal relationships hold a historical primacy over the rule of law in Japan,
and the Constitution, as the supreme law of the land is no exception. 239 The basis of
Japanese personnel relations, from ancient times to the present, is the primacy of the
group and each individual's proper position and role in that group. 240 This polity
originated from a Japanese religious cult of clan ancestor worship, the ujigami , or clan-
237
van Wolferen, Chapter 16.
238Chie Nakane, Japanese Society (Berkerly, Ca.: University of California, 1970),
p. 115.
239Nakane, previously cited, p. 139, comments that "Japanese culture has no
conception of God existing abstractly, completely separate from the human world. In
the ultimate analysis, the Japanese consciousness of the aspect of religious devotion
grows out of direct-contact relations between individuals." In other words, personal
relationships are a higher law.
24
°Ruth Benedict, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword (Boston, Mass.: Houghton
Mifflin, 1946).
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gods. 241 The social order was strictly enforced, and to disobey meant "something
incomparably harsher than the socialistic tyranny of early Greek society: it means
religious communistic despotism—supreme social tyranny suppressing personality."242
Today, the cult of the ujigami remains and if one visits Japan and observes the many
festivals held there, ceremonies of tribute to the ancient clan-gods can be observed.
Instead of devoting one's life to his proper position in the clan, new associations,
such as trading companies, command the attention of Japanese. Habatsu , cliques, are
formed by association, and one's gjmu, duty, to the group can last a lifetime.
Relationships within the group is centered on the notions of sempai (senior), kohai
(junior), and doryo , meaning one's colleagues. 243 To disobey one's proper role is an act
of great shame, haji, and leads to ostracism from the group. The habatsu mondai
(political infighting among the factions) in Japan's Diet is a reflection of friction
between the United States and Japan. Deals are made but can not be completed due
to conflict with a higher obligation. Habatsu cut across organizational lines to such a
degree, one questions where the real authority lies. 244 It is hard for the Western mind
to comprehend the Japanese social order without experiencing it in action. For example,
there is nothing comparable in the Occident to the sight of employee roll-call in front
24,George B. Sansom, Japan: A Short Cultural History (Stanford, Ca.: Stanford
University Press, 1982), p. 37.
242Lafcadio Hearn, Japan: An Interpretation (Rutland, Vt.: Charles E. Tuttle, 1981).
Heam observed Japan at the turn of the century and his use of "communism" was
meant in a classical sense. Benedict, previously cited, p. 303, mentions that Japan has
not changed so fundamentally (in 1946) since the 1890s, that some of the difficulties
Lafcadio Heam described (personal loyalties) then will not likely recur.
241Nakane, previously cited, p. 26.
244
van Wolferen, previously cited.
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of some small Japanese enterprise. With precision, pomp, and seriousness, tunics are
all that is lacking to envision oneself in ancient Sparta or Rome.
After the war, ultra-nationalism and extreme political ideology were purged from
Japanese customs, but the social relations of the people remain uniquely Japanese. The
system lasted for so long that its influence remains, with good and bad results. Japan's
low crime rate, productivity, in short, a great deal of her post-war success, is due to
the remaining characteristics of the ancient social order. Unfavorable characteristics
include the lack of innovative spontaneity among students, and a reluctance to let
outsiders into the group. 245 The Western notion that inalienable individual rights are
guaranteed from the tyranny of the majority has taken root, but not necessarily
flourished, in Japan. Also, personal relationships at times conflict with the notions of
Western law. This is evident in certain political and social spheres.
In the political sphere for example, Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei was
convicted of bribery during the Lockheed scandal and was forced to resign in the
1970s, yet he was reelected to the Diet and increased his power to such a point that
he became the "king maker" of Japanese politics. Tanaka's extensive personal relations,
based solely on his political chikara (power) and not on some social or political issue,
created a habatsu that dominated the choice of subsequent Prime Ministers until Tanaka
suffered a stoke a decade later. Tanaka merely cultivated the traditional personal
24?James Fallows, "Containing Japan," The Atlantic , May 1989, p. 52. Mr. Fallows
comments that, "unless Japanese society changed fundamentally, it is hard to imagine
that any of Japan's great power centers-banks, manufacturers-will ever share power with
non-Japanese." Here rests a fundamental clash of Western and Japanese values.
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relationships that have remained the essence of Japanese polity. 246 Even though he
broke the law, he did not serve a prison sentence. The Tanaka phenomenon shows the
superiority of personal relationships over law in Japan, if one has adequate power. This
does not mean that Japan is an unregulated society. On the contrary, feudal Japan was
so strict that regulations which determined the size, cost, and number of gifts for
children's birthdays were promulgated. Attention to detail remains in Japan. If one has
inadequate power, such as Prime Ministers Takeshita and Uno, then the habatsu will
be deficient and fail to reach a national consensus. In such a case politicians must
submit to the will of the Japanese people. However, if elite habatsu have reached a
consensus on a certain policy, and no other political habatsu is formed to counter it,
then it appears the will of the Japanese people is not necessarily the ultimate arbitrator.
For example, Japanese have come to realize that they pay more for domestic products
than their foreign counterparts do for Japanese products. Also, while the Japanese per
capita GNP is among the world's highest, the quality of life, such as sewer systems,
highway transportation, housing, etc., is sub-par in comparison to other advanced
industrialized countries. Yet the individual desire to introduce consumerism lacks
habatsu power, and Japan's antiquated distribution system continues. 247
In the social sphere, Japan's Constitution explicitly states that "all of the people
are equal under the law and there shall be no discrimination in political, economic, or
246
Historical figures who attained great power are now considered deities, with
shrines and festivals, such as Tokugawa leyasu. Tanaka's power, significant in the post-
war period, pales in comparison with major Japanese historical figures.
247
van Wolferen, previously cited, questions, "for what ultimate purpose do (the
Japanese) deprive themselves of comfort and risk the enmity of the world?"
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social relations because of race, creed, sex, social status or family origin." 248 However,
for almost one million ethnic Koreans and Chinese, ninety percent having been bom
in Japan, these words have no meaning. Even though these "aliens" pay taxes, they are
deprived the right to vote, hold public office, teach in Japanese schools, and enjoy
other benefits of citizenship. After the war, General MacArthur's staff requested the
Japanese government draw up a draft Constitution. What was submitted was a virtual
replica of the Meiji Constitution, containing pre-war notions of civil rights and the role
of the Emperor. Since the occupation was concerned with primarily premoting
democratization and demilitarization, the Constitution was drafted under Gen.
MacArthur's direction. When the Japanese government protested MacArther threatened
to take the issue directly to the Japanese people by referendum. Knowing that the
Japanese people would choose the MacArther Constitution, with its enfranchisement of
women, guarantee of labor unions, etc., over their Meiji-style draft, the government
declined opposition. However, Supreme Commander Allied Powers (SCAP) allowed the
Japanese government to revise some articles of the Constitution, and vague phrases and
words were inserted to allow for future reinterpretation. By using the term Kokumin
Japanese for the word "people," the government made Article Thirteen useless for
non-Japanese residing in Japan. The guarantee of civil rights in Article Thirteen was
also negated by the insertion of Article Ten, which stated, "the conditions necessary
for being a Japanese national shall be determined by law." 249 Laws were passed by
24R
Japanese Constitution, Article 13.
249Koseki Shoichi, "Japanizing the Constitution," Japan Quarterly , July-September
1988, p. 236. Mr. Koseki believes the present day Constitution is genuinely Japanese.
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the Diet, similar to the Meiji style, which have restricted citizenship to ethnic Koreans
and Chinese. To the Western notion of civil rights, the Diet's actions appear to be in
violation of the spirit, if not the letter, of the supreme law of the land. Blatant
discrimination directed towards the Burakumin , a traditional outcaste class of ethnic
Japanese dating back several hundreds of years, is unquestionably unconstitutional.
Japan's Supreme Court has failed to end discrimination for these ethnic Japanese,
numbering over one million people, despite clear instructions regarding the matter laid
out in the Constitution. Japanese society has, by and large, accepted the denial of civil
rights to the Burakumin and other "aliens" because they are simply outside traditional
groups.
The "Peace Constitution," while interpreted in ways that seem unconstitutional,
has made a significant contribution in promoting democracy in Japan relative to pre-
war conditions. The political enfranchisement of women has been, in a limited sense,
a revolutionary measure considering their status before the war. The most important
contribution to democratization in Japan is Article One, which states, "The Emperor
shall be the symbol of the State and of the unity of the people, deriving his position
from the will of the people with whom resides sovereign power." The Emperor is
indeed the symbol of the people, and more so than other Western monarchs. He still
maintains a religious connection to the Japanese people. 250 The Japanese people support
the depolitization of the Emperor, expressed by Article One, but the old notions of
"^akane, previously cited, p. 140, states, "...the Emperor, with his ancestors, is
conceptualized as the ultimate figure of successive lineal extensions. ..common to all
Japanese through their respective ancestors: he is not a sacred figure divorced from his
people."
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Kokutai remains accepted in right-wing religious and political fringe groups. 231
Regarding the ultra-nationalistic fringe, of particular importance is the number of
government officials who cling to beliefs of the ancient way. 252 This is not surprising
considering that numerous high level government officials, even some who became
Prime Minister, administered the "New Order" in Asia during the war. Personal
relationships among them, loyalties of a lifetime, reinforce their view that Japan was
a victim of the Second World War, only the Japanese were wrongly labeled an
aggressor nation, and it was the "white race" that started the war by colonizing Asia. 253
Japan's rise to an economic and financial superpower only reinforces the beliefs of
right-wing elements. While some Japanese are ultra-nationalistic, the majority supports
the "Peace Constitution" and what it symbolizes: an end to ultra-nationalistic militarism.
The Japanese Constitution is a key issue regarding any revised United States-Japanese
security arrangement, and as such an understanding of it and the position it holds in
Japanese society is critical.
251Sugata Masaaki, "Shinto Resurgence," Japan Quarterly , October-December 1988,
pp. 369, 370. Mahikari, one of the fastest growing sects in Shinto today, maintains the
doctrine that 73 generations of emperors had ruled over the world with Japan at its
center before the coming of Emperor Jimmu.
"'Clyde Haberman, "Japan Quietly Recalls WWJJ Surrender," New York Times
.
16 August 1987, p. A4. Sixteen of twenty cabinet members visited Yasakuni Shrine in
addition to two hundred LDP parliamentarians.
^Okuno Seisuke, "Shinryaku Hatsugen: Doko Ga Warui," Bungeishunju , No. 7,
1988, p. 114. Mr. Okuno resigned from the Japanese cabinet in 1988 after saying
there had been no aggression in China, and the Chinese government responded with
strong protests. Besides his position as Minister of Land Administration, he served in
the Ministery of Education and Ministery of Justice. Mr. Okuno was a member of the




Article Nine is probably one of the most famous features of any Constitution, yet
it is widely misunderstood outside of Japan. As stated in the previous section, it was
common to hear in the United States that Japan was limited by its Constitution in
deploying naval forces to the Persian Gulf. Also, many Japanese assume that Article
Nine was forced on Japan by the United States without any Japanese counsel. Neither
notion is true-there is no limit to Japanese defense spending according to Constitutional
interpretation. In fact, the Japanese government can choose to interpret the Constitution
to any perceived requirement for Japanese national security as long as there is a
consensus among the political habatsu that is accepted by the Japanese public. 254 The
flexibility of Article Nine lies in its ambiguous wording. It states:
Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order , the
Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the
threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.
In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph , land, sea, and air
forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of
belligerency of the state will not be recognized. 255 (author's emphasis)
With the insertion of the above underlined phrases, Japanese officials have been
able to revise the SCAP Constitutional draft in a way that allows for the Japanese
government of the 1980s to interpret Article Nine in various ways. After Article Nine
was written, neither General MacArthur nor Prime Minister Yoshida believed that the
inherent right of self-defense was unconstitutional. This matter was legally settled in
""James R. Van de Velde, "Article Nine of the Postwar Japanese Constitution,"
Journal of Northeast Asian Studies , Spring 1987, p. 26.
255Japanese Constitution, Article Nine.
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1959, when Japan's Supreme Court ruled that the Constitution "in no way denies the
right of self-defense." Further interpretations of the document were deferred by the
Supreme Court to the Japanese government. Consequently, the type of military
equipment and role the Japanese Self-Defense Forces should play has been decided
by the government in an incremental way, building a national consensus on security
policy. 256 For example, it was once considered illegal to have jet aircraft, but now
Japan has more jet fighter aircraft than the United States has deployed in Asia. The
FSX program will enable the Japanese to domestically produce top-of-the line aircraft
in the future. Once it was considered contrary to the spirit of the Japanese Constitution
for Japanese vessels to carry certain arms, i.e., torpedoes, but now Japan has more
rocket delivered torpedoes (ASROC) than the Soviet Pacific Fleet. 257 This ability to
interpret the flexible Constitution depending on the political mood of the Japanese
public allows for no legal limits concerning the security of Japan. There is no territorial
limit as such for the exercise of defending Japan and national influence may require
the use of the SDF during times of peace. 258 To show the elasticity of the governments
interpretation, Prime Minister Kishi announced in 1959, that nuclear weapons for
defense could be possessed, and that forces could be dispatched overseas, without
^Van de Velde, previously cited, pp. 29-35.
"^aketsugu Tsurutani, "Japan's Security, Defense Responsibilities, and
Capabilities," Orbis, Spring 1981, p. 96.
"'Japan Defense Agency, previously cited, pg. 71, states: "The necessary minimum
force to defend Japan as employed in the execution of its right to self-defense is not
necessarily confined to the geographic scope of the Japanese territorial land, sea, and
airspace."
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violating the Constitution. 259 However, maintaining strategic systems, such as ICBMs
and long-range bomber aircraft, has been declared against the spirit of the Constitution.
Japan is currently mulling over the prospects of allowing Japanese non-Self Defense
Force personnel to participate in U.N. peacekeeping forces. 260
The Constitution has been interpreted to allow for Japan's participation in
collective security arrangements as long this is done within the framework deemed
necessary for the defense of Japan only. However, the reluctance of the Japanese
government to interpret the Constitution to allow for a United States-Japan-Korea
security arrangement has no real basis in law, it is most certainly based in antagonistic
Japanese-Korean relations and the Japanese public's fear of being drawn into a war by
"power politics." 261 Because the United States was unable to secure a collective
agreement in Asia, comparable to NATO in Europe, it became a partner to a diverse
range of bilateral and multilateral Asian pacts. Therefore, neither Japan nor South
Korea has a formal commitment to assist each other during a conflict. Such
arrangements will come under increasing scrutiny because of cost-effectiveness, and the
potential for the United States to be required by treaty to assist one ally in the region
during a crisis while a very capable ally, i.e., Japan, observes the outcome.
259Hata, previously cited, p. 20.
26
Pacific Defense Reporter , October 1988, p. 42.
26,Japan Defense Agency, previously cited, p. 71 mentions "...Japan has the right
of collective self-defense under international law. .the government believes that the
exercise of the right of collective self-defense exceeds the minimum limit (necessary
for the defense of Japan) and constitutionally is not permissible."
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Since the Japanese Constitution can be interpreted to not rule out preemptive
strikes for self-defense, retaliation against an aggressor country on its territory, or the
dispatch of forces overseas to defend Japan, such military contingencies cannot be
discounted because of the Western notion of unconstitutionality, if the public recognizes
such actions as inherent to Japanese security. 262 As stated in the previous chapter, if
diplomacy fails, Japan's military capability to regain the Northern Territories in the
1990s is real, and such action would not necessarily be interpreted as unconstitutional.
United States diplomats who negotiate for a collective defense system with Japan
should be prepared for the "constitutionality question" to be raised by their Japanese
counterparts, and realize the political machinations behind it. President Reagan and
Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki's joint communique in 1981 acknowledged the
appropriateness of a rational division of labor in defense, and Mr. Suzuki's following
statement that Japan, "within the framework of the Constitution," would protect its sea
lanes of communication to 1,000 miles as a national policy, clearly shows that Japan
is willing to adopt appropriate security policies if it perceives there is a danger to the
Japanese national interest. 263
If the United States is to adjust its security commitments in Northeast Asia
during the next decade and beyond, it would seem prudent to attempt to induce Japan
to join in some form of collective security pact, and to recognize that any Japanese
opposition to do so is based primarily on political reasons and not the Constitution.
263
146.
262Van de Velde, previously cited, p. 41.
James E. Auer, "Japan's Defense Policy," Current History . Vol. 87, No. 528, p.
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Japanese interpretation of the Constitution has consistently displayed flexibility in
virtually every aspect of defense, except collective security. This is detrimental to the
security interests of the United States for a more important reason than arguements of
of "burden sharing." It shows a Japanese inclination to "go-it-alone," and an
unwillingness to assist in a common, rather than individual, security. For example, a
U.S. combatant that is attacked outside of Japanese territorial waters would not, in
theory, receive assistance from a Japanese combatant nearby, as it would no longer be
purely for Japan's own defense, according to a 1972 interpretation. 264 If Japan chooses
to persue an independent route regarding national security, the existing balance of
power will change and some of the United States allies and friends, such as Korea,
Taiwan, Australia, Singapore, and the Philippines, may view Japanese military strategy
as a security threat. To contain Japan from choosing such an independent option that
could lead to increased United States-Japanese political tensions, a new security
arrangement should preferably include the U.S., Japan, and Korea. 265 At a minimum,
it should seek a Northeast Asian collective security effort, even if it excludes the
United States. For example, a Japanese-Korean pact would be preferable to the interests
of the United States than an independent Japanese defense strategy that was supported
264Langdon, previously cited, p. 404. Japan has recently announced that it would
assist US transports resupplying a Japan that was under attack. While some in US
military circles consider this positive, should not this be expected of any ally, and that
the converse would be an outrage.
265Edward A. Olsen, "Security in Northeast Asia: A Trilateral Alternative," Naval
War College Review , January-February 1985. On p. 20, Prof. Olsen points out that
concerning a joint effort, "virtually no pressure has been exerted on Tokyo or Seoul
by Washington towards an expanded Japanese-ROK defense relationship."
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by three-six percent GNP of the world's second largest economy. 266 In short, if the
United States withdraws or reduces military presence in Asia, hegemony by a single
power can be prevented through joint security efforts. Continuation of the security
status quo prevents the building of trust between Japan and her neighbors concerning
defense, makes an independent Japanese security option more probable, and most
importantly, prevents the Japanese public from realistically appraising and accepting
Japan's legitimate security role and accountability of that role. A Japanese defense
force that will have the world's third largest budget in the 1990s, maintains top-of-
the-line equipment, yet is under-deployed, does not appear to be a real test of civilian
control over the military. When Japan finally considers the SDF to be an active
instrument of influence to promote and defend national interest, the historical
supremacy of the Japanese military may challenge democracy in Japan.
B. DOMESTIC AND REGIONAL CONSTRAINTS
The greatest restraint to an expanded Japanese security effort in Northeast Asia
is, of course, a fear of revived militarism. This persists within Japan and in the
surrounding countries of the archipelago. The underlying reason for such fears is the
belief that Japan, in comparison to Germany, has not learned the lessons of World
War JJ. 267 Opponents of militarism in Japan believed the one percent of GNP limit on
266Japan would dominate such an alliance, but South Korea may be in a more
threatened position if the US conducted dramatic withdrawals from Asia. The purpose
of a Japanese-Korean pact would be to build trust and impose restraints on power.
267Urban C. Leher, Asian Wall Street Journal , 9-10 September 1988, p. 1, reports
that a Japanese intellectual remarked, "the West Germans are trying to learn from the
war experience. The Japanese are trying to bury it." Also, a Korean diplomat said that
he worries "30-40% of Japanese feel they did nothing wrong in Korea."
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defense spending, promulgated by Prime Minister Miki in 1976, acted as a hadome ,
brake, to prevent Japan from becoming a great military power. 268 Also, the National
Defense Program Outline (NDPO), setting forth the required minimum force structure
to deter small-scale aggression, was established by the Miki government to counter
fears of unchecked military growth. 269 An "exclusively defensive defense," senshu boei.
policy was adopted by Japanese governments in response to the overwhelming desire
of Japan's citizens that the nation not follow the path of militarism that lead to war.
Japanese were able to embrace pacifism and unarmed neutrality for decades because
of the U.S. guaranteed security. This has prevented a realistic appraisal of security
requirements in Japan comparable to West Germany. Most importantly, unlike West
Germany, the public's attitude towards the Japanese Self-Defense Forces has remained
confused. 270
It seems the Japanese public's rejection of a revised Constitution, allowing for
removal of any military restraints, has checked militarism. 271 However, in denying any
security role outside of Japan, i.e., collective security, the notion of civilian control
remains untested. Since the rise of militarism in Japan was linked to an unaccountable
military establishment, especially overseas, in the 1920-30s, it would appear prudent to
268Odawara, previously cited, p. 248.
269Chuma Kiyofuku, "What Price the Defense of Japan," Japan Quarterly , July-
September 1987, p. 254.
270Langdon, previously cited, p. 408, quotes fomier Socialist Party Chairman
Ishibashi, in 1984, as saying, "the SDF which are unconstitutional are legal in existence
pursuant to the SDF laws established in the Diet."
27,Odawara, previously cited, p. 251, mentions that Japan's major political party,
the Liberal Democratic Party, has maintained a party platfonn since 1955 that promotes
"revision to an autonomous Constitution."
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exercise civilian control of Japanese forces outsi.de of Japan, i.e.. in a collective
secwrity context Collective security among independent nation-states requires
consultation and compromise to function properly, and it usually restrains excessive




-.> '--. -.*-.=:' how accountable tc civilian control that power will be
'..•'.'-. j* ]-. K7<:".v/-A \r\ conjunction with legitimate security interests. 272 Now that the
Bedlfl V/^JJ is politically defunct, fears of a unified Germany, while lingering, are
basically put a->ide because West Germans have passed the litmus test of democracy:
accountability bl die military Indeed, Mr. Manfred Woemer, a German, is Secretary
General of NATO Unfortunately, because of the over-dependence on the United States
lecufity guarantee, Fapatl remains to be tested, and consequently, is not perceived to
b( willing tO Contribute to Western security vi.s-a-vis West Germany.
FflpflnefC opposition to militarism frequently is linked to the United States-
FftpaneSfl .<< urity arrangement Most Japanese do not consider the mutual security pact
;i treaty oi alliei^'and Japan's security relationship with the United States is viewed
by boih the nj-lit and left wings as one of a "lackey" to Washington's "power
politii I
""" Japan's defense growth, then, is seen as nothing more than a series of
"•cm-, Okazaki, previously Cited, Chaptei Seven, "Can Japanese Democracy Fight
a Wai ," foi related concerns.
"'Amine !OSt, Current Policy, No. 974, previously cited, p, 5, mentions that at the
Willimsburg Summit meeting In l°K<, Prime Minister Nakasone asserted that "Japan
i. Iimily a ineiiibei ol (be West" Ibis was significant, siiue the 1981 statement of
"alliance" with the US almosi brought down the Suzuki government,
' MMaeda Misao. "*< >|><-tiiii^> (be DoOl to B Military Buildup," Japan Echo , Vol. XIV,
No 2, 1987, p 64
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responses to United States pressure to do something about economic friction, i.e., arms
purchased from the United States helps the balance of trade between the two nations.
Also, the Japanese left finds the concepts of "balance of power," "deterrence," and the
role of the military in security issues as invalid in today's modem world. The idea that
the United States was able to follow a policy of isolationism under the aegis of Pax
Britannica, and was later forced to assume world responsibilities after the Second
World War, is an inappropriate example for Japan to follow. 275 The pervasiveness of
this left-wing view in Japan, symbolized by the forced resignation of Japan's Foreign
Minister after Prime Minister Suzuki declared the United States and Japan allies in
1981, is eroding with the realities of the late 1980s. The evident collapse of
"administrative bureaucratic socialism," to use the phrase coined by Moscow,
symbolized by the lowering of the Berlin Wall, is a confirmation of the United States
grand strategy of Containment and all that it implies, i.e., deterrence, balance of power,
etc. George Kennan's correct prediction, that "tyranny carries with it its own seeds of
destruction," reconfirms that his policy of containment is the prime mover for events
in East Europe. The popular revolt against communism in Eastern Europe appears to
be the results of people power, but the final outcome of European political status will
largely be determined by those nations which can exercise power and influence to
support the self-determination of East Europeans. Perhaps, Soviet approval of events
in East Germany, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia is merely an attempt
to buy time for reforms, to forestall the "seeds of destruction" inherent in tyranny.
"'Sakamoto Yoshikazu, "Rejecting the Military Path", Japan Echo , Vol. XIII, No.
1, 1986, p. 56.
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Power politics is a reality, reconfirmed by the success of Containment to erode the
Iron Curtain in Eastern Europe, and Japan will not doubt abide by that mode of
international relations in the next decade. Japanese power politics to date has relied on
economic measures, but as Japan garners military capability in the 1990s, it is not
unreasonable to expect Japan to promote national interests by all means possible-
including the military. The removal of the one percent GNP limit on defense spending
is a step in that direction. As Japan assumes political and military stature
commensurate with its economic standing, the restraints on military power in the
execution of national interest policy will become the greatest post-war exercise of
democracy by the Japanese people to date.
An independent Japanese defense role in Northeast Asia will certainly be opposed
by every nation which experienced Japanese aggression during World War II.
Unfortunately, few Japanese have yet to reach a catharsis on the legacy of the war and
move beyond a "victim mentality." There is a common belief that the NICs of Asia
owe a large amount of their success to the efforts of Imperial Japan. 276 A joint United
States-Japanese security effort in the region can lessen regional fears, much in the same
way NATO has done for Germany in Europe. However, an increase of three percent
GNP on defense, a revised NDPO that proposes unlimited force structure, and an
independent Japanese security strategy is not the interest of any U.S. ally in the
276
Flora Lewis, "Japan's Looking Glass," New York Times , 8 November 1989, p.
A21. Ms. Lewis quotes Shintaro Ishihara, a top LDP dietmember who notes economic
success in Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore, and says they "were all, at one time or
another, under Japanese administration. We are aware some negative things happened
under Japanese administration, but it cannot be denied that many positive things were
left behind."
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region. 277 Prime Minister Lee of Singapore has told Japan that it would be ill-advised
to leave the United States security arrangement. 278 The same holds true for Korea,
Taiwan, P.R.C., and the Philippines. However, Japan, while possessing a GNP treble
of all other nations combined in Northeast and Southeast Asia, is not capable of
returning to the military dominance of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.
Even though Japan's defense budget will probably equal that of all the countries in
Greater East Asia combined (Soviets excluded) in the early 1990s, the individual
nations of the region are not the military "back waters" of the colonial 1930s.
Nationalism will certainly prevent a military hegemony of any single power from
imposing its will in the whole region, much like Latin America views the "power from
the North." Values, in particular the exclusion of those outside the group, remain the
"achilles heel" of any Japanese ultra-nationalism. Japan will likely occupy the unloved
position of being a overly developed economic hegemon in the region. 279
Another check to revised militarism is the younger Japanese generation's outlook
in life, just as young Germans reject the militarism of Nazi Germany. Economic
consumerism and political pluralism is just beginning to take hold in Japan, producing
a new generation that might find the ideology of the ancient way, Kokutai, absurd.
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Betts, previously cited, pg. 12, points out that, "if Japan were to become a
military as well as economic superpower, resolution of economic tension between
Washington and Tokyo would be more imperative. Such a transformation would amount
to a revolution in the international system. With genuine military multi-polarity, the US
would have less reasons to remain involved through forward deployment and defense
commitments in the region."
""Washington Post , 14 October 1988, p. A32.
279Barry Buzan, "Japan's Future: Old History Versus New Roles," International
Affairs
. 1988, pp. 567-570.
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They are considered so different from the older generations that a new phrase,
shinjinrui , new human race, has been coined for them. 280 U.S. efforts to open up
Japanese markets, eliminate the antiquated distribution system, and introduce
consumerism, did strike at the very core of Japan's ancient social values. This is the
underlying reason why Japan, even though it maintains an average trade surplus of $50
billion with the United States and finds no obstacles to investment in America, has
recently voiced strong opposition to U.S. requests for trade based on reciprocity.281
Japan's future prosperity may well depend on whether the younger generation
assimilates Western values, i.e., individual freedom, or prefers to be "uniquely" group
oriented Japanese. The latter belief, termed Nihonjinron , theorizing on the Japanese
race, seems to be a revival of Kokutai without military strings attached. Basically, the
thesis portrays the Japanese as unique in the world, supposedly due to both nature and
nurture. Hence, U.S. trade negotiators find that American access to certain markets in
Japan, such as beef, ski equipment, and construction is stonewalled because Japanese
have "unique" intestines, snow, and soil. Combine Nihonjinron with the myth that the
Emperor is not a mortal being, and the possibility for future extremism is real. 282
28 The Economist , "Japan Survey," 5 December 1987, p. 33.
281Ishihara Shintaro, "NO Wa NO De Am," Bungeishuniu , No. 11, 1989. Mr.
Ishihara, co-author of "A Japan That Can Say No", points to cultural and historical
differences as underlying U.S.-Japanese trade friction. Mr. Ishihara believes the Heisei
Era, Emperor Akihito's reign, is the dawn of a new civilization, not necessarily based
on Western values. Mr. Ishihara is a member of the Reimei no Kai , new civilization
association (habatsu) in Japan's Diet.
282The Central Japan Tourism Promotion Liaison Council, "The Splendors of
Central Japan, " May 1988, published by the Aichi prefectural (state) government,
Nagoya, p. 30, describes Ise shrine as "dedicated to Amaterasu, the Sun Goddess-the
ancestor of the Imperial household " (author's emphasis)
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Perhaps an indication of whether the next generation of Japanese elite favor reform or
revision, will take place in 1990 during the daijosai . the rite of Akihito's enthronement.
This ancient ceremony provides for the symbolic impregnation of the Emperor by
deities and his rebirth with divine qualities. 283 Hopefully, the shinjinrui will see through
any right-wing efforts to revive Kokutai or State Shinto via the Daijosai. 284 Japan's
future as an economic and military great power, perhaps superpower beyond the next
decade, will have to face the contradiction between some residual ancient social values
and the Western values of individual freedom, now spreading even to "administrative
bureaucratic socialist" countries behind the Iron Curtain.
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van Wolferen, previously cited, p. 324.
284The daijosai ceremony and official visits to Yasukuni Shrine appear to be a clear
violation of the Constitution, i.e. separation of church and state, or at least not in the
spirit of "democratization and demilitarization" values supposedly held in postwar
Japan. While Japan has received strong protests from Korea and China over visits to
Yasukuni, and probably will receive more for the daijosai if it smacks of State Shinto,
it remains a mystery why the U.S. State Department has remained silent on this issue.
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V. THE UNITED STATES-JAPANESE ALLIANCE IN CHANGING TIMES
The improvement of United States-U.S.S.R. relations after the Malta Summit has
the potential to bring about an end to the Cold War and decrease the threat of an un-
winnable global nuclear war. Events during the latter months of 1989 in Eastern
Europe portend a "beyond-containment" world. The Bush Administration desires
perestrokia to succeed in the following aspects: 1) reform the Soviet economy and join
the international system of free trade; 2) reduce Soviet military expenditures to a real
level of "reasonable sufficiency," allowing both the United States and U.S.S.R. to shift
from military confrontation to international economic competition; 3) work together to
resolve low-intensity conflicts in the Third World through political, rather than military,
means; and 4) most important in the long-term, develop incremental democracy that
erodes the unpredictable excesses of dictatorship. If perestroika succeeds in the above
criteria, United States security strategy will be due for a drastic over-haul to meet the
new international environment. As the symbol of the Cold War, the Berlin Wall,
totters, it is not unreasonable to envision a dramatic decrease in United States-U.S.S.R.
troop presence in Europe. 285 This could lead to U.S. force reductions in Asia. If
perestrokia fails, the United States must be prepared for a hard-line regime to emerge
in Moscow, Marxist fundamentalists clinging to a revolutionary ideology, and a possible
increase in the tensions between open and closed societies. Indeed, a hard-line regime
285New York Times , 20 November 1989, p. A 16, reports SECDEF Cheney has
directed studies on reducing the US Defense budget by $180 billion over the next five
years.
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in Moscow confronted with economic disaster and nationalist turbulence may strike out
against a perceived threat. 286 Therefore, whatever security rearrangement with Japan that
takes place must also take into account both the optimistic and pessimistic predictions
of United States-U.S.S.R. relations. In short, it must be a flexible strategy in Asia to
account for the possibilities of failure or success of Gorbachev's reforms.
While United States public opinion seems to be following the European public
view of a less-threatening Soviet Union, Amerian-Japanese perceptions of each other
are beginning to depart from the post-war norm. For example, recent surveys show that
Japan's economic domination is a greater threat to United States national security,
according to U.S. public opinion, than the traditional threat of Soviet expansionism. 287
The late Theodore White, in 1985, argued that a relentless Japanese economic
juggernaut aimed at deindustrializing the United States was seeking to win the "war of
the Pacific" through unfair economic tactics. 288 Also in the security sphere, new
frictions are beginning to appear. "Techno-nationalism" over the FSX fighter has
strained United States-Japanese relations to a level reminiscent of the Vietnam-era. The
U.S. Department of Defense has even warned Congress that "there is a limit beyond
286The Chinese Communist Party declared the 1989 student protest a
counterrevolutionary movement supported by foreign nations desiring the overthrow of
the socialist order. Would not the Soviets blame a similar occurrence on the "bourgeois
support" of the West?
287Asian Wall Street Journal , 16 August 1988, p. 10.
288
see David Bergamini, Japan's Imperial Conspiracy (New York, N. Y.: William
Morrow and Company, 1971), and Russell Braddon, Japan Against the World (Briarcliff
Manor, N.J.: Stien, 1983) for alannist views of post-war Japan.
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which Japan should not go in defense expenditures" and to treble Japanese defense
spending (to three percent GNP), "would be a destabilizing factor." 289
Meanwhile, Japan is increasingly finding status quo subservience to the United
States unacceptable. Some Japanese have recently advocated that Japan has the power
to say "no" to the United States, and a new international order, not based on U.S.
power but Japanese, is possible. 290 For example, Japan could threaten semiconductor
supply, harming U.S. military capability. By and large, the Japanese view themselves
as victims of the Second World War and the power politics of the Cold War. 29 ' This
is probably the major block for Japan to enter a collective defense system. As an
example of victim mentality, certain Japanese polls found that, among high school
students, the United States was chosen as the most probable enemy if Japan were to
be in a hypothetical war. Many are developing a "soft nationalism" that recognizes
^Jane's Defense Weekly , 22 October 1988, p. 984.
290Lewis, previously cited, extensively quotes Shintaro Ishihara and the founder
of Sony Corporation, Mr. Morita, from their co-authored book "A Japan That Can Say
No." Mr. Ishihara wrote, speaking of super conductors, that, "this type of technology
does not exist anywhere in the USSR or US. It exists only in Japan and Gennany. If
the giants in the economic field and the politicians can join together around this type
of technology, it would open up new possibilities for our advancement. Whether or not
this can be achieved depends upon our large and small choices in the future; in sum
it is a question involving the sensibilities of our politicians." Mr. Morita wrote, "the
time will never again come when America will regain its strength in industry, we are
going to have a totally new configuration in the balance of power in the world."
29,Urban C. Leher, "Revised View of History Finding Favor," Asian Wall Street
Journal , 9-10 September 1988, p. 1 quotes influential rightist, Hideaki Kase, as saying,
"Japan did not wage an unjust war. As a matter of history, we have been treated very
unfairly by the victors...Japan adopted a pertinent pose after WW II because it is much
easier to say everything we did before 1945 was wrong and we are so sorry. It lets us
get away with spending only 1% of GNP on defense while we let the Americans play
mercenary."
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Japan has a role, its proper place in international society, but they do not quite know
exactly what it is. A revised security arrangement should seek to lessen United States-
Japanese friction and strengthen the bilateral relationship by compensating for each
other's weaknesses. Security arrangements between the United States and Japan have
served the national interests of both nations well for the past four decades. An
agreement crafted to meet the needs of both nations, reflecting political, economic and
military conditions that have changed since the commencement of the current security
treaty, may lead to more decades of mutual prosperity.
Japanese, by and large, support the continuation of the special relationship
between the U.S. and Japan, and realize the dangers of seeking to become an
independent power center. Mr. Seizaburo Sato, a foreign policy advisor to Mr.
Nakasone, says the greatness of power is measured by four things: wealth, military
strength, political ideas and the will to impose them, and a culture that appeals to other
people and can influence them. Only the United States meets all of these superpower
requirements. 292 Yet the Japanese are recognizing they cannot continue a minimalist
foreign policy, and their economic stature requires a reappraisal of seikei bunri in favor
of a realization of the interrelationships of economic and military factors. 293 Perhaps the
greatest fear is that Japan will be faced with a real security threat, become shocked
out of its idealism and find its version of democracy unprepared for the power politics
292The Economist , 13 August 1988, p. 29.
293Hideki Ohata, "Dialogue with Morgenthau in Japan: A New Approach to Power
Politics," Pacific Focus , Vol. II, No. 2, Fall 1987.
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of international relations. 294 While U.S.-Soviet relations are presently at an all time
high, U.S.-Japanese relations, due to economic friction, show increasing tension that
may become more difficult to manage in the 1990s. The U.S. bilateral deficit with
Japan could lead to protectionist laws by Congress, requiring Japan to protect a
widening economic sphere in Asia and the Pacific, placing it in direct confrontation
with the U.S. and upsetting the balance of power. The challenge facing both the U.S.
and Japan is to manage change without excessive protectionism and Nippon-Utsu
,
"Japan-bashing," in the United States and opening markets in Japan without reviving
an unhealthy Japanese nationalism that could go to the extreme. 295 A collective
Northeast Asian security arrangement can help reinforce Western democratic values,
as it has in Germany. Certainly, a beyond-containment strategy should apply in Asia
as well as in Europe.
A. A SECURITY REVIEW: ISSUES & OPTIONS
The United States long ago recognized that Japan would someday arise from
defeat in the Pacific War to power and influence. America's effort to influence
Japanese values during the occupation, by policies of democratization and
demilitarization, seemed to have kept this in mind. Because of the special relationship
between the United States and Japan, i.e., Japan's dependence on the United States for
defense, it remains to be proven that the above mentioned values have completely
294
see Tetsuya Kataoka, Waiting For a Pearl Harbor (Stanford, Ca.: Hoover Press,
1980), that predicts such a change to Japanese democracy.
295George R. Packard, "The Coming US-Japan Crisis," Foreign Affairs , Winter
1987-88, pp. 352-357.
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taken hold in Japan. 296 With the occupation at an end, NSC- 125 was formulated for
Japan as an adjunct to the American Containment policy, codified in NSC-68, in 1952.
The basic idea of NSC- 125 was to promote long-term stability in Northeast Asia, with
Japan playing a central role. Specifically, the doctrine set the following goals:
The United States will defend Japan from external aggression, given the
importance of Japan (geostrategic and economic).
The United States will set up a Pacific Collective Security Organization
(Pacific Pact), which Japan will be expected to join.
The United States will promote Japan's rearmament with conventional weapons
and provide necessary assistance.
The United States would support Japan's admission into the United Nations.
The United States would see that Japan obtains resources by participating in
development of S.E. Asia.
The United States will provide Japan economic assistance (aid and access to
the U.S. market).
As a long-term projection, Japan will be in the Western camp, but will
eventually want freedom of action in Asia, in which case a clash with U.S.
interests may arise.
296Yamane, previously cited, p. 1308, says, "...the nationalist conservative camp,
an overwhelming majority in Japan, will eventually split into two opposing factions:
one continuing to emphasize a pro-American status-quo oriented policy, and the other
will view such a policy to static and undignified. A danger of Japan sliding into the
role of a regional military power backed by ultra-nationalism is real."
297
Hata, previously cited, p. 19.
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With such guarantees to national security, it is not surprising that Japan opted to
raise Constitutional conflicts with points two and three of NSC-125. 298 In hindsight one
can make a strong case that Japan chose not to agree to these points due to historical
antagonism with proposed pact members, i.e., Korea or Taiwan, and that relying on the
United States for defense allowed Japan to concentrate scarce resources on rebuilding
the nation. Japan, unlike West Germany, was able to claim itself a pacifist nation, due
to the unique experience of the atomic bombing. Thus, the United States had to assume
sole responsibility for security of Northeast Asia in general, and Japan in particular. To
achieve this, the United States formed bilateral security arrangements with Japan,
Korea, and Taiwan. By unilaterally guaranteeing the defense of Japan, the United States
postponed a realistic assessment of security needs by the Japanese people. 299
Consequently, an idealistic unarmed neutralism held sway in Japan into the 1970s.
Political consensus for national security was lacking, and the public did not even
support the legality of the SDF until only within the last decade. 300
Point number two and three of NSC-125 were obviously proposed concerning the
immediate challenge of the day, conflict in Korea, but they were also favored for the
""Martin Weinstein, The Washington Quarterly, previously cited, on p. 19., refers
to the U.S.-Japanese security treaty to be what the Japanese government has always
officially called an anzen hosho
.
a security guarantee extended by the U.S. to Japan.
299Sato Kinko, "The Irrational 1% Ceiling on Defense Spending," Japan Echo , Vol.
VII, No. 2, 1985, on p. 25, said, "US military aid is the contemporary equivalent of
the Kamikaze, or Divine Wind, that swept in and saved Japan from Mongol invasions."
30nChuma, previously cited, p. 258, points out only 15% of Japanese polled in
1987 approved of the removal of the 1% ceiling for defence spending, while 61%
expressed disapproval. Nevertheless, the 1% limit was disbanded.
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underlying values that the United States held regarding the future of international and
regional security.
For example, before negotiating a security treaty with the Japanese, John Foster
Dulles stressed the importance of trust and collective security and the ultimate
preference for United States-Japanese security relations. In his speech to the Japanese
press club in February, 1951, Dulles said:
Collective measures are the only dependable deterrent. The likelihood of failure
is a deterrent to aggression...Japan can draw some useful lessons from these
elemental security principles...the Japanese government and people will then have
primary responsibility to maintain in their homeland a protection corresponding
to that of a householder...any people who avoid that precaution are guilty of
contributory neglect and deserve little sympathy...the UN was fonned with its first
stated purpose to effect collective measures for the preservation of peace. The
Security Council was given the duty to create an international force to deter
aggression. Japan, if so disposed, can share collective security protection against
direct aggression. The security plan we outline does not require that the Japanese
nation become militaristic. ..the program would realize the UN ideal, which is the
'inherent right of individual or collective self-defense' shall so be implemented
that 'armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest '...we seek a
peace in which will afford Japan opportunity to protect by her own efforts the
integrity of full sovereignty which peace will have restored; opportunity to
achieve moral stature and respected leadership through the force of good
example. ..to create a feeling. ..that Japan is now a nation to be trusted. 301 (author's
emphasis)
The ideals of NSC- 125 have guided the United States-Japanese security
relationship since Japan regained sovereignty. The belief that "so long as they wish
American protection, the Japanese should be able to count on the United States to
defend Japan whether or not they are prepared to mount a major defense buildup in
their own behalf^clearly contradicts the initial United States security objectives
30,John Foster Dulles, "From Occupation to Cooperation," Speaking of Japan ,
January, 1984.
302
Franklin B. Weinstein, previously cited, p. 13.
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regarding Japan in Northeast Asia. In light of Japan's capability to reach maritime
parity vis-a-vis the Soviets in the 1990s, such support for a minimalist Japanese
defense policy seems to ignore Japan's defense structure growth. Despite Japanese
reluctance to assume responsibility for defending the home islands, the United States
concluded a Security Treaty with Japan in 1951.
The Security Treaty between the United States of America and Japan in 1951 and
the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States
in 1960 differ dramatically regarding the original intentions of NSC- 125. The former
treaty stated in its preamble that:
The United States of America, in the interest of peace and security, is
presently willing to maintain certain of its armed forces in and about Japan, in
the expectation , however, that Japan will itself increasingly assume responsibility
for its own defense against direct and indirect aggression. ...(author's emphasis)
Further support for NSC- 125 was also included in Article Four:
This treaty will expire whenever in the opinion of the Governments of the
United States of America and Japan there shall have come into force such United
Nations arrangements or such alternative or collective security dispositions as will
satisfactorily provide for the maintenance by the United Nations or otherwise of
international peace and security in the Japan area. 303 (author's emphasis)
The revised treaty of 1960 removed the previous preamble, with its "expectation that
Japan will itself increasingly assume responsibility," and also deleted any reference to
collective security expiring the treaty as stated in Article Four. Instead, the United
States commitment to defend Japan was enlarged while Japanese expectations were
lowered. For example, the former treaty states the function of U.S. forces stationed in
Japan as simply "to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security
toTiedman, previously cited, pp. 183, 184.
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in the Far East and to the security of Japan against anned attack from without." Article
Five of the current treaty states:
Each party recognizes that an armed attack against either party in the
territories under administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and
safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance
with its Constitutional provisions and processes ** (author's underline)
The present treaty, in comparison to the original treaty, clearly favors Japanese
interest over the U.S. ideals expressed in NSC-125. An attack on Japan by the
U.S.S.R., while increasingly improbable, is a common danger to United States and
Japanese interests. But is not conflict in Korea also a common danger to United States
and Japanese interests? Apparently not, since according to the archaic treaty of 1960,
even an attack on U.S. forces outside the territory of Japan, even if it is only a mile,
is not in any common interest of both the United States and Japan. U.S. forward
deployed forces in Japan have the unbelievable possibility that they can depart from
bases on foreign soil, to defend that foreign land, come under attack, return to the
same foreign base, and expect no assistance from the nation they defend. Now that
Japan has more conventional defense structure on the islands than the United States has
in the Western Pacific, outside of the power projection capabilities of sea-based air
power and nuclear submarines, the notion that U.S. forces in Japan are mere
mercenaries is pervasive in Japan. 305 A recurrence of another Persian Gulf scenario,
30
*Japan Defense Agency, previously cited, p. 260.
305Edward A. Olsen, US-Japanese Strategic Reciprocity (Stanford. Ca.: Hoover
Institution Press, 1986), p. 97 points out Prime Minister Nakasone as saying, "Japan
will defend itself by its own efforts, but also will use US forces a hundred percent in
an emergency. This will make the defense cost cheaper."
133
where U.S. forces are sent into harm's way, while a very capable ally with common
interests contributes next to nothing, will be increasingly difficult to justify to the
American public. For this very reason, U.S. defense credibility on the Korean Peninsula
decreases with each year that Japan gains military capability. Revising the United
States-Japanese security arrangement, based on reciprocity, is long overdue.
With Japan's security guaranteed by treaty, U.S. overseas bases and a Navy of
unprecedented dominance in Asia provided a stable, secure environment that fostered
economic growth in the region for decades. However, the debacle of Vietnam ended
the sense of U.S. military supremacy and commitment in Asia. The United States
pledged "no more land wars in Asia" and began to rely solely on a maritime strategy
combining sea power and air power to protect interests in the region. This strategy
began to appear insufficient when naval force structure was reduced (from a high of
931 combatants in 1968 to 479 combatants in 1979) while the Soviets built their
Pacific Fleet into a "blue water" navy. 306 The U.S. military function has been primarily
the ability to reinforce and resupply allies and friends, with adjustments to divisions
of labor, if attacked. However, to deter attack, the basic U.S. contribution has been to
assume that the strategy for defense is militarily effective, and seen by our adversaries
to be so. 307 The lack of adequate naval forces required for escorting convoys
resupplying and reinforcing (Re&Re) Europe in a global war scenario lessened the
credibility of maintaining an effective deterrence. U.S. naval force reduction world-
wide forced the necessity of announcing a new maritime strategy, the swing strategy,
306Webb, previously cited.
307Reagan, previously cited, p. 18.
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during the Carter Administration. The swing strategy relied on shifting elements of the
Third Fleet from the Pacific to the Atlantic theater, in the event of war, to ensure
sufficient force would be available to reasonably guarantee Re&Re of Europe. 308 This
strategy followed previous ideas of transferring naval forces from one ocean to another
in time of need, i.e., transferal of Atlantic Fleet ships to the Pacific before World War
II. However, the swing strategy seemed more of a political gesture to signify
commitment to NATO than a realistic war-fighting strategy. 309
The swing strategy carried important implications for the nations of Asia, notably
Japan. Admirals Zumwalt and Bagley remarked in 1978 that "U.S. policies in the
Pacific are placing sole security alliance on American sea power that is already over
committed...and if the swing strategy is implemented...then the security of Japan may
be the most vulnerable at the time of greatest hazard." 310 To make matters worse, the
Islamic revolution in Iran threatened vital sea lanes in the Persian Gulf, and the United
States Navy was required to provide continuous battle group presence in the Indian
Ocean. This unexpected development in Southwest Asia furthered the need for warship
procurement above and beyond Northeast Asia and Atlantic requirements. Japan became
more vulnerable than before the swing strategy, in a global war scenario, since the
United States now had to devide its limited naval resources among three potential
308
Betts, previously cited, p. 10.
309James C. George, ed. The Soviet and Other Communist Navies (Annapolis, Md.:
Naval Institute Press, 1986), pp. 283, 284.
3,0ADMS. Elmo Zumwalt and Worth H. Bagley, "Strategic Determination in the
Pacific: The Dilemma for the US and Japan," Pacific Affairs . January 1978, Vol. 9,
No. 2, pp. 122, 127.
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fronts (Atlantic, Indian Ocean, and with whatever forces remained, Pacific). 3" It seems
to be no coincidence that at the same time that U.S. naval forces declined, Japan began
to develop a Comprehensive National Security policy that funded warship construction
which today makes Japan's Maritime Self-Defense Force the most modern Asian navy.
A key element in the rearmament of the United States during the Reagan
Administration was to build a 600 ship navy. To correct the deficiencies of the swing
strategy, these ships were to provide enough naval force structure to ensure Re&Re of
Europe in a global war without diminishing Asian security by default. However, 600
ships would not be enough to conduct naval operations in simultaneous theaters
(Atlantic, N.E. Asia, and Indian Ocean) with sufficient force required for a favorable
order of battle. In short, there were not enough carrier battle groups (15) for all three
fronts at once, and still have a prudent reserve in American waters. The United States
inability to fight three fronts at once is a condition of strategic significance in post-
war national security policy.
In a worst case scenario, global war, a three-front naval requirement is not at all
improbable given the close proximity of Soviet armed forces to the areas in question.
Soviet participation would not be required for a simultaneous two front requirement,
i.e., Persian Gulf and Korean peninsula. While the United States has insufficient naval
force structure to conduct offensives simultaneously in three theaters, it may be able
to conduct offensive and defensive operations in all three theaters if allied assets,
especially Japanese, are committed to the order of battle. A failure of perestroika and
31l
Tsurutani, previously cited, p. 92, points out, "the US 7th Fleet has to patrol
the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf, it cannot be expected to provide much assistance
to Japan unless some of its carriers happen to be in close proximity."
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emergence of a hard-line regime in Moscow may require a three front capability by the
United States to maintain a flexible response deterrence.
The Reagan administration introduced its Maritime Strategy to counter the
deficiency of naval forces required to maintain a favorable balance in a global war
scenario. The Maritime Strategy consists of three phases. The first phase, deterrence
or the transition to war phase, seeks to control escalation by showing the Soviets the
United States will cede no area by default. Aggressive forward movement of anti-
submarine (ASW) forces, both submarine and maritime patrol aircraft, would force
Soviet submarines to retreat to defensive bastions to protect their ballistic missile
submarines. This forward surge of U.S. naval forces, sea-based air power and
submarines, intends to tie down Soviet forces, limiting the transferal of force to Central
Europe. The second phase, seizing the initiative, tasks U.S. naval forces to destroy
Soviet forces in forward areas, i.e., Atlantic, Indian Ocean, and Pacific, and neutralize
Soviet clients if required. As U.S. battle groups move forward, ASW forces would
wage an aggressive campaign against all Soviet submarines, including ballistic missile
submarines. With the destruction of the Soviet Fleet in phase two, U.S. forces would
commence phase three, carrying the fight to the enemy. Here, Soviet bases are
threatened and the continued assault on Soviet ballistic missile submarines changes the
nuclear balance to favor the United States. War is then terminated on terms acceptable
to the United States by threatening direct attack on the Soviet homeland or changing
the nuclear correlation of forces. 312
3,2Admiral James D. Watkins, "The Maritime Strategy," in the Maritime Strategy,
Supplement to U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings , January 1986, pp. 8-14.
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The Maritime Strategy influenced United States-Japanese security relations.
During the formulation of the Maritime Strategy, Japan's security relations with the
United States reached unprecedented levels of cooperation. A 1978 guideline for United
States-Japanese defense cooperation was promulgated, strengthening planning,
intelligence, logistic, and training ties between the nation. 313 However, the guideline
continued to restate Japan's role as being only to repel limited, small-scale aggression
as spelled out in the NDPO. Since 1981, the United States has maintained that, as a
part of the division of defense responsibilities in United States-Japanese security
arrangements, the United States provides for the protection of Japanese SLOCs in the
Southwest Pacific and Indian Oceans, and Japan protects the territory, air and SLOC
around its island territories, which include the Bonin and Okinawa island chains,
extending nearly to Guam and Taiwan, respectively. 314 This 1,000 mile sea lane mission
and Japanese statements to mine the Tsushima, Tsugaru, and Soya straits, bottling up
the Soviet Pacific Fleet, if warranted, enhanced the credibility of the Maritime Strategy.
But while Japan agreed to assume an extended sea lane mission, and did in fact share
intelligence with the United States concerning Soviet naval movements, the JMSDF
continues to remain "pierside navy" in comparison to the U.S. 7th Fleet tempo of
313Japan Defense Agency, previously cited, pp. 261-265.
3l4
Auer, previously cited, p. 181.
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operations. 315 Also, the U.S. 7th Fleet and JMSDF have yet to go beyond the training
stage, i.e., conduct "real world" operations together at sea. 316
The Maritime Strategy has raised a great debate, centered on specific issues such
as feasibility, parochialism, and cost. 3 ' 7 In general terms, the Maritime Strategy reflects
the traditional Mahanian function of naval forces, i.e., the destruction of the enemy
fleet through a decisive battle or series of battles at sea. Consequently, naval force
structure procurement in the 1980s favored power projection instruments, i.e., nuclear
submarines and aircraft carriers, over traditional elements of sea control, i.e., surface
combatants. Another traditional naval school of thought, based on Corbett, believed the
object of naval warfare must always be directly or indirectly either to secure command
of the sea or to prevent the enemy from securing it. This command of the sea meant
nothing but the control of maritime communications, whether for commercial or
military purposes.^ According to Corbett, the function of the fleet was to guard one's
own communications and seize those of the enemy. Thus, a balanced fleet was
necessary that included an appropriate mix of elements for the decisive battle (power
3,5Japan Defense Agency, previously cited, p. 145, states in 1987 the JDA
requested budget allocations for an annual increase of 1 ,400 to 1 ,600 hours of steaming
time, which equates from 58 days per year to 66 days per year for each flotilla. This
is less than one-third operational tempo of the Seventh Fleet.
3,6Cooperation ashore contrasts to the two nation's naval forces at sea. The author
served almost four years on board combatants based in Japan and joint "real world"
operations were nonexistent.
3,7See John J. Mearsheimer, "A Strategic Misstep," and Linton F. Brooks, "Naval
Power and National Security," in International Security , Vol. II, No. 2, Fall 1986, for
a critique and rebuttal of the Maritime Strategy.
3,R
Julian S. Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy (Annapolis, Md.: Naval
Institute Press, 1988), pp. 91, 94.
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projection) and escort (communication control). The Maritime Strategy of the 1980s
may be required, due to domestic budget considerations and lowering of the Soviet
threat, to shift toward a balanced fleet that Corbett would have favored. 319
In an Asian context, the current Maritime Strategy seems to follow in the
footsteps of the swing strategy by continuing to consider the Pacific as only an
afterthought to the Atlantic theater. 320 For example, a war in Central Europe, in
accordance with the Maritime Strategy, will bring a response of horizontal escalation,
including strikes against the Soviet Far East, near the Japanese periphery. Would
NATO be willing to execute horizontal escalation on the Soviet Western flank if only
Japan came under attack by the Soviets? Consequently, many Japanese feel the
Maritime Strategy in the Pacific is a NATO contingency plan, and their security is a
mere pawn to horizontal escalation. Some Japanese seek a defense buildup to lessen
the option of horizontal escalation by the United States near Japan. 321 Japanese
objections to bringing the war to the Pacific, if there is war in Europe, seems valid
considering the economic value of the Pacific vis-a-vis the Atlantic. 322
3I9
see John J. Weltman, "The Short, Unhappy Life of the Maritime Strategy," The
National Interest , Spring 1989, for a proposal of a naval force structure suited for
maritime communication defense rather than excessive power projection capabilities.
320
It is interesting to note that the Maritime Strategy seems to hold the same
principles, i.e. three phases of warfare, in both the Atlantic and Pacific, yet US naval
strategy and tactics in the Atlantic and Pacific during World War II were dramatically
different, based on different theater requirements, assets, and threats.
32,Sato Seizaburo, "The Case For a Strong Defense," Japan Echo , Vol. XIII, No.
1, 1986, pp. 69-70. Mr. Sato says if Japan is weak it will have to follow a US
decision (horizontal escalation), but if Japan is military capable, the US would need
help of the JSDF to operate effectively in and around Japan, i.e., with Tokyo's assent.
322Christian Science Monitor , 6 November 1989, p. 10, reports that in 1987 total
Asian GNP was worth $7,688 billion in contrast to EEC GNP of $4,259 billion.
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Also, the idea of attacking Soviet ballistic missile submarines in Asia, i.e., in the
Sea of Japan and Sea of Okhotsk, may lead to vertical escalation, including tactical
nuclear warfare or even a strategic exchange, very close to Japan. The United States
could separate Japan from the Western cause if it attacks Soviet ballistic missiles
submarines near Japan, during a European front war scenario, and the Soviets
responded with tactical nuclear ASW weapons. 323 Some Japanese do not concur with
the United States assessment that it may not happen, just because there is no written
doctrine by the Soviets saying that they will not utilize tactical nuclear weapons in
defense of their ballistic missile submarines. 324 In an Asian military context, the debate
over ascertaining what the Soviets will or will not do based on published strategy
contradicts traditional military maxims. Sun Tzu's primary thesis is that war is based
on deception. To base one's strategy on the enemies overt statements is to submit
oneself to deception. According to Sun Tzu, strategy is a secret and disseminated to
an opponent only for deception.
The U.S. forward deployed strategy in Asia is primarily based on maritime assets.
A maritime strategy will become increasingly important if overseas basing rights, i.e.,
the Philippines, become difficult to maintain in the 1990s. It will become even more
important if U.S. ground forces are withdrawn from Korea and Europe in large
numbers. If the U.S.S.R. does indeed join the community of nations, and cuts military
force structure to the level where it is no longer considered threatening, then the Cold
323
see Francis Fukuyama, "Asia in a Global War," Comparative Strategy , Vol. 6,
No. 4, 1987, for the negative effects of horizontal escalation near Japan.
324Brooks, previously cited, p. 79, stresses that to assume the Soviets will use
tactical nuclear weapons in defense of SSBNs is a "misreading of stated policy."
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War may be over. However, the requirement to keep an "open door" to commerce,
resource access, and protect national interests will still require the maintenance of a
maritime strategy in Asia, if not the "Maritime Strategy."
The continued budget crisis has made the 600 ship navy goal unattainable during
the Bush administration. As stated in Chapter One, U.S. naval force structure has been
cut in FY 89 and 90 during periods of economic growth. Secretary of Defense
Cheney's proposals for $180 billion in defense cuts, if required, during the early 1990s
may decrease U.S. Navy force structure to approximately 500 ships, a number similar
to the late 1970s and the era of the swing strategy. Furthermore, recession could
prolong the delay of warship procurement that was not as favored as power projection
elements during the years of the Maritime Strategy, i.e., surface combatants. If the
Persian Gulf was an indication of future low to middle-intensity conflicts, then surface
combatants will be in increasing demand to protect maritime communications. To meet
the challenge of maintaining a flexible security strategy which can account for either
Soviet success in real "sufficient defense," or Soviet regression into a hard-line
offensive threat in the 1990s, the United States should restructure the security treaty
with Japan to meet the requirements of three naval theaters.
B. A REVISED U.S.-JAPANESE SECURITY STRATEGY
A United States-Japanese alliance should replace the strategy of Containment in
Asia that places primary security responsibility on the anned forces of the United
States. In formulating such an agreement, the United States should consult and promote
the participation of our Asian allies, Japan, Korea, Australia, Singapore, the Philippines,
and others if required, in developing a common understanding (the security status quo
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is increasingly unacceptable) of beneficial objectives (continued stability and prosperity)
for all concerned nations. 325 This would diminish anxiety over an increased Japanese
security role in the region and signify the U.S. has continued security interests with the
nations stated. The purpose of a United States-Japanese security strategy would be to
share the burden and decision making of protecting convergent United States-Japanese
interests. The basic idea of this strategy is for Japan to assume a primary area of
security responsibility (PASR) in the Northeast Asia from aggression. 326 Japan's PASR
would range from the Kuriles to the Bashi channel. Japan's favorable maritime balance
vis-a-vis the Soviets in the 1990s supports this strategy. How Japan decides to
implement the strategy is up to the Japanese, but in doing so they can depend on
partial U.S. assistance should aggression occur. 327 By consulting with Japan on the
integration of United States-Japanese PASR strategies, a joint analysis would detennine
the character of naval forces required for the plausible threat of war, the strategic
capabilities and positions which would present a credible peacetime deterrent, and the
actions each nation should take with its own sea power so that effective, coordinated
32501sen, previously cited, "The Maritime Strategy in the Western Pacific," p. 48,
comments that, "the US can only hope to explain its strategic purposes in the Western
Pacific and Asia if it first builds a more comprehensive set of common perceptions of
shared interests."
326Sato Seizaburo, previously cited, p. 43, recommends, "Japan can make a valuable
contribution to the Western Alliance by bolstering its surveillance system, air power,
ASW capability, taking responsibility for all air space and sea lanes from the Kuriles
to Guam and the Philippines to the South."
327Edward A. Olsen, "Determinants of Strategic Burden Sharing in East Asia,"
Naval War College Review , May-June 1986, comments on pp. 12, 13, that a "transfer
of the onus of responsibility to Japan for devising a new and improved framework for
a revised Mutual Security Treaty" negates accusations that "manipulators try to ply
Japan into a strategic blueprint designed by the Pentagon."
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naval deployments are proportionately and reliably shared. 328 For example, agreement
on a U.S. role to support Japan's northern flank, by deploying U.S. naval forces near
the Aleutians, lessens the need for Japan to overexpand defense forces.
Preferably, a Japanese-Korean agreement on security around the Korean peninsula
could be reached. Japan has already declared military exercises with the R.O.K. as
legal.
329 South Korea's decision to allow the R.O.K. Navy to participate during next
year's RJJV1PAC exercise allows for the first ever joint Japanese-R.O.K. naval training
exercise. If U.S. Army troops are reduced or withdrawn from the peninsula, as a
measure of continued commitment, U.S. Marines in Okinawa could continue, on an
annual or bi-annual basis, to participate in the Re/Re exercise, Team Spirit, in Korea.
Japan can play a legitimate, constructive role in supporting Korean defense, discussed
later. This reverses the current status of the United States-Japanese Security Treaty, in
which the United States has primary responsibility for defending Japan and no
guarantee of Japanese support in a Korean War scenario.
In return for Japan's responsibility for taking the lead in promoting peace and
stability in Northeast Asia, in this revised strategy the United States would continue to
assume PASR of the vital sea lanes from the strait of Hormuz to Taiwan. Japan would
still depend on the U.S. nuclear umbrella, but to deter conventional aggression the
Japanese should defend themselves with only partial United States assistance, i.e., an
Aleutian Task Force to support Japan's northern flank. U.S. forces in Japan, mainly F-
16 fighter aircraft, could be withdrawn in the 1990s as Japan deploys the FSX fighter.
328ADMS. Zumwalt and Bagley, previously cited, p. 126.
329Simon, previously cited, p. 46.
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American naval forces in Japan would be tasked with only the primary mission of
defending the sea lanes from Hormuz to Taiwan. The only U.S. naval forces that
should be primarily concerned with the defense of Japan should come from a joint
U.S. -Japanese naval task force, discussed later. Consequently, a new security treaty with
Japan should spell out that Japan is responsible for full, rather that limited ,
conventional defense. This increases the credibility of maintaining the preferred
international order by defeating the enemy in whatever theater if global war breaks out.
The United States can concentrate on theaters that are vital to the free world with
sufficient force to prevail, i.e., the Persian Gulf.
This proposed strategy would allow for either an end of the Cold War between
the U.S.-U.S.S.R., the emergence of a hard-line regime in Moscow, and a Japan
gaining in stature in the world military sphere. United States interests in Northeast Asia
would not be unilaterally impaired since U.S. naval forces, officially tasked for Indian
Ocean and South China Sea duties, could be shifted in accordance with need. U.S.
marines in Okinawa would indicate a commitment to Korea. Japan's MSDF would
increase its operational tempo and deploy in Northeast Asia. Thus, United States
presence could be scaled down, but can be reinforced if necessary. If perestroika
succeeds, the United States can decrease deployments, and further depend on Japan
to carry out its own strategy in the Northeast Pacific near the Soviet periphery. This
might coincide with the implementation of CFE reductions. The U.S. Navy can
continue to provide the traditional presence role that is useful to shipping in the vital
sea lanes of the Indian Ocean. If perestroika fails, and a credible contingency is
required in a global war scenario, the United States would then have a more favorable
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correlation of forces in the Pacific if it were to deploy two carrier battle groups and
one battleship battle group to the Indian Ocean, ensuring that the straits of Hormuz
remain open, and an equal force disposition near the Aleutians, in a position to assist
in the defense of Japan's northern flank, yet in a prudent reserve position. All other
elements of the U.S. Pacific fleet would be in American waters awaiting deployment
orders based on the requirements of the moment. Japan seems likely to hold its own
against a Soviet conventional attack in the 1990s. To say otherwise, is to cast doubt
on the United States combat ability in the Western Pacific, since the U.S. has fewer
fighter aircraft and surface combatants than the Japanese. By unifying Japanese assets
and strategy with a revised U.S. Pacific Maritime Strategy, the United States and Japan
together can meet the requirement of three naval theaters. This would deter war and
increase the credibility of maintaining the preferred international system if deterrence
fails. Moreover, if perestroika fails, the United States can exercise this strategy without
Japanese acceptance, i.e., force the Japanese to defend themselves by declaring
beforehand an intention to do less in the region during a global crisis.
Most importantly, the United States can ascertain what the ultimate security
objectives of Japan are. A PASR would propel Japan on the world arena as a great
power, not just an economic superstate. It would further subject Japanese values to
regional scrutiny. Japanese-Soviet relations may actually benefit in the long-term. 330 As
a matter of course, the U.S. should support Japan in becoming a permanent member
330
Sato, previously cited, p. 43, mentions that if Japan assumed a regional security
role, "though it might strain Japanese-Soviet ties for a while, over the long-run it
should bring stability to the bilateral relationship."
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of the United Nations security council as it assumes political and military power
commensurate with its economic standing.
To induce Japan to assume bilateral defense roles with the United States in the
region, thus reducing Asian fears of a militant Japan, the United States would have to
revise, what the Japanese officially call the current Security Guarantee Treaty, Anzen
Hosho Joyaku , altering it to become a Mutual Defense Treaty, Sogo Boei Joyaku . The
current treaty can be revised after a notification of one year, allowing sufficient time
to consult allies and prepare details. During the interregnum, the U.S. should stress to
Japan that the treaty revision is acceptance of Japan's power and should not be
perceived as further "Japan bashing" in response to U.S.-Japanese economic tension.
Japan would prefer this than no treaty at all with the United States. Soviet nuclear
weaponry in the region is beyond the capabilities of a unilateral Japanese defense in
the early 1990s. Procrastination on changing the security status quo may force Japan
to choose an independent security option since Japan has replaced the United States,
in economic terms, as the principal power in Asia. 331 Thus, the United States does have
a superior position, based on the nuclear umbrella, to influence the Japanese to accept
collective security with the United States for defense of the region, including the
Korean peninsula. The United States has the power, by threatening to do less, to
influence both Japan and Korea to accept an agreement for the common good. Both
U.S. and Japanese military planners are operating on the assumption that the two
"'Daniel Sneider, "How Japan Became the Dominate Player in Asia," Christian
Science Monitor , 13 November 1989, pp. 10, 11. reports that Japan now has more
total trade with Asia than with the US, and that 65% of all funds in Asia, government
aid and private investment, is from Japan. Based on economic interest, Japan has more
investment, trade, and aid to Asia than to the US.
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countries would begin cooperating right from the outbreak of hostilities. A revised
security arrangement would merely bring official defense policy in line with reality. 332
Japan's Constitution may have to be revised, but it is far better to let Japan reform
Article Nine in a period of peace than to have it rewritten in a time of crisis. With a
new security agreement, Japan could join the United States in the following joint
defense roles:
• UNITED STATES-JAPANESE JOINT TASK FORCE Combine three U.S.N.
and three JMSDF combatants, under a single joint command which would rotate
between senior U.S. and Japanese Officers. Their tasking would be to patrol the
waters of Japan, conduct ASW operations, and joint training. They would be a
ready force for "real world" operations. Monitoring die Soviet Fleet if they
approach the straits should be their primary mission. Language barriers exist, but
not as bad as Standing Force Atlantic (NATO). After a few years, South Korea
probably could join this little group operating in the Sea of Japan. This would
solidify operational responsibility for sea lane defense with our Asian friends. It
would free the 7th Fleet for PASR tasking in the Indian Ocean or South China
Sea, without increasing "states-side" deployments. Savings would be substantial.
Patrol in the Sea of Japan, during the past Olympics, and search for KAL 007,
would have been a perfect examples of U.S.-Japanese Joint Task Force, BEI-
NICHI TOGO SAKUSEN NINMU BUTAI , assignment.
• ARG ESCORT . Integrate U.S.N. Amphibious Ready Groups (ARG) with JMSDF
Flotillas for transits between Okinawa and Korea. ARGs are deficient now in
escort protection and will be more so in the 1990s. A U.S. carrier battle group
may not be near Northeast Asia, a "come-as-you-are" scenario for ARGs. This
lessens the credibility of our Korean defense posture. The JMSDF could pick up
an ARG in Okinawa, provide protection along the way, and "hand off to the
R.O.K.N, in the Tsushima straits. Return would be the reverse, R.O.K.N. "handing
off to the JMSDF. The transit would never leave waters adjacent to Japan.
Therefore, Japan could openly declare those waters an "area of non-aggression"
and the JMSDF role is to simply prevent aggression in Japan's territorial and
adjacent waters, a truly defense role. The idea of safe transit in waters adjacent
to Japan may not even require Constitutional revision, since JMSDF forces are
merely escorting vessels in a declared peace zone. Even the announcement of
such a plan would help deter an attack on U.S.N, amphibious ships resupplying
and reinforcing the R.O.K. in time of conflict. This would assist in defense of
2Okazaki, previously cited, p. 46.
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the Korean Peninsula, show Japan's contribution, and build trust between Japan
and Korea.
• JOINT BATTLE GROUP PRESENCE. To signify commitment and solidify
the alliance, occasionally, JMSDF Flotillas could join a scaled down U.S. Navy
carrier or battleship battle group en route to Indian Ocean duty. Or, a future
Japanese carrier could be escorted to the Indian Ocean by U.S. Navy combatants
deployed from the United States without a U.S. carrier. Savings would be
substantial, and such a strategy would be preferable to a completely reduced U.S.
presence in the Indian Ocean. Japan would realize the U.S. accepts it as a full
partner in Western security since the Japanese would be assuming a great power
role in securing world energy supplies.
The role Japan decides to perform in Northeast Asian security can be substantial
if influenced to do so by the United States. Numerous influential Japanese support such
an expanded role in Northeast Asian security. 333 It is a test of the U. S. goals of Asian
stability and peace in general and post-war Japanese "democracy and demilitarization"
in particular. Regrettably, U.S. policy on Japan's role in regional defense has gone
from a "free rider" to "don't spend any more," without much innovation in utilizing
Japanese assets. Many Japanese feel what the United States wants from Japan is not
rearmament or even a real military alliance, but "defense cooperation," meaning
Japanese purchases of U.S. weapons without Japanese input in strategy and policy. 334
Now that the United States is facing dramatic defense cuts, it cannot leave the
impression of a withdrawal without serious contemplation of what security arrangements
333Okazaki, Miyoshi, Sato, Tsurutani, etc. cited as references, support a Japanese
defense role becoming of a nation state.
334Chalmers Johnson, Speaking of Japan, previously cited, p. 25.
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are left behind. Otherwise, the upshot may be for Japan to introduce a 1990s version
of the Sumada plan if United States-Japanese political tensions continue to increase. 335
C. THE RISKS OF CHANGING STRATEGIES
All strategies carry inherent risks. This thesis has highlighted the risks of
continuing the security status quo with Japan. A revised security arrangement, as
submitted for consideration in this thesis, also has risks. However, the following risks
listed will, in the opinion of the author, only increase as Japan gamers economic,
political, and military wherewithal in the 1990s.
First, Japan may not reach an agreement with the United States on a collective
security treaty. In such a case, Japanese nationalism may go to an extreme and Japan
may decline a bilateral agreement in favor of an independent security strategy.
Increased trade friction between the U.S. and Japan may make it difficult for Japan
to reach a consensus on a revised treaty. Without any treaty, U.S. forces forward
deployed in Japan would be forced to withdraw, increasing risk for U.S. national
interests in the region without a Japanese guarantee to accept a formal security
responsibility.
Second, Japan may not be satisfied with the PASR described herein. In particular,
defense of Korea may be rejected by the Japanese, even though an agreement on the
larger area (PASR) is reached. Likewise, Japan may be willing to accept a formal
security role south of the archipelago, but may decline any role in the Sea of Japan
335
Hata, previously cited, p. 20, mentions that Defense Agency Director Sumada
proposed a policy in 1955 that was to have the Defense Ministry revert to a Ministry
of Defense, establishment of local militia, develop nuclear weapons, and state
ownership of defense industries.
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and/or Sea of Okhostk, especially if an agreement is reached with the Soviets on the
Kuriles.
Third, once agreed upon, Japan may not follow the terms of the treaty, i.e.,
pursue an independent option. Considering that Japan reluctantly supported the British
during conflict in the years of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty, and independently pursued
a strategy of self-strengthening, this may be the highest risk.
Fourth, Soviets, Chinese, and Koreans may feel threatened by Japan's new
security role. This may harm U.S. interests if the above nations blame the U.S. for
Japan's new role. This short-term risk may be minimal if the alliance proceeds to build
trust in the region in the long-term. Apprehension in countries of Northeast Asia can
be lowered if the United States conducts full consultations and seeks advice from the
nations concerned before treaty negotiations commence.
Finally, a reduction of U.S. forward deployed forces may revive an isolationist
tradition, placing United States interests at peril. Such was the outcome of the first
grand strategy in Asia, the "Open Door." In this context, Congress may press for
further reductions of any U.S. role after an agreement has been reached. However,
American pre-war isolationist tradition can be an asset during negotiations. For
example, the U.S. should stress that failure to reach a formal PASR agreement with
the Japanese may result in a return to pre-war U.S. strategy of non-involvement in
foreign affairs, with a dramatic decline in capability to defend interests to the preferred
international order that Japan depends on. The common denominator for risk appears
to be ultra-nationalist tendencies in Japan.
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VI. CONCLUSION
During a period of dramatic East-West change, the key relationship in Asia
between the United States and Japan appears to be heading into uncertain waters.
While the security relationship has set the framework for stability, prosperity, and
progress, many on both sides of the Pacific are beginning to question the
appropriateness of a security treaty that was framed during a different era. Despite
increasing economic frictions between the nations, the United States and Japan hold
very similar interests in areas of vital importance.
Differing values between the United States and Japan may exacerbate the special
relationship if misunderstanding between the two societies in not cleared. Nationalism
in Japan may be a force for stability in the region, or instability if it is extreme.
Japan's efforts to assume a political, and perhaps military, role commensurate with its
economic standing will first have to rectify the contradiction between residual ancient
social values and individual rights of those outside the group. The United States can
assist Japan in assuming a political role equal to its economic status by readjusting the
bilateral security relationship.
If the procurement trends of the 1980s continue, Japan's maritime forces will
attain a clear conventional superiority over the Soviet Union's maritime forces in the
1990s. This may have a dramatic affect in the Northeast Asian region. It will provide
Japan with heretofore non-existent security options as an instrument of national power
to promote the national interest. The Japanese people may be confronted with a test
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of their democracy, depending on the manner Japan eventually decides to deploy the
military, i.e., in a collective security context or an independent strategy.
The United States should insist on a revised security treaty with Japan and
propose that Japanese naval forces assume primary responsibility of stability and peace
in Northeast Asia while the United States continues primary responsibility of stability
and peace in the vital sea lanes of communication in the Indian Ocean and South
China Sea. This strategy has risks, but a failure to readjust the security arrangement
while Japan continues to accumulate military capability, yet declines to commit to a
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